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ABSTRACT 
The thesis begins by making two distinctions which are 
central to its methodology. The first is that between valid 
and invalid criticism, the second between philosophy of 
language and meaning theory. These distinctions combine to 
produce the methodology which informs the thesis, namely 
that a theory of meaning can be validly criticised in terms 
of its account, implicit or explicit, of first language 
acquisition and, conversely, an account of first language 
acquisition can be validly criticised in terms of its 
theory, implicit or explicit, of meaning. The thesis 
continues by testing the appropriateness of the methodology 
against the classical empiricist and rationalist accounts of 
meaning expressed in terms of Ideas, arguing that the 
majority of criticisms of these accounts misfire as they do 
not operate within the framework of the positions they 
purport to criticise. Such invalid criticism is replaced 
with that argued for here, the conclusion being that the 
classical accounts of meaning are to be rejected on the 
grounds that they make use of a phenomenon, language, whose 
acquisition they cannot, within the terms of their own 
position, explain. Modern, post-Fregean, empiricist and 
rationalist positions, those of Quine and Chomsky 
respectively, are then subjected to similar treatment. Both 
of these positions have explicit accounts of first language 
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acquisition and so the conclusion to this section of the 
thesis reverses that reached when discussing the classical 
positions, in that the explanations of first language 
acquisition given by modern empiricists and rationalists are 
based on meaning theories which, for a variety of reasons, 
do not justify their explanations of the phenomenon of first 
language acquisition. 
In an attempt to move towards a more positive position two 
alternative accounts of meaning theory, the formal and the 
descriptive, are then examined. The formal account, 
Davidson's, is defended against those critics who produce 
attacks centering upon its meaning theory as being, in the 
sense described above, invalid. However, as it is then 
shown not to be able to account for first language 
acquisition, it is eventually rejected. The descriptivist 
account is identified by tracing the development of 
Wittgenstein's philosophy to support a particular 
interpretation of his later account of meaning as being a 
descriptive one and a defence is offered to a number of 
criticisms of that position. A poorly worked out 
experiential account of first language acquisition is then 
identified, and this is developed further by introducing the 
area of non-linguistics, where meaning can be given without 
words. The thesis concludes by suggesting that this area's 
account of first language acquisition, although having a 
number of difficulties with its implied meaning theory, can 
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be combined with the later work of Wittgenstein to produce 
what is at least a descriptively adequate account of both 
meaning and first language acquisition. Moreover, it points 
to an area of enquiry where philosophical techniques can be 
utilised to great effect so as to add new dimensions to work 
in the fields of both philosophy and linguistics. 
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SECTION I - INTRODUCTION 
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By far the majority of work published in the field of first 
language acquisition is non-philosophical or, at best, 
indicates that there may be minor philosophical problems in 
the area which are of such little significance that they can 
safely be ignored. Thus a recent collection of papers on 
language acquisition has not one contribution by a 
philosopher, an omission made especially clear in the 
preface: 
During the last ten years the human infant 
has become a major focus for scientific 
investigation. Psychologists, linguists, 
psycholinguists, speech pathologists and 
educators have been expanding the boundaries 
of their respective disciplines to include 
the study of the basic processes and 
structures of the human infant 
(Schiefelbusch and Bricker 1981, p.ix), 
whilst another collection opens with the identification of 
the epistemological dimension of language acquisition and 
then quickly moves away from examining this dimension in any 
detail (Levelt et al. 1978, pp.5-6). 
Perhaps one reason for this strange omission is that the 
shift in emphasis in modern philosophy from mere linguistic 
analysis to descriptive metaphysics has not been taken 
sufficient note of in areas such as those listed by 
Schiefelbusch and Bricker. Indeed, Firth's definition of 
descriptive linguistics as "an autonomous group of related 
disciplines - such as phonetics, phonology, grammar, 
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lexicography, semantics and ... the sociology of language" 
(Firth 1950, p.37) is not too far from Strawson's conception 
of descriptive metaphysics as describing the actual 
structure of our thoughts about our world (Strawson 1959, 
p.9). The parallel can, of course, be taken further in that 
Strawson's rejection of revisionary metaphysics (a 
metaphysics which attempts to produce a better structure 
with which to explain our thoughts about our world) finds an 
echo in Firth's rejection of what might be called 
revisionary linguistics, although in the latter's case this 
is couched in terms of avoiding the reification of 
systematics (ib. p.42). 
Another, and probably more important, reason for 
philosophy's absence from this area of inquiry is the fact 
that the problems of first language acquisition have, in the 
main, been seen in terms of "why and ... how" (Stork and 
Widdowson 1974, p.144), which assumes that philosophical 
problems concerning the nature of what it is that is 
acquired are of little or no relevance. The literature 
shows a clear and consistent bias towards the problem of 
acquisition itself, rather than to what this thesis will 
argue are logically prior problems, problems which cluster 
around assumptions about what it is that is acquired. This 
bias involves the important assumption that language is 
synonymous with the spoken word, which results in 
non-verbalized "language" being made unavailable, either as 
simple data or, more importantly, as a possible resolution 
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to problems concerning both the what and the how of first 
language acquisition. This is more than a matter of mere 
definition as to whether or not "language" should be 
narrowly defined as being only verbal communication or as 
something more. Young, for example, produces a very wide 
definition of language as being "any species-specific system 
of intentional communication" (Young 1978, p.177). Then, 
however, he proceeds to talk of the problems of language 
acquisition only in the much more narrow terms of "encoding 
and decoding" the spoken sound (ib.), although he does 
qualify this in places (for example, pp.184-185), even 
though his original definition would allow for much more 
than just the spoken word. 
Another assumption which stems directly from this bias is 
the view that only linguistics, in particular that of 
Chomsky and his followers, can best deal with the field of 
first language acquisition. Thus, although Falk, for 
example, does see the central problem of this field as being 
the "what" of language, he rejects as directly relevant the 
first ten months of a child's communicating life as playing 
any "significant role in the acquisition of language" (Falk 
1973, p.319), because his implicit definition of language is 
in terms of the spoken word, a definition which to a certain 
extent is forced upon him by his acceptance of Chomsky's 
transformational grammar. A similar move is made by Derwing 
and Baker who shift from using the wider definition of 
language, when they talk of children communicating by means 
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of "any device, linguistic or otherwise" (Derwing and Baker 
1977, p.86), to the narrower definition, when they talk of 
the problems of identifying linguistic stages as being "the 
primary goal of language acquisition research" (ib. p.94), 
seen in terms of the structure of words (ib.). 
This thesis, then, will take as its central problem the 
nature of what is acquired in first language acquisition; 
which is to say that meaning theory has much of importance 
to contribute to the field of first language acquisition. 
The relationship between these seemingly discrete areas of 
enquiry will be shown as being in the form of a two-way 
interaction, in that the fact that language is acquired is a 
piece of empirical evidence that philosophical theories 
about the nature of meaning have to accommodate, and a 
failure to do so adequately must throw grave doubts on their 
validity. Conversely, theorists in this field who believe 
that their accounts of the "why and how" of first language 
acquisition are in some sense free of philosophical 
difficulties will be shown that their work is, in effect, 
the detailed workings out of the consequences of a 
particular, often implicit, theory of meaning. If that 
theory of meaning is unsound then it is likely that there 
will be important difficulties with these consequences. 
With Platts, "the essential theoretical prelude to the First 
Word" is an explicit theory of meaning (Platts 1979, p.5) 
and such a theory, incorporating as it does "a view of the 
relation between language and reality" (ib. p.6), is 
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therefore of direct relevance to an area of enquiry that 
has, in the main, seen philosophy as being at best of only 
peripheral interest. 
The first three sections of the thesis consist of a critical 
examination of what might be called "standard" theories of 
meaning and their accompanying theories of first language 
acquisition. The fourth section identifies various 
psycho-linguistic theories and criticises them by 
concentrating on their implicit theories of meaning, thus 
revealing the interconnectioon between these areas of 
enquiry. The fifth section identifies two alternative 
theories of meaning and attempts to show how the fact that 
one of them allows for non-verbal communication to have 
meaning, to be a part of language, opens up an area that the 
assumptions of much work in the field of first language 
acquistion has forced theorists to ignore. In doing so 
philosophy's concerns are shown to include the 
non-linguistic area, where there is meaning without words. 
Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition - p.7 - 
SECTION II - THE CHAINS OF EMPIRICISM AND RATIONALISM 
He listened as a young infant listens, 
undiscriminating. Those born with eyes and 
ears must learn to see and hear ... to select 
meaning from a welter of noise. 
(Le Guin 1966, p.109) 
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2.1 The Nature of An Acceptable Philosophical Criticism 
A recurrent theme in this thesis is that of "valid 
criticism". Indeed, it can be read as a defence supported 
by a series of case studies, of a particular view of what is 
to count as acceptable criticism and is itself constrained 
by that view to make use only of certain kinds of criticism 
when dealing with various arguments. For this reason it 
would seem wise to begin by establishing quite why a 
particular methodology should be accepted as informing the 
thesis' concerns. 
Some philosophers have not seen their methodology as itself 
part of their legitimate area of enquiry. Thus Hospers, for 
example, in attempting to produce "the" definition of 
philosophy lists its various subject areas (epistemology, 
ethics and so on) and concludes: 
once the tangled meaning-questions have been 
adequately analysed, the philosophical 
enterprise ... will consist of a systematic 
and reasoned attempt to examine the ground or 
basis of belief in each of these areas 
(Hospers 1953, p. 54). 
The central problem here is that what counts as an 
"adequate" analysis is intimately bound up with what will 
count as an acceptable "basis of belief". This is not so 
much the problem of reflexivity, or self-referral (cf. 
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Mackenzie 1987, pp.119-120), as the problem of what might be 
termed categorial blindness. The assumption seems to be 
that there exists some sort of analysis which can be made to 
apply to all arguments' bases, which carries within it the 
further assumption that there is only the one categorial 
framework, for how else could such an analysis be made 
relevant? That is, if a particular methodology is seen as 
having as its context a particular "basis of belief", or 
categorial framework, then some argument is required to show 
that the methodology, and especially what it accepts as 
valid argument, will apply across contexts to other 
categorial frameworks. Such an argument is missing in 
Hospers' work, although a sine qua non for many philosophers 
of education, but its form would have to be transcendental, 
spanning, as it must do, particular frameworks. 
In identifying one of his fundamental questions of 
philosophy as being the analysis of 'analysis' (KOrner 1969, 
p.26) KOrner in effect re-opened the debate concerning what 
was to count as philosophy, a debate continued in the 
journal Metaphilosophy whose title is appropriately defined 
as "the investigation of the nature of philosophy" 
(Lazerowitz 1970, p.91). In doing so he came to reject the 
validity of transcendental arguments and, as a necessary 
implication of dismissing such arguments, to accept the 
possibility of alternative categorial frameworks existing 
apart from his own (KOrner 1974). 
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His rejection proceeds by identifying the necessary 
conditions which any transcendental argument must meet in 
order that it might be sound and by showing that all, or 
some, of these conditions no such argument can in fact meet 
(KOrner 1967, p.330). KOrner's arguments can be 
re-interpreted in order that they might identify what is to 
count as acceptable philosophical criticism. That is, 
Korner's arguments directed at establishing that any defence 
of a position can do no more than exhibit that position's 
categories (exhibition-analysis) are capable of being 
re-worked so as to show that any criticism of a position can 
do no more than either exhibit that critic's categories or, 
alternatively, the categories of the position under attack. 
The first type of criticism is that which purports to be 
purely "objective" and refers to some criterion of objective 
truth to mediate between a philosophical dispute (see, for 
example, Wilson 1979, p.24). This is similar, if not 
identical, to Hospers' position and suffers from the same 
categorial blindness, for if the nature of truth is what is 
at issue between the disputants then that cannot be used as 
the criterion for resolving their dispute. Thus when Peters 
identifies certain principles which presuppose rational 
discourse (Peters 1966, p.165) he can be seen as identifying 
the criterion for rational discourse, a viciously circular 
argument (cf. KOrner 1973, p.14). 
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Similarly, if a criticism proceeded by laying out various 
alternative positions and then compared one with another in 
order that the 'best' might be selected then this too would 
be circular. The criterion for selecting between 
alternatives would itself have to be defended and this could 
only take place if some agreement on such a criterion which 
spanned the alternative positions had already been reached. 
However, this is the very point at issue, for what 
identifies positions as alternatives is precisely such a 
lack of agreement (and this is to leave aside Korner's 
criticism that one could never be sure that all alternatives 
had in fact been identified). 
The literature on indoctrination, for example, shows the 
circular nature of the argument to perfection. It is not 
that the various disputants evince different categorial 
frameworks, but rather that they supposedly identify 
alternative, uniquely identifying, criteria, for the concept 
of indoctrination (see Snook et al., 1972). This is done by 
comparing different criteria with the favoured one, which is 
to ignore the prior problem as to how the criterion for 
comparison is to be reached. Indeed, this particular debate 
moves from the first criterion offered to two alternatives 
and then back to the first, which shows the circular nature 
of the problem to perfection. 
The third kind of criticism is one which operates from 
within a position so as to "enter into the thought of a 
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metaphysician as we enter into that of a writer of 
imaginative literature" (Walsh 1963, p.18). At this point 
one is examining the internal consistency of a position by 
reference to that position's own criteria. The results of 
such criticism would appear to be valid, for they operate 
from within the context they criticise. At one level they 
could be seen as mere tinkerings in which the context is, so 
to speak, being fine-tuned (cf. Simons 1975, p.39) and for 
Korner at least, that is all they can do as: 
Failure to distinguish between the merely 
internal incorrigibility of a particular 
categorial framework and its indispensability 
may lead to the sad spectacle of one 
philosopher accusing another of confusing the 
categories, when in fact they do not share 
the same categorial framework ... And this is 
not saying very much, even if it is said in a 
very superior tone of voice 
(KOrner 1969, p.219). 
Ignoring such a distinction, for example, leads Peters to 
criticise many of his critics for "misunderstanding" his 
position (see, for example, Peters 1967) when in fact they 
are working from within an alternative categorial framework 
which takes as problematic the assumptions that he takes as 
axiomatic (cf. Wilson 1967). A similar point is made in 
another context, closer to the concerns of this thesis, when 
Bennett points out that Quine's criticism of Chomsky's work 
fails to come to grips with Chomsky's arguments because "It 
is not clear to me how mentalism can be refuted by an 
argument which has behaviourism as a premiss" (Bennett 1976, 
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p.261). 
However, if contra KOrner, one could identify a phenomenon 
which alternative positions all made use of in their 
different ways then one would have recourse to a fourth kind 
of criticism. This would be as acceptable as the third 
kind, because it would be internal to the position under 
consideration, but would have elements of the first kind of 
criticism's objectivity without its failing of circularity, 
as it would apply across positions. Identifying such a 
common or shared phenomenon would still constitute internal 
criticism, provided it could be shown that the phenomenon 
concerned was a necessary feature of the various positions 
under consideration. 
In this way, even if a particular theory did not deal 
explicitly with the 'common' phenomenon, if it could be 
shown that the phenomenon was an implicit part of that 
theory's concerns then its introduction (if necessary, by a 
careful elaboration of the theory so as to show that the 
phenomenon was indeed a part of the theory's concerns) would 
still allow for internal criicism of the theory. Whether or 
not a particular theory gave an explicit account of the 
'common' phenomenon would not affect the internal status of 
the 'common' phenomenon, because what is at issue is whether 
or not it is possible to give such an account whilst 
remaining consistent to the other aspects of the theory 
under consideration. Of course, when the account is given 
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explicitly then it becomes easier to see whether the theory 
is internally consistent. 
What this thesis offers as just such a phenomenon is that of 
first language acquisition. Given that all philosophical 
positions make use of language (except, perhaps, that of the 
extreme sceptic) - and this is a descriptive point rather 
than a transcendental one - then all, either implicitly or 
explicitly, would need to carry with them some account of 
language's first acquisition. If this account conflicts 
with other important aspects of their philosophy then it 
cannot be corrected by mere tinkerings for, given the 
importance of what is at issue, the conflict is more than 
simply a matter of producing a neatness in the position. If 
it cannot within its own terms account for something central 
to itself, language, then the position is internally, and 
therefore fundamentally, flawed. 
Put somewhat baldly, then, the view that only the fourth 
type of criticism, combined with the third, can apply to 
alternative philosophical positions is both a methodological 
constraint of this thesis and a tool for criticising 
alternative positions; other criticism are, as will be 
shown, either circular or trivial. Moreover, as the 
position which will eventually be defended begins by trying 
to resolve the problem of first language acquisition, rather 
than assuming its resolution, then this is to attempt a 
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methodological consistency throughout the thesis. 
Another, related, methodological preliminary is to point to 
an important distinction, albeit a somewhat blurred one, to 
be made between philosophy of language and meaning theory. 
The more general term, philosophy of language, identifies a 
meta-inquiry into fundamental presuppositions of the 
discipline of linguists, in particular the concepts of 
meaning, reference, facts, truth, symbol, assertion and the 
various ways in which these concepts relate one to another. 
It thus raises important questions about the nature of 
language qua language, so stepping back from linguistics' 
more immediate concerns with aspects of particular languages 
such as English or Urdu. It is, then, to be seen as "an 
attempt to get clear about the basic concepts we use in 
thinking about language" (Alston 1964, p.ix). 
Meaning theory, however, is the more specific term, being 
that part of the philosophy of language which, 
traditionally, has been seen as examining "the very essence 
of language" (Black 1968, p.206), the ways in which 
language, defined as a collection of linguistic units, 
allows communication to occur. This traditional view of 
meaning has important limitations, which will be discussed 
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later, but it does at least allow one to see that the more 
general term, philosophy of language, is on this account 
similar to Rorty's definitions of the term (Rorty 1980, 
pp.257-258), in that traditionally its subject-matter has 
been approached from an epistemological perspective 
("impure" philosophy of language), but now it is dealt with 
from a logical perspective ("pure" philosophy of language), 
for reasons that will become obvious. 
This distinction makes more than a mere verbal point. With 
Popper, "words are significant only as instruments for the 
formulation of theories" (Popper 1960, p.28), and the theory 
that the general/specific distinction is here meant to 
produce is that traditional and modern philosophers of 
language are not necessarily dealing with problems of 
meaning per se, for one could be a philosopher of language 
and not feel oneself to be directly concerned with meaning 
theory. Of course, because the one is subsumed under the 
other, it is possible to winkle out a theory of meaning from 
the shell of arguments concerned with other aspects of the 
philosophy of language. It should, however, be noted that 
the theory of meaning which is thus brought protesting into 
the light can all too easily be criticised as offending 
against the assumptions of an alternative philosophy of 
language without realising that these assumptions actually 
generate the theory of meaning. This is to say no more than 
a criticism of a theory of meaning operates on two levels. 
The first is a matter of internal consistency; the second, 
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more drastic and problematical, is a matter of 
presupositional debate. 
Much the same points can be made about theories of language 
acquisition. Such theories have the same relationship to 
the philosophy of meaning as it, in turn, has to the 
philosophy of language. Work produced by a labourer at one 
end of this chain of generality can be re-presented in terms 
of the other end of the chain, but the links must connect 
for criticism to be seen as relevant. That is, an account 
of language acquisition (LA1) can be produced by, or 
produce, a theory of meaning (MT1), which in turn can be 
produced by, or produce, a philosophy of language (PL1), 
such that one has the chain: 
A) PL1<-> MT1<-> LA1 
If, however, the philosophy of language was different in 
important respects at a later time then one would initially 
have the chain: 
B) PL2<->MT1<->LA1 
which, for consistency's sake would either revert to 'A' or, 
eventually, become: 
C) 	 PL2<->MT2<->LA2 
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The temptation might then be to criticise one aspect of 'A', 
for example its meaning theory, from the standpoint of 'B'. 
In effect this would be to assert that the chain 
PL2<->MT1<->LA2 was inconsistent, an assertion which 
misfires as a criticism as one would have to show that 
either PL1 or/and LA1 were not consistent with PL2 or/and 
LA2. Such categorial debate is, to say the least, unlikely 
to reach a clear conclusion as the very terms that might 
frame such a conclusion are themselves a part of the debate, 
being an example of the circularity alluded to earlier 
(p.12ff). This is to run counter to Korner who, correctly, 
identifies the problem in terms of competing categorial 
frameworks being "incorrigible if viewed from the inside and 
corrigible if viewed from the outside" (KOrner 1974, p.14), 
but then posits the supposedly categorial-free mediating 
concept of "information" (ib. pp.63-64). Information (such 
as 'x is dead') is itself category-dependent and, as such, 
in KO.rner's own terms cannot bridge category frameworks (cf. 
Kuhn's (1962) incommensurable paradigms). 
Thus the theory that philosophy of language and theory of 
meaning are distinguishable, although not discrete, areas of 
enquiry allows one to see the nature of the debate which 
exists within those areas. Moreover, by suggesting that 
there is here a move from formal to substantive concerns 
further justification is given for including linguistic and 
psycho-linguistic concerns within a philosophical thesis. 
This is because if substantive matters such as theories of 
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language acquisition are connected to a philosophy of 
language, then those linguists and psycho-linguists who see 
themselves as dealing with what they might naively term a 
purely empirical matter are, at some point, cashing in their 
philosophy of language's promissory note. In fact, as will 
now be shown, the nearer one moves to the substantive issues 
in this area the more difficult it is to perceive competing 
theories as categorially distinct, although superficially, 
at the formal level, they may well seem incommensurate one 
with another. It is as if the chains 'A' and 'B' diverged 
at one end, their philosophy of language, but converged to 
the same anchoring point, the phenomenon of communication. 
As this phenomenon must somehow be first acquired then 
further support is given to the view that first language 
acquisition is something which, at the risk of being 
seriously flawed, any philosophy of language must allow for. 
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2.2 Traditional Empiricism and Rationalism 
Given the distinction between philosophy of language and 
theory of meaning it becomes clear that what might once have 
been seen as a simple re-vamping exercise by modern 
empiricists and rationalists of their forbears' more 
traditional positions, such that they could all be 
identified by the blanket terms empiricism and rationalism 
(for example, Gilroy 1974), should now be taken as distinct 
positions, at least at the formal level, hence the sub-title 
above. There are certainly connections, as Chomsky for one 
has made clear (Chomsky 1966), but this is to ignore the 
fact that he is primarily concerned with language 
acquisition and his forbears with the philosophy of 
language. To identify both concerns' theorists as, for 
example, rationalists is to overload the term with 
ambiguities. 
Traditional empiricist and rationalist philosophies of 
language were, in effect, implied by their respective 
epistemologies. Given that these epistemologies, and thus 
their metaphysics (Hospers 1956, p.349), were different and, 
indeed, sometimes developed in part as a result of a 
criticism of the alternative position (for example, 
Leibniz's claim that he intends "to add something to what he 
(Locke) has given us" so as to clear away "some difficulties 
which he had left in their entirety" - 1704, p.367), then 
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one might expect two distinct chains leading to two distinct 
accounts of language acquisition. Such an expectation might 
lead one to suggest that empiricism would be an example of 
the previously described chain 'A' and rationalism an 
example of chain 'B' and, on a purely formal level, this at 
first seems satisfactory. Formally, traditional empiricism 
(TE) would then be identified thus: 
TE 
WORLD structures KNOWLEDGE given via IDEAS within 
the INDIVIDUAL 
whereas traditional rationalism (TR) would be represented 
thus: 
TR 
INDIVIDUAL has IDEAS which structure his KNOWLEDGE 
of the WORLD 
Although much simplified such formal identifications allow 
one to see that both positions were concerned to give an 
account of knowlege which would confound the skeptic (cf. 
Hamlyn 1970, p.23), the emphasis for the empiricist being 
laid upon the world of experience and for the rationalist 
upon the individual's own mental structuring ability. 
Selective quotations might also seem to support these formal 
identifications and the clear distinction they appear to 
make between the two positions. Hume's claim, for example, 
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that "nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions" 
(Hume 1938, p.71), where 'perception' and 'sensation' are 
hopelessly intertwined (cf. Hamlyn 1961, pp.116-130) might 
be cited as giving substantive support to the formal 
identification of traditional empiricism (TE), and 
Descartes' attempt to "call away all my senses" which allows 
him to produce certain truths without reference to "the 
images of corporeal things " (Descartes 1641a, p.107) could 
well be used as substantive support for the formal 
identification of traditional rationalism (TR). However, as 
will be shown, these formal identifications tend to break 
down when related more directly to the thinkers they purport 
to describe. 
Before leaving the formal level, it is worth noting that 
there is one other benefit in talking in terms of TE and TR, 
in that it allows one clearly to see how each has a 
philosophy of language and thus a theory of meaning and of 
language acquisition. The philosophy of language of TE is 
concerned to relate its various elements, in particular the 
concept of truth, to the world, thus making truth synthetic, 
whereas that of TR emphasises reason and thus makes some 
truths a priori. Their theories of meaning, even at this 
formal level, are far less discrete however. This is 
because of the fact that it is not the world or the 
individual, with TE and TR respectively, which give language 
(for the traditionalists this means a collection of 
individual words) its meaning, but rather Ideas (a term 
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which is examined below). For both positions language has 
meaning because it accurately reflects the individual's 
Ideas, so both are reference theories of meaning and both 
positions share the same referent, the individual's Ideas. 
They diverge, then, when seen as propounding philosophies of 
language and converge when seen as meaning theorists. One 
might expect them to remain together when one generates a 
theory of language acquisition from their shared meaning 
theory, but at this point they diverge again (at least on 
the formal level). 
These movements can be represented thus, where 'E' 
represents empiricism and 'R' rationalism respectively: 
Philosophy of Language:(E) 	 Philosophy of Language:(R) 
IDEA 
Reference Meaning Theory 
Language Acquis lon:(E) 	 Language quisition:(R) 
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This divergence is surprising, given what was agreed earlier 
(pp.l2ff) about the difficulty of categorial disagreements, 
as it seems to be a prima facie case of such disagreement 
operating satisfactorily, the two categorial positions 
sharing the arena of Ideas. At this point one needs to look 
at the substance of each position and here one immediately 
runs up against the problems of opening up what has been 
aptly termed "this Pandora's box of a word" (Ryle 1933, 
p. 17), Idea. 
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Locke's claim that experience is where "all our knowledge is 
founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself" (Locke 
1690, p.89) seems to support the selective quotation of Hume 
given earlier (p.15) and so provide some plausibility to the 
formal account of traditional empiricism. However, he then 
immediately examines the source of the content of thought, 
concluding that there are two sources, "the objects of 
sensation" and "the perception of the operations of our own 
mind within us" (ib. p.90). Admittedly this "internal 
sense" is not quite on a par with sensory knowledge ("This 
source of ideas ..., though it be not sense, as having 
nothing to do with external objects" - ib.), but 
nevertheless "All our Ideas are of the one or the other of 
these," (ib. p.91). It follows that some knowledge is 
produced from an area which is not, strictly speaking, the 
physical world, namely "the actings of our own minds" (ib. 
p.90). 
To a certain extent this weakening of the empiricist 
position is forced on Locke by his insistence on accounting 
for "common received opinions" (ib. p.88), for we do talk 
about having knowledge without necessarily having a direct 
experience of the 'object' of that knowledge. More 
important, however, is his use of the term Idea which is 
variously defined, one such definition being "whatsoever is 
the object of the understanding when a man thinks", it being 
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asserted as a commonplace fact that "everyone is conscious 
of them in himself" (ib. pp.66-67). 
Locke was well aware that the term committed him to what we 
would now call a doctrine of privacy (as when he remarks 
"the scene of ideas that makes one man's thoughts cannot be 
laid open to the immediate view of another" - ib. p.443) and 
was quite happy to accept that language was public, for "to 
communicate our thought ... signs of our ideas are also 
necessary ... words" (ib.). It is clear, then, that his 
philosophy of language makes use of both the public and the 
private world (this is facilitated by the ambiguity of 
'object' in the phrase "object of understanding"), whereas 
his theory of meaning involves only the private world of 
Ideas. For Locke "words ... stand for nothing but the ideas  
in the mind of him that uses them, ... ideas ... collected 
from the things which they are supposed to represent" (ib. 
p.259). 
This is, in a sense, a double-translation reference theory 
of meaning in that 'Things' are the referents of Ideas and 
Ideas are the referents of Words. 	 However, Locke is still 
drawn towards the referent 'Idea' as providing "clear and 
distinct knowledge", for if "we accustom ourselves to 
separate our contemplations and reasonings from words" then 
and only then is error avoided (ib. p.353). Such an 
argument, taken to its logical conclusion by Berkeley and 
Hume (and, in a slightly different context, the early 
Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition - p.27 - 
Wittgenstein), would make the physical world irrelevant as a 
referent, so producing a simple unitary translation 
reference theory of meaning (cf. Bennett 1971, p.1), where 
words would have meaning by being connected to their 
referent, Idea. 
Thus Berkeley accepts from Locke the view that man can avoid 
the "delusion of words ... by considering his own naked, 
undisguised ideas" (Berkeley 1710, p.111), but draws the new 
conclusion that it follows, apparently logically, that "all 
other real things ... which compose the world ... we should 
not ... pretend to affirm or note any thing of them ... you 
can only distinguish between your own ideas" (Berkeley 1713, 
p.263). Objectivity, of course, is provided within the 
reference theory's ideational framework by this account 
through recourse to God and his perceptions. 
Hume, however, as an atheist cannot make use of this move. 
Consequently, he attempts to redefine Idea, such that those 
"perceptions ... as they make their first appearance in the 
soul" are to be defined as Impressions and those which he 
describes as "the faint images of these in thinking and 
reasoning" are Ideas (Hume 1738, p.11). Ideas, then, have 
as their referent Impressions (they "represent" them - ib. 
p.16) and words, even those which seem to identify general 
referents, in fact "raise up an individual idea" (ib. p.28). 
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Here the double-translation meaning theory returns, but 
under a slightly different guise. We have Impressions of 
the world and, in turn, Ideas which are the referents for 
words. It follows that we cannot use language to speak 
directly about Impressions, but we can only give "instances 
which are analogous" to the way they act upon the mind (ib. 
p.30). On this account, as Hume himself realized, there 
cannot be an Impression of the self "without a manifest 
contradiction and absurdity" (ib. p.238), only a "collection 
of different perceptions" (ib. p.239). This is a basic 
fault, even in his terms, for his philosophy of language and 
theory of meaning as, without a unitary self, there could be 
no repository for Impressions and Ideas. Because Hume's 
empiricism is so vigorous what was only implied by Locke and 
Berkeley is now made explicit and the self within which 
Ideas (or Impressions) reside and which thus is crucial for 
explaining meaning (for these philosophers at least) is 
"finally splintered ... into myriad shards that can never be 
conjoined" (Hacking op.cit. p.169). 
This is a far more pertinent criticism of the traditional 
empiricist theories of meaning than the standard refutations 
because it operates within the traditionalists' own 
framework. The standard criticism, that of attacking their 
private referent as being irrelevant to an explanation of 
public language (see, for example, Parkinson's one-paragraph 
dismissal of such theories along these lines in a collection 
of papers on meaning where not one paper represents this 
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position - Parkinson 1968, p.4), fails to bite as it is 
privacy which is, for these thinkers, all important for 
meaning. Indeed, as Berkeley showed, by making meaning 
depend entirely on Ideas then the logic of the position is 
such that Ideas by definition cannot be caused by the world, 
but only by some transcendent "person" having transcendent 
Ideas, or by our selves. 
This may well not be perceived as a problem for the 
traditional empiricist in that, given the terms of the 
philosophy of language he is working within, he has no way 
of perceiving it as a problem (although Reid - 1788 - is a 
possible exception to this point). However, in addition to 
what they do see as a problem within their philosophy of 
language there is another difficulty that only Locke, of the 
three traditional empiricists examined here, attempts to 
deal with directly. At this point the divergence away from 
traditional rationalism (see pp.15-16) is most clear, even 
though Berkeley and Hume's position has to be teased out 
from what they say about meaning, the point of divergence 
being the account given of language acquisition. 
Given the reference theory of meaning held by these thinkers 
(and, in spite of Hacking's remarks to the contrary - 
op.cit.  p.52 - they do have a theory of meaning, where 
meaning is irreducibly private) then their account of first 
language acquisition is going to consist of an explanation 
of how their referents, Ideas, are acquired (one half of the 
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translation account) and a further explanation of how the 
Ideas are associated with their appropriate word (the other 
half of the translation account). The clearest explanations 
given of the acquisition of the double-translation account 
of meaning is that given by Locke. 
Locke, consistent in his opposition to the doctrine of 
innate Ideas, asserts: 
He that attentively considers the state of a 
child at his first coming into the world will 
have little reason to think him stored with 
plenty of ideas 
(Locke op.cit. p.91) 
and continues by arguing that as "there appear not to be any 
ideas in the mind before the senses have conveyed any in" 
(ib. p.97) then it follows that it is these sensory Ideas 
which "the mind seems first to employ itself in" and on 
which it is eventually able to reflect and so produce 
knowledge from within itself. This, of course, is to rely 
on some sort of associationist psychology, in which by dint 
of continued exposure to "outward objects that are 
extrinsical to the mind" (ib. p.98) impressions are forced 
on the mind and these, presumably, become Ideas, the 
referents that give words their meaning. 
Leaving aside problems that we may have with this psychology 
(for, after all, what else could the empiricist turn to?) it 
is clear that, as meaning is Idea-dependent, then language 
is to be first acquired by developing Ideas, presumably by 
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allowing the mind to be bombarded with sensory impressions. 
Within its own terms of reference this account is doubly 
unsatisfactory. First, it implies that the mind has some 
way of allowing impressions to become Ideas, of allowing all 
the impressions that the senses "convey" in to the mind to 
be distinguished one from another. This cannot be merely a 
passive biological ability that the child possess, for on 
Locke's own account the mind is active in sorting out its 
sensory input. 
In order to avoid slipping into an account that requires 
children to possess some innate Ideas which provide the 
basis for their sortal abilities to function (which is to 
contradict a central element of Locke's position) Locke 
would have to respond by making use of the associationist 
psychology which underpins his account of learning so as to 
defend the view that the mind has the innate ability to 
structure the sense impressions which it meets (as, indeed, 
he does when he speaks of the mind as being "fitted to 
receive the impressions made on it" - ib. p.98). At this 
point he is moving away from a theory of meaning to some 
sort of neurological account of the biology of man and he 
would require empirical evidence to support what is in 
effect a hypothesis forced on him by his theory of meaning. 
Until such evidence is forthcoming little more can be said 
about the hypothesis. 
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The second line of attack, however, is less easy for the 
traditional empiricists to rebut by appealing to 
neurological hypotheses. Given the Idea-dependent structure 
of their argument, Ideas are necessarily the fount of 
word-meaning (that is, meaning is Idea-dependent). It 
follows that first-language acquisition, the first 
correlation of meaning to Ideas, consists in correlating 
Ideas to Ideas. This, however, leaves unanswered the 
question of how Ideas are first correlated to meaning, 
unless Ideas are again referred to (as, within the 
Idea-dependent structure of the argument, they must be). 
In this way an infinite regress is generated which 
effectively prevents an explanation being given of the 
creation of the first Idea. Within the context of 
first-language acquisition the traditional empiricists thus 
have the problem of explaining how the first Idea, the first 
intimation of meaning, can arise in the child without at the 
same time either generating a debilitating regress or 
abandoning the Idea-dependent structure of their argument 
altogether. 
There is a parallel here with Plato's Third Man argument, 
which shows that the Platonic theory of meaning generates an 
infinite regress of Forms, where Forms explain the meaning 
of Forms and so on. The regress can only be halted in 
Plato's case when his Forms meet a physical world which, 
within the structure of his nominalist argument, 
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middle-period Plato explicitly rejects. Alternatively, 
Plato can (and possibly does in his later Theaetetus) 
abandon the theory of Forms which creates the regress. 
Locke at least saw no problem here, but both Berkley and 
Hume realised that a full-blown Ideational theory implies 
some form of scepticism, for if the physical world is 
acquired by means of Impressions and Ideas then in an 
important sense there are for us only Ideas and Impressions 
of that world. Berkley attempted to halt the regress that 
his Ideational theory of meaning generates by an appeal to 
God (which, of course, simply transfers the problem to the 
Deity rather than resolves it), whereas Hume accepted the 
scepticism without halting the regress. 
Within the context of the problem of first-language 
acquisition the traditional empiricists can be seen as 
having the problem of explaining how, within the terms of 
their empiricism, their theory of meaning can account for 
the child's first relating a meaning to an Idea. To do this 
they would seem to have to move away from the view that 
meaning is Idea-dependent, otherwise they appear to be left 
with an infinite regress of Ideas; yet such a move would 
radically alter their theory of meaning and, by implication, 
their empiricism. Indeed, Locke and Berkeley can be seen as 
attempting to halt the regress by introducing neurological 
and religious considerations respectively into a 
philosophical argument, whilst Hume has to accept that his 
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attempt to halt the regress has the unfortunate result of 
destroying the conception of a unitary self which is 
necessary for the self actually to have Ideas and 
Impressions. 
Thus the double-translation theory of meaning of the 
traditional empiricist produces two problems for their 
theory of language acquisition, leaving aside problems such 
as that of privacy which certain modern philosophers have, 
illegitimately, levelled against them. These problems are 
conceived in the terms of their own categorial framework and 
force them into accepting either some aspects of the 
rationalist's account of meaning, or an infinite regression 
of explanation. As they are consistent in avoiding innate 
Ideas it follows that they must accept the regression 
identified above. Thus their philosophy of language suffers 
from the crippling disability of being unable to account for 
a phenomenon which is crucial to its meaning theory, the 
acquisition of language. 
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Traditional rationalists certainly have a philosophy of 
language which is distinct from that of the traditional 
empiricists. Truth, for Descartes at least, was to be 
identified in terms of "what was presented to my mind ... 
clearly and distinctly" (Descartes 1637, p.17), this being 
made analogous to the truths of logic and mathematics, and 
so being, in some sense, a priori and divorced from the 
sensory world. Thus the cogito (ib. p.29), for all of its 
problems, was seen as a necessary truth, a foundation for 
all other truths, but was explicitly not derived from the 
external world. Indeed this philosophy of language makes 
the human mind paramount over the physical world, at least 
as far as truth is concerned, for: 
the idea which I possess of the human mind 
... is incomparably more distinct than is the 
idea of any corporeal thing 
(Descartes 1641a, p.127), 
where 'distinctness' is the criterion for certainty. 
Spinoza's construction of a hierarchy of knowledge, based on 
the assumption that true knowledge is defined in terms of 
logically neccessary propositions (Spinoza 1677, 
pp.186-187), is consistent both with Cartesian methodology 
and in the down-grading of the status of sensory 
'knowledge'. Similarly, Leibniz's distinction between 
truths of fact and truths of reason is, in effect, a 
distinction between contingent and necessary truths (Leibniz 
1702, p.359). Both of these philosophers differ from 
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Descartes in a number of important ways, but superficially 
at least their philosophy of language, in particular their 
conception of truth, is certainly within the same tradition 
and in opposition to that of empiricism: they would accept 
as the centre of their conception of philosophy that "the 
trustworthiness of the senses is inferior to that of the 
intellect" (Descartes op.cit. p.178). 
The formal representation of these positions (p.24) asserts 
that they converge at the term Idea, and this can be clearly 
seen when individual rationalists' work is examined. 
Descartes, for example, stresses the importance of simply 
using "the power of conceiving" (ib. p.185) in order to 
ascertain whether or not there is, or is not, an Idea of 
something. Spinoza's definition of Idea is more complex and 
certainly less ambiguous than Descartes', for he wishes to 
use it to establish a novel form of the coherence theory of 
truth (cf. Hampshire 1951, p.87 - for Spinoza "to say of an 
idea that it is true must be to state its relation to other 
ideas in the system of ideas which constitute God's 
thinking"), but on the surface at least is almost identical, 
Idea being "a conception of the mind which the mind forms" 
(Spinoza op. cit. p.144). Leibniz explicitly tightens up 
Descartes' use of the term, but still talks of "ideas lying 
in our mind as the statue of Hercules is dormant in the 
rough marble" (Leibniz 1684, pp.289-290). All three 
rationalists' accounts of Idea, then, identify it as a 
necessary feature in their meaning theory, in some sense a 
Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition - p.37 - 
referent, as it was for the empiricists, and so their 
meaning theory now needs to be made explicit. 
Descartes' meaning theory is hidden by the ambiguity of his 
referent, Idea. At one stage he makes what seems to be a 
straight-forward point about meaning which is, to all 
intents and purposes, identical to Locke on meaning, namely: 
I cannot express anything in words, provided 
that I understand what I say, without its 
thereby being certain that there is within me 
the idea of that which is signified by the 
words in question 
(Descartes 1641, p.227)(-). 
This would make an Idea a referent of a meaningful word, 
although the fact that Idea can mean, amongst other things, 
either "an act of my understanding ... or ... what is 
represented by this act" (Descartes 1641, p.229)(-)  makes 
the way that the word refers equally ambiguous (cf. Kenny 
1967, p.229), although it is the former use which is truly 
rationalist. Spinoza avoids the correspondence theory 
implied by the latter use of the term by arguing for an 
Ideational theory which is very like Berkleley's (see, for 
example, his claim that "when we say that the human mind 
perceives this or that thing we say nothing else than that 
God has this or that idea" - Spinoza op.cit. p.155). 
However, with Hampshire (op.cit. pp.91-94), Spinoza's 
account of truth allows him to accept that our ordinary 
language's referents are of "inadequate and confused ideas" 
(Spinoza op. cit.  p.181) because these are related to our 
minds, whereas adequate Ideas "exist in God" (ib. p.180) and 
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are to be discovered, as with middle-period Plato, by the 
use of the understanding. 
There are, then, for Spinoza two kinds of language, ordinary 
language with its corresponding referents and a second kind 
with its referents which is necessarily true (ib. p.187), 
and it is to the first kind of language that words belong. 
Leaving aside the second kind of language, his description 
of ordinary language can be seen as making use of a 
reference theory in which: 
when we hear or read certain words, we 
recollect things and form certain ideas of 
them similar to them. 
(ib. pp.186) 
Leibniz's theory of meaning gives a foretaste of Kant's 
compromise between empiricism and rationalism, as his 
metaphor of Ideas lying within the mind suggests. 
Experience is needed to chip away the superflous pieces of 
marble so as to reveal what was inherent within it (Leibniz 
1704, p.373), but it is not sufficient to explain what was 
already within the marble (ib. p.369). However, his 
philosophy of language is such that this compromise is not 
developed. Instead he perceives language as "primarily a 
social instrument" (ib. p.449) which allows us to understand 
one another's Ideas, again allowing for him to be identified 
as holding a reference theory of meaning. 
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It should be noted at this point that the rationalists' 
meaning theories are, one one level, identical with the 
empiricists' in that they involve some sort of translation 
account of language. On another level, however, they are to 
be distinguished in that as Ideas are seen as being, in some 
sense, caused in the mind by God then theirs is not a 
double-translation account, only a single-translation one. 
In this respect at least Berkeley is closer to the 
rationalists than the empiricists. 
Given this meaning theory it becomes possible to see how 
their theory of language acquisition differs from the 
empiricists'. The most important difference, of course, is 
that the referent is, is some sense, innate and so first 
language acquisition consists of making use of these innate 
referents. Thus Descartes accepted that "the power of 
thinking is asleep in infants" (Descartes 1641b, p.212), 
whilst also accepting the Idea of oneself and of God are 
"innate in me" (ib. p.125), although Leibniz was at pains to 
reject the view that these Ideas were "naturally imprinted, 
because not known to children" (op.cit. p.400), replacing it 
with the view that only necessary truths are innate. 
Indeed, even the truths of experience can only be "assured 
of ... forever ... through the reason" (ib. p.403), which is 
to make, in places at least, the operation of the mind (what 
he calls "a disposition, an aptitude, a preformation" - ib.) 
innate, rather than its particular content. Spinoza's 
account of ordinary language is also operational in this 
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sense, a point confirmed by his claim that to think 
otherwise is to suppose "an idea to be something dumb, like 
a picture on a tablet, instead of being a mode of thought" 
(op.cit. p.189). 
For the rationalists a consequence of accepting the 
single-translation account of meaning is that, unlike the 
empiricists, they can, if they so wish, make use of the 
physical world in helping to make innate Ideas operational 
(as Leibniz and Spinoza - op.cit. p.169 - do explicitly and 
Descartes does by ambiguity). First language acquisition, 
on this account, consists in effect of actualizing a 
potential, breathing life into otherwise dormant Ideas. 
Again, privacy is not seen as a problem for these thinkers 
(Spinoza, for example, describing this "problem", uses it to 
distinguish between subjectively different meanings of the 
same perception - op.cit. p.169), so modern criticisms along 
such lines fail to bite again. 
What does produce a pertinent criticism is an argument which 
attacks the basic presupposition of their position, namely 
that the empiricists' regression of Ideas (which, as argued 
earlier prevents them accounting adequately for language 
acquisition) can be halted by an appeal to God as the source 
of necessarily true Ideas (that is, Ideas which do not 
require further Ideas to give them meaning). Without going 
into the details of their attempts to avoid such criticism 
(see, for example, Descartes' replies to Gassendi, op.cit.  
Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition - p.41 - 
p.226ff) it is perhaps sufficient to point out that their 
theory of knowledge is such that one can only have a 
meaningful Idea of an Idea by reference to another Idea - 
meaning is Idea-dependent. It would follow that to have the 
meaning of the Idea 'God', as Idea-free is simply to assert 
something which in the terms of their theory is meaningless. 
Thus the traditional rationalist philosophy of language has 
to be seen as accepting a theory of meaning which, in its 
own terms, cannot meaningfully account for the phenomenon of 
language acquisition, a phenomenon which it accepts as 
existing. 
There are further problems with empiricism and rationalism 
per se which are best examined at the conclusion of this 
section. What has been argued here is that, although 
traditional empiricist and rationalist philosophers were not 
primarily interested in elucidating a theory of meaning it 
is possible to deduce such a theory from a close examination 
of their philosophy of language, in particular their 
respective accounts of truth. The theory of meaning so 
derived can, in turn, be used to identify an explanation of 
how language is first acquired and this explanation of first 
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language acquisition can be turned back upon its meaning 
theory and philosophy of language in order to provide a 
criticism which is valid in the terms of the presuppositions 
of these traditionalists. This validity is a function of 
avoiding any criticism couched in the modern terms of 
privacy, using instead the assumptions the traditionalists 
accepted, in particular that of the nature of Ideas and also 
the fact that language (in the sense of individual words) is 
indeed acquired. 
The formal representation of their positions (p.24) now 
needs adding to in the following way: 
Philosophy of Language:(E) 	 Philosophy of Language:(R) 
IDEA 
Reference Meaning Theory 
Language Acquisition:(E) Language Acquisition:(R) 
Single-Translation Account 
Double-Translation Account 
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This representation is meant to indicate that as one 
descends from the purely formal level of the 
traditionalists' philosophies through their theory of 
meaning to the substantive level of their accounts of 
language acquisition divergencies and convergencies become 
clear and represents, in effect, a map of this section's 
arguments. In the terms of the traditional positions, then, 
the problem of the acquisition of a first language is 
fundamental, not because they cannot give such an account 
but because in doing so they cast into doubt the remainder 
of their position. 
The next section moves away from these traditional positions 
and examines the philosophies of language of modern 
empiricists and rationalists. As will be seen, there are 
clear links with the traditional positions, both with their 
philosophical assumptions and with their weaknesses. 
However, their meaning theories do not have to be squeezed 
out from some other aspect of their philosophy of language, 
for what distinguishes the traditional and modern positions 
is the latter's direct concern with meaning. Consequently 
their theories of language acquisition are equally clear 
and, once again, will be used as a way of criticising the 
positions from within their own frameworks. 
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SECTION III - MODERN EMPIRICISM 
The perfect use of language is that in which 
every word carries the meaning that it is 
intended to, no less and no more. 
(Connolly 1938, pp.39-40) 
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3.1 Introduction 
A number of points have been made in the preceding 
sub-sections which carry over into this section, in that 
they explain the distinction being made on the formal level 
between traditional and modern empiricism and rationalism. 
Although other ways of distinguishing the old and the new 
will be mentioned in due course perhaps the most important 
is that the traditionalists were primarily concerned with 
developing a philosophy of language, which accounts for 
their emphasis on epistemology, whereas the moderns are 
concerned with more substantive issues, in particular the 
problem of language acquisition. 
For this reason it is to be expected that instead of having 
to generate a meaning theory and its corresponding account 
of the acquisition of language from an explicit philosophy 
of language, this section of the thesis may well have to 
reverse the process. In so doing it will, again, attempt to 
avoid the kind of invalid, cross-categorial criticism 
described previously, in that pre-suppositional debate will 
be avoided (as much as it can ever be) and criticised where 
it does occur, being replaced with questions concerned with 
the internal consistency of each position. 
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In this way, this section of the thesis will not work from 
an explicit philosophy of language to an implicit meaning 
theory and account of language acquisition, with criticism 
proceeding via debate concerning the relationship between 
the two implicit areas to their explicit base. Instead it 
will be typified by its movement from a base provided by an 
explicit account of language acquisition towards a meaning 
theory and philosophy of language that this base supports, 
once again examining the nature of the relationship between 
the specific and the general components of each particular 
position. 
3.2 Frege 
Perhaps the most obvious difference between the 
traditionalists and the moderns is the abandonment of the 
former's key concept 'Idea'. This difference is intimately 
connected with the replacement, by Frege in particular, of 
the private, mentalist, interface between language and 'the 
world' with an interface which is public and shared. 
Frege was struck by the fact that "one can hardly deny that 
mankind has a common store of thoughts which is transmitted 
from one generation to another" (Frege 1892, p.212) and yet 
this public aspect of language is not catered for by a 
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philosophy of language resting upon ideational 
presuppositions. In the words of a more recent philosopher, 
there is a distinction to be drawn between "traditional 
epistemology with its concentration on ... knowledge in the 
subjective sense (the second 'world' of knowledge)" (Popper 
1972, p.110) and "the objective third world of actual and 
potential theories and books and arguments ... of language" 
(ib. pp.117-118), these two being easily confused because 
ordinary language has no natural way of distinguishing 
between them. It is this public aspect of language which is 
missing in the traditionalists' theories of meaning and 
language acquisition, but it is an omission which is not 
seen by them as important, partly because of their emphasis 
on the philosophy of language and partly because, as some 
argue, they "did not have a theory of meaning ... (they) had 
a theory of ideas. That is a theory of mental discourse" 
(Hacking 1975, p.52). 
What impressed Frege about the public nature of language 
and, after him, philosophers like Popper, was of no 
consequence to the traditionalists partly because of their 
own interests and presuppositions and partly because of the 
limitations of ordinary language. Frege made a three-part 
distinction (not,as if often supposed, only a two-part 
distinction), a significant move which had the consequence 
of allowing the theory of meaning to become a dominant 
aspect of modern western philosophy. This distinguished 
between Vorstellung (Idea, or Conception), Sinn (Sense) and 
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Bedeutung (Reference). 
Ideas/Conceptions he defines as "the direct experiences in 
which sense-impressions and activities themselves take the 
place of the traces which they have left in the mind" and as 
"an internal image" (Frege op.cit. p.212); as such they are 
synonymous with the traditionalists' Idea. 'Referent' is 
defined as "the object itself" (ib. p.213), "perceivable by 
the senses" (ib. p.212), and 'Sense' as being "the common 
property of many and therefore is not a part or a mode of 
the individual mind" (ib.). This last "is grasped by 
everybody who is sufficiently familiar with the language" 
(ib. p.210) and it "has different expressions in different 
languages or even in the same language" (ib. p.211). 
The relationship between these three aspects of language is 
neatly summarized thus: 
The referent ... is the object itself ...; 
the conception, which we thereby have is 
wholly subjective; in between lies the sense, 
which is indeed no longer subjective like the 
conception, but is yet not the object itself. 
(ib. p.213). 
It is this last which allows for the transmission of thought 
and which, for Frege and those who came after him, justifies 
the absence of any "further discussion of conceptions and 
experience" (ib. p.214). Having introduced the 
private/public dichotomy modern philosophy's emphasis moves 
away from the former and onto the latter, in particular the 
relationship between sense and Referent, between denotive 
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meaning(1)  and its object. 
A second, and equally significant move, was the 
consideration of the "entire declarative sentence" (ib. 
p.214) as containing meaning, as opposed to the 
traditionalists' view that individual words, linked to their 
Ideas, were the units of meaning. These two moves are 
connected, of course, in that the Referent of a sentence is 
not an Idea, or collection of Ideas (themselves 
representations of objects), but rather 
Every declarative sentence concerned with the 
referents of its words is ... to be regarded 
as a proper name, and its referent, if it 
exists, is either the true or the false .... 
the truth value of a sentence is its referent 
... From this we see that in the referent of 
the sentence all that is specific is 
obliterated. 
(ib. pp.216-217) 
Difficulties with this particular modern referential theory 
will be dealt with in a more developed form of the theory 
later in this section. The point that is being made here is 
that Frege is without doubt "the first analytic 
philosopher", such philosophers' major concern being defined 
as producing "a comprehensive theory of meaning" (Sluga 
1980, p.2): as such he represents the watershed for 
traditional and modern empiricism and rationalism, in that 
he abandons Ideas as vehicles for meaning and words as 
significant units of meaning, constructing an explicit 
meaning theory based on public language. 
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Various tributaries lead off from Frege's insight, many 
eventually leading back to some form of traditional 
empiricism. Thus Russell's Logical Atomism, whilst still 
being a theory of meaning, abandons Frege's identification 
of meaning with Sense, replacing it with Reference in order 
that it might, so he thought, deal with three puzzles 
(Russell 1905, pp.484-488). Leaving aside the question as 
to whether or not Frege's original theory of meaning could 
have resolved Russell's puzzles, the immediate result of 
Russell's meaning theory is to re-introduce some form of 
Idea, but now termed "sense-data". This reproduces, as 
Russell himself saw, the very privacy that Frege was at 
pains to remove from language, but perceived by Russell as a 
strength of his meaning theory, not a weakness, for 
It would be absolutely fatal if people meant 
the same things by their words. It would 
make ... language the most hopeless and 
useless thing imaginable, because the meaning 
you attach to your words must depend on the 
nature of the objects you are acquainted with 
and since different people are acquainted 
with different objects, they would not be 
able to talk to each other unless they 
attached quite different meanings to their 
words. 
(Russell 1918, p.195) 
It also, of course, produces an account of first language 
acquisition which is couched in the traditionalst's terms of 
ostension where 'this' and 'that' serve as a temporary way 
of identifying a sense-datum (ib. p.203) and where one first 
acquires language by direct acquaintance with words and 
their corresponding sense-data referents (cf. Russell 1912, 
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pp.25ff). This position has already been criticised (see 
above, pp.27-30) and so need not be examined again here. 
Another tributary would be that provided by the Logical 
Positivists, in particular A. J. Ayer(2). Again, this can 
be identified as being, at heart, a form of traditional 
empiricism. Although he is at pains to distinguish himself 
from the "psychological theories of empiricists" like Hume 
(Ayer 1936, p.181) and to make it clear that the concept 
'sense-datum' is ambiguous, especially when the relationship 
between the datum and its supposed object is considered 
(Ayer 1956, p. 127), his account of the verification of a 
statement in terms of "the existence of the experience" (ib. 
p.21) is, although linguistically based, on a par with the 
traditionalists' approach. 
There has to be, for Ayer, a 
natural terminus to any process of empirical 
verification; and statements which are 
descriptive of the present contents of 
experiences are selected as the most worthy 
candidate. 
(ib. p.54) 
In context the preceding quotation reads as if it is not 
Ayer's own position, but rather some form of Russell's (see 
especially p.52-53). However, in an earlier paper, he quite 
clearly accepts the notion of these basic propositions, but 
translated into a linguistic, rather than a sensory, mode, 
when he claims that 
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the sense in which statements like 'This is 
green' ... can be said to be indubitable is 
that, when they are understood to refer only 
to some immediate experience, their truth or 
falsehood is conclusively determined by a 
meaning rule of the language in which they 
are expressed. To deny them in the 
situations to which they refer is to misapply 
the language. 
(Ayer 1950, p.121) 
Basic propositions are here defined as those "whose truth or 
falsehood is conclusively established, in a given situation, 
by a meaning rule of the language" (ib. p.123). In this way 
Ayer can be seen as attempting to avoid the private aspect 
of "sensory predicates" (ib. p.122) by emphasising the 
public nature of his meaning rules. 
There is, in effect, a double reference implied, one to 
private experience, the other to public rules of meaning, 
and it is the assumed connection of the latter to the former 
that reintroduces the traditionalists' problems. This is 
especially obvious when Ayer defines meaning rules as those 
which "correlate certain signs in the language with actual 
situations ... The rules are learned ostensively" (ib. 
p.120), so forcing his theory of first language acquisition 
into the traditionalists' mould, with all of the 
traditionalists' attendant problems. This reversion to 
traditional empiricism is a result of accepting that at some 
stage the child would have only knowledge of "actual 
situations" which it would then, via ostension, have to 
perceive as corresponding to basic propositions, a clear-cut 
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translational model of both meaning and language acquisition 
theory. 
What is required of a thoroughgoing modern empiricist is an 
explicit theory of first language acquisition and meaning 
coupled with a philosophy of language, the whole of which 
does not depend upon some variant on the concept 'Idea' or 
on the view that meaning is atomistic: this is a requirement 
which represents no more and no less than a plea to remain 
consistent with aspects of Frege's original work. Such an 
empiricist is W.V.O. Quine, and it is to his work that I 
will now turn. 
Given both the quantity and the nature of Quine's work it is 
helpful to attempt to identify certain recurrent themes in 
his philosophy, especially as these interconnect in a 
particularly intricate way. This thematic circle has the 
following four points on its circumference: 
1. The nature of an acceptable empiricism 
2. An account of first language acquisition 
3. A meaning theory 
4. A philosophy of language, 
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with the first and fourth overlapping so as to produce a 
seamless philosophy. 
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3.3 The Nature of an Acceptable Empiricism 
Quine's work is an explicit development from Frege's, 
producing a chain of publications whose links move from a 
critique of Frege's conception of the analytic nature of 
mathematical truths (1936), to a discussion of empiricism 
and the synthetic/analytic distinction (1951) and then an 
unpacking of this last to include points 2, 3 and 4 above. 
This is not to say that he accepts Frege's work in its 
entirety, only that it clearly influences his philosophy, 
and this influence is particularly noticeable when one 
considers the account he gives of his modern empiricism. 
In a paper which sets out to identify two connected "dogmas 
of empiricsm" he distinguishes what he calls Pragmatic 
Empiricism from the empiricism of the traditionalists. He 
claims to have avoided both traditional empiricism's first 
dogma (that there is a hard-and-fast distinction between 
analytic and synthetic truths) and its second (the reduction 
of meaning to "immediate experience") as a result of 
accepting an holistic approach to language. This holistic 
approach stresses the fact that "our statements about the 
external would face the tribunal of sense experiences not 
individually but only as a corporate body" (ib. p.41). 
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He rejects the first dogma, partly by arguing that the 
distinction has yet to be made in a way which is not, in 
some sense, circular and partly by rejecting as "nonsense 
and the root of much nonsense" a split between the 
linguistic and the factual elements of any separate 
statement (the analytic and the synthetic respectively). 
This rejection is based on the grounds that "taken 
collectively, science has its double dependence upon 
language and experience; but this duality is not 
significantly traceable into the statements of science taken 
one by one" (ib. p.42). 
For this same reason he rejects the second dogma, replacing 
"the impossible term-by-term empiricism of Locke and Hume" 
and that of the statement-by-statement empiricists with the 
view that the "unit of empirical significance is the whole 
of science", where "science" is defined as "the totality of 
our so-called knowledge or beliefs". However, he breaks 
with the traditionalists' conception of knowledge, by 
claiming that knowledge is "a man-made fabric which impinges 
on experience only along the edges" (ib.). 
This metaphor is a useful one in helping to clarify quite 
what his empiricism involves. It is a strange cocktail of 
both correspondence and coherence theory, with the addition 
of a dash of pragmatism. 	 At certain specific and limited 
points some of our knowledge (which is possessed by both the 
individual and his community) is created by sensory 
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experience, hence the relevance of a correspondence theory, 
but the rest of the "fabric" holds together in that it 
coheres with itself. However, the former type of knowledge 
is not beyond correction, nor is the latter; neither are 
purely synthetic nor purely analytic, for they interconnect 
such that an alteration of the border of the fabric requires 
the cloth as a whole to alter, and vice-versa, these 
altertions occurring for pragmatic reasons. 
Thus in rejecting reductionism he is led to reject not only 
the "naive mentalism" of the traditionalists (Quine 1969a, 
p.97), but also the arguments of Kant and others concerning 
the supposed distinctions between analytic and synthetic 
statements, which purport to steer a middle path between 
classical empiricism and rationalism. As he neatly puts it 
Empiricism of this modern sort ... comes of 
the old empiricism by a drastic 
externalization. The old empiricist looks 
inward upon his ideas; the new empiricist 
looks outward upon the social institution of 
language ... the idea itself passes under a 
cloud. 
(ib.) 
This is not, however, some simplistic form of linguistic 
relativism (pace Harrison 1979, pp.110-111), for he believes 
as an "unassailable" truth that the "stimulation of his 
sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has had to go 
on, ultimately, in arriving at his picture of the world" 
(Quine 1969c, p.75). 
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As will be shown in a moment, "ultimately" is here to be 
read not as indicating a return to some form of 
reductionism, but rather as referring to the edge of the 
man-made fabric of knowledge, although whether this 
so-called truth will hold is another matter. In a recent 
paper his empiricism's development is conveniently charted 
as being a shift of focus from ideas, to words, to sentences 
and finally to "systems of sentences" (Quine 1981b, p.70), 
two inevitable implications being, first, a rejection of the 
analytic/synthetic distinction and,second, a rejection of 
the first philosophy/natural science distinction. Such a 
galloping holism allows one accurately to identify Quine's 
empiricism as being Holistic Empiricism, in that he has 
"rescued and restored ... the fundamental doctrines of 
empiricism by taking the unit of empirical significance to 
be language as a whole" (Harrison op. cit. p.111). 
Leaving aside, for the time being, whether or not this is an 
acceptable form of empiricism it is, nevertheless, 
recognisably empiricism. Moreover, it has three further 
implications which are of importance for this thesis. His 
claim, qua holistic empiricist, that "statements do not have 
their private bundles of empirical consequence" (Quine 
1969c, p.82) brings with it accounts of how such statements 
are first acquired, of meaning and of the philosophy of 
language. It is to the first of these three that I will now 
turn. 
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3.4 Holistic Empiricism and First Language Acquisition 
One might expect that a modern empiricist's account of first 
language acquisition would make use of the work of 
psychological empiricists, in particular that of Skinner. 
This would follow the same pattern as the traditionalists' 
accounts already examined which were heavily dependent upon, 
amongst other things, an associationist psychology. This is 
not to say, of course, that such psychological work is 
philosophical, only that it provides a framework within 
which a certain kind of philosophy, empiricism, is at home. 
This distinction is of some importance, if only to deflect 
philosophers' criticisms of psychological behaviourism as 
being, for example, "ninth-rate philosophy" (Williams 1972) 
and reintroduces the problem of categorial criticism, a 
point that will be taken up later. This expectation is one 
Quine satisfies, although it is mediated through his 
holistic empiricism. 
The behaviourism that he accepts from Skinner, what has been 
termed Quine's "hard core behaviourism" (Davis 1976, p.141), 
he himself describes as the "same old pattern of 
reinforcement" (Quine 1960, p.82). Although a footnote 
shows that he is well aware of Chomsky's powerful criticisms 
of Skinner (ib.) he still believes that operant conditioning 
is the only acceptable way of explaining how a child 
acquires the first few words in his language (ib. pp.80-81). 
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Thus he consistently argues that "conditioned response does 
retain a key role in language-learning. It is the entering 
wedge to any particular lexicon" (Quine 1969a, p.96) with 
this conditioning being "within the scope of standard animal 
training (Quine 1974, p.72). 
Despite this apparently extreme behaviourism, which 
deliberately echoes Skinner (for example, compare Skinner's 
definition of verbal behaviour as being "behavior reinforced 
through the mediation of other persons" - 1957, p.14 - with 
Quine's account of how "the stimuli to saying 'Mama' which 
continue to be reinforced are ... the seen face and the 
heard word" - 1960, p.81), the holistic nature of Quine's 
empiricism rescues him from the consequences of accepting 
that this is all that is necessary satisfactorily to explain 
both the learning of the first few words and the vocabulary 
that follows from them (pace Skinner op. cit. p.31). 
This is accomplished partly by accepting the fact that, 
"whatever we may make of Locke, the behaviorist is knowingly 
and cheerfully up to his neck in innate mechanisms of 
learning readiness" (Quine 1969a, pp.95-96), and partly by 
giving an extended account of the acquisition of more and 
more abstract aspects of language to support his holistic 
contention that we do not learn each new word in isolation 
from other words, but rather that in learning the first "few 
dozen words, there will be no further word in the language 
that has not already been anticipated in its entirety" 
Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition - p.61 - 
(Quine 1960, pp.88-89). 
There are two kinds of "innate mechanisms" which are, pace  
Mohanty, not both "basic concepts" (Mohanty 1979, p.35). 
The first, which is basic, in the sense of being a necessary 
requirement for language learning to begin, is the concept 
of "a sort of pre-linguistic quality space" (Quine ib. 
p.83), which allows us to order "our episodes as more or 
less similar" (Quine 1974, p.19). The second is basic in a 
quite different sense, in that it allows language learning 
to continue from the start provided by quality spaces and 
conditioning so as to enable the child to surmount "this 
great hump that lies beyond ostension" (Quine 1969a, p.97). 
For Quine there is only one basic (that is innate and 
pre-linguistic) assumption, namely that we have to be able 
to "space" our sensory stimulations. Mohanty, then, is 
mistaken in listing a set of supposedly distinct basic 
concepts which are, in context, for Quine merely 
sub-divisions of the basic concept of 'quality space' 
(Mohanty ib. p.27). 
Quine's next move is to mix this innate hypothesis with 
Skinnerean behaviourism and his own brand of empiricism to 
produce his explanation of how language is first acquired. 
This is achieved by the identification of two kinds of 
sentence, Occasion and Observation Sentences. 
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Occasion Sentences are the more general term and are defined 
as being those which command "assent or dissent only as 
prompted ... by current stimulation" (Quine 1960, p.36), 
unlike Standing Sentences, which do not require such 
promptings (an example of the former would be, "I am in 
pain", of the latter "Yes, I was in pain then"). The assent 
or dissent, however varies from occasion to occasion (Quine 
1977, p.39) and these Occasion Sentences are crucial for the 
modern empiricist's "linking of language to non-linguistic 
reality" (Quine 1977, p.156). 
Quine argues that the child builds on these Occasion 
Sentences so as to develop those aspects of language which 
do not appear to link directly to "reality". This is 
achieved partly by arguing that even general terms are, at 
heart, object-based (Quine 1960, p.109), partly by using 
"analogy and extrapolation" from more obviously object-based 
language (ib.) and partly by leaning heavily on the 
interconnected nature of language (ib. p.122). Leaving 
aside the question as to whether or not this account of the 
development of the complexities of language is a sound one, 
what is of interest here is whether or not the account of 
the foundations of this development are secure. 	 At this 
point attention turns from Occasion Sentences to a sub-set 
of them, namely Observation Sentences. 
For Quine, as with other empiricists, there are "degrees of 
observationality" (ib. p.42), but instead of couching these 
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degrees in terms of a distinction between Ideas and 
Impressions, or between knowledge by acquaintance and 
description, he distinguishes between Occasion Sentences 
whose stimulations vary considerably between people (those 
containing the word "teacher", for example) and those which 
vary hardly at all. These last are Observation Sentences(3)  
and are crucial for language to be acquired (as opposed to 
developed). 
Observation Sentences are defined as: 
an occasion sentence whose occasion is not 
only intersubjectively observable but is 
generally adequate, moreover, to elicit 
assent to the sentence from any present 
witness conversant with the language. It is 
not a report of private sense data; 
typically, rather, it contains references to 
physical objects. 
These...are keyed directly to observation 
(via) conditioned response. 
(Quine 1975, p.73) 
Such conditioning is "soft" in the sense that one does not 
as a child, automatically say "Mama" in the presence of 
one's mother, but will do so if asked. In this way it is to 
be seen as the acquisition of an appropriate habit, rather 
than of an appropriate reflex. 
In an earlier paper Quine had examined what he called the 
"spectacular reducibility" of, for example, Carnap who 
attempted to analyse non-logical and non-mathematical 
expressions into expressions of logic, mathematics and "one 
'empirical' primitive, representing a certain dyadic 
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relationship described as recollection of resemblance" 
(Quine 1936, p.268). Although he is opposed to such moves 
in the fields of logic and mathematics (in part because of 
his rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction), it is 
clear that the view of, amongst others, Whitehead, Russell 
and Carnap that there is a primitive base from which 
language (or, in Russell's case, mathematics) is 
"definitionally constructible" (ib. p.257) is one that has 
crept back in to his account of first language acquisition. 
For Quine the primitive base consists of sensory 
stimulations which the child can 'space' and the base 
develops by the use of the concept of an Observation 
Sentence. This is a sentence 
we can correlate with observable 
circumstances of the occasion of utterance or 
assent, independently of variations in the 
past histories of individual informants. 
They afford the only entry to a language ... 
(It is) situated at the sensory periphery of 
the body scientific, is the minimal 
verifiable aggregate; it has an empirical 
content all its own and wears it on its 
sleeve. 
(Quine 1969c, p.89) 
Their primitiveness, and therefore the way in which they are 
at one and the same time both verbal and yet referentially 
non-verbal (cf. Wittgenstein 1921, 2.15121), is brought out 
some five years after the previous quotation when Quine, 
addressing himself to the description of Observation 
Sentences, points out that "somewhere there have to be 
nonverbal reference points, nonverbal circumstances that can 
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be intersubjectively appreciated and associated with the 
appropriate utterance on the spot" (Quine 1974, p.37). 
The "appropriate utterance" is, of course, an Observation 
Sentence. These sentences are primitive (in that they "are 
our introduction to language, for they are the expressions 
that we learn to use without learning to use others first" - 
Quine 1977, p.157). They are, qua sentences, clearly 
verbal, but at the same time they are non-verbally 
referential in that they link language to a non-linguistic 
reality (ib. p.156). 
In effect, they are forced upon Quine by his abandonment of 
the traditionalists' Idea in favour of the sentence, a point 
he recognizes himself (ib. pp.155-157). As the concept of 
Idea drops out as irrelevant and that of Observation 
Sentence takes its place as the bridge between sensory 
stimulants and language then, as an empiricist, he has t 
talk in terms of them being "in closest causal proximity to 
the sensory receptors" and of their truth-value being 
determined only by "the sensory stimulation present at the 
time" (Quine 1969c, p.85), this last being intersubjectively 
checked by community agreement (ib. p.87). Once Observation 
Sentences have been acquired through "direct conditioning" 
(Quine 1974, p.42) then the child has the means to develop a 
language which can move further and further away from such 
sentences. In a very real sense, then, language is 
constructed from Observation Sentences, hence the similarity 
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to the position he was criticising in 1936. This means, in 
effect, that Quine's theory of first language acquisition 
depends upon his account of how these sentences are 
themselves acquired. 
That account attempts to avoid the privacy problems that 
Quine sees as being relevant to the traditionalists' 
accounts of the matter. Despite his acceptance of 
Wittgenstein's criticism of ostension, he still relies on 
ostension to trigger the innate quality spacing mechanism by 
claiming that the pointing finger, for example, emphasises a 
section of the visual field, so allowing this kind of 
sentence to be learned (ib. pp.41-45). As he says, the 
"learning of an observation sentence amounts to determining 
... its similarity basis ... the distinctive trait shared by 
the episodes appropriate to that observation sentence" (ib. 
p.43). This "innate sense of perceptual similarity" (ib. 
p.19) has been described earlier as "quality spacing", but 
here Quine emphasises that, although it is subjective, it 
also has "a degree of objective validity" (ib.) in that 
natural selection "will have fostered perceptual similarity 
standards in us" (ib.). 
Thus we are biologically predisposed to recognize certain 
perceptions as being similar. This predisposition is 
encouraged through ostension and conditioning to elicit 
Observation Sentences which can then be used to construct 
Occasion Sentences and Standing Sentences. The whole 
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process is facilitated by the way in which the interlocking 
nature of language leads the child from linguistic 
primitives to complexes via "contextual learning" (Quine 
1960, p.93). 
It was argued earlier (pp.17-18) that the traditional 
empiricists had a double-translation theory of meaning. 
Here, however, there is a double-translation account of the 
acquisition of language, in that sensory irritations are 
translated into Observation Sentences which, in turn, 
translate into the rest of language. This, then, involves a 
particular meaning theory and it is one that Quine makes 
quite explicit. 
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3.5 Quine's Empiricist Meaning Theory 
It has been said of Quine that his meaning theory is 
non-existent, in that 
in Quine's theories of language acquisition 
and use, the meanings of sentences play no 
role. An utterance is a response to verbal 
or non-verbal stimulations. No meanings 
intervene. Hence, there is no reason to give 
an account of how children learn the meanings 
of sentences. 
(Davis 1976, p.150) 
Even if that interpretation were correct it would be, of 
course, itself a meaning theory. However, Quine himself 
talks of his "verification theory of meaning" (Quine 1969c, 
p.81). This involves something called "empirical meaning" 
(ib.) and differs from the traditionalists' ideational 
reference theory by stressing the fact that "statements 
largely do not have their private bundles of empirical 
consequences" (ib. p.82). The meanings of sentences do play 
a role, contra Davis and Hacking (1975, pp.178-180), but the 
distinction drawn between different types of sentence is 
crucial here. 
Quine's holistic empiricism is again in evidence, for he 
argues that the coherence of one sentence with another is 
what gives most sentences" (ib. p.81 - my emphasis) their 
evidential base, their meaning, but Observation Sentences 
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are specifically excluded from this conclusion, for these 
are stimuli-dependent. As has already been shown (ib. 
pp.68-81), "the keying of sentences to shared stimulation" 
(ib.) is, for Quine, a necessary condition for Observation 
Sentences to have meaning, another being the stress he 
places on the conditioned learning that explains how 
"keying" occurs. This contrasts with the traditionalists, 
who would have replaced "shared stimulation" with "the 
individual's Ideas", but that there is a meaning theory here 
is beyond doubt. 
This meaning theory is very similar, if not identical to, 
the traditionalists' reference theory, for Observation 
Sentences at least (and, perhaps, by a reduction of the rest 
of language to such sentences, for language as a whole too -
a point that will be returned to later). The definition of 
these sentences as being "precisely the ones that we can 
correlate with observable circumstances of the occasion of 
utterance", as being "where meaning is firmest" and as 
having "an empirical content all (their) own" (ib. p.89) 
shows that meaning is here being used in the sense of 
empirically verifiable. This empirical verification 
proceeds by means of a two-way referential connection, from 
sensory stimulus to Observation Sentences and vice-versa and 
is mediated by the linguistic community itself (cf. Quine 
1969b, p.28). 
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It is, in effect, what might be called a Stimulus meaning 
theory (cf. Quine 1960, p.32), offered as an account of how 
one aspect of language, its first steps, have meaning. On 
its own, however, it does not constitute a meaning theory 
for the whole of language, this being derived from the 
holistic, or coherence, relationship described earlier. 
Quine's attempt to elucidate Observation Sentences by the 
use of the metaphor of their being "the anchor line" between 
public experience and language (Quine 1977, p.157) suggests 
another analogy here. Quine's two meaning theories are 
comparable to two aspects of ship-building. The first, his 
Stimulus meaning theory, applies to the building of a ship's 
keel. This has to be laid first, and all that follows 
depends upon it. The second, his Coherence meaning theory, 
applies to the rest of the ship. Without the former, the 
latter would never develop; without the latter, the former 
would not be a developed craft. Occasionally Quine stresses 
the latter (for example, when he says that "meanings are 
meanings of expressions" - Quine 1981a, p.44) and, on its 
own, such statements do support the interpretation that 
Davis and Hacking, for example, suggest. However the 
primacy, both temporal and logical, that he gives to 
Observation Sentences shows that such an interpretation is 
only a part of the story and that these sentences do have 
"their separable empirical meaning" (Quine 1981b, p.71), 
which is explicable by the use of his stimulus meaning 
theory. 
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These two meaning theories, and in particular his 
referential meaning theory, presuppose a philosophy of 
language, as does his account of first language acquisition. 
In fact, as will now become clear, to examine his philosophy 
of language is to do no more than continue the examination 
of various aspects of his holistic empiricism, especially 
its epistemological and metaphysical position, and so brings 
the description of his work full circle. 
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3.6 Quine's Philosophy of Language 
It was pointed out earlier that Rorty's distinction between 
impure and pure philosophy of language might help to 
distinguish traditional empiricism from what followed it 
(pp.15-16). However, it is clear from Quine's work that the 
three aspects of his philosophy already considered combine 
to produce an epistemological position which is certainly 
not "pure" in Rorty's sense of that term. Admittedly, Quine 
is not primarily concerned with refuting epistemological 
skepticism, as were the traditionalists, and his rejection 
of their key concept 'Idea' also marks a break with their 
work. 
Nevertheless, he produces an epistemology which has been 
"naturalized", in that his holistic empiricism leads him to 
reject the traditionalists' view that knowledge consists of 
"private bundles of empirical consequences" (Quine 1969c, 
p.82); his account of language acquisition leads him to 
emphasise both the individual's innate abilities and 
conditioning as helping to create knowledge; and his 
theories of meaning to reiterate the "impossibility of an 
epistemological reduction" (ib.) and to stress the 
importance of the individual. 
This produces a summary of his epistemological position 
which shows that, for Rorty at least, it remains as 'impure' 
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as that of the traditionalists 
The old epistemology aspired to contain, in a 
sense, natural science; it would construct it 
somehow from sense data. Epistemology in its 
new setting, conversely, is contained in 
natural science, as a chapter of psychology. 
(ib. p.83) 
Indeed, this is a viewpoint of Quine's work that Rorty 
himself accepts (Rorty 1980, p.299). Moreover, this 
naturalism is taken still further by Quine, again as an 
inevitable consequence of his theories of language 
acquisition and meaning, in that he believes that 
epistemology, perceived of as a part of psychology, might 
well advance by identifying evolutionarily valuable 
knowledge, and, perceived of as a part of linguistics, might 
be able to identify "perceptual norms ... taken as 
epistemological building blocks, the working elements of 
experience" (ib. p.90). 
It can be seen, then, that traditional empiricists started 
with an epistemological concern from which it is possible to 
generate an account of language acquisition and meaning 
theory, whereas for Quine the reverse appears to be true, in 
that his epistemology is consistent with a holistic 
empiricist account of language acquisition and meaning 
theory. His metaphysics is also no more than consistent 
with what has gone before and hinges on both aspects of his 
holistic empiricism, on 'holism' by stressing that 
individual words have a referential meaning only within the 
language as a whole, and on 'empiricism' by the 
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"stimulations" that produce the referents for Observation 
Sentences. It is not that knowledge requires no referents, 
for that would be to concentrate on his coherence meaning 
theory alone, but rather that some knowledge claims are 
sensory based, these being expressed through the medium of 
Observation Sentences. 
This account of reality (which locates meanings in language 
and to which the child accommodates as it first acquires 
language) is presented as a thesis concerning the 
indeterminacy of translation. Given (as a result of his 
holistic empiricism) that there are no "objective references 
of terms" (Quine 1960, p.79), no "fact of the matter" (Quine 
1977, p.167) to appeal to which might decide between two 
competing translations of a newly-discovered language, then 
such translations are indeterminate in that neither can be 
compared to the original meanings of native speakers. There 
is, moreover, a similar "empirical slack in our own beliefs" 
(Quine 1960, p.78), in that the further one gets from 
"sentences with visibly direct conditioning to non-verbal 
stimuli" (ib.) the more indeterminate one's meanings are 
within one's own linguistic community (Quine 1974, p.83). 
In effect Quine's problems of translation are problems of 
reference for that aspect of his philosophy which stresses 
the coherence of language as a system of mutually supporting 
meanings. If these problems are incapable of resolution 
then it would be impossible for a child to acquire language, 
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as he would have to start (and, at the same time, end) by 
acquiring the whole of language. Indeed, Quine makes a 
similar point when he warns against the "gratuitousness of 
... imputing our ontology" to the first words that a child 
utters (ib. p.82). 
As has already been shown he avoids this impasse by 
identifying a "referential part of language" (ib. p.84), the 
Observation Sentences. Ordinary language is "loosely 
referential .... loosely factual" (Quine 1977, p.168) and 
the tightly referential and factual aspect of language which 
is necessary for the beginnings and continuation of language 
is, of course, to be found in Observation Sentences. At 
this point Quine accepts that he is a physicalist (ib. 
p.169), for his concern with such sentences is with their 
public stimulations upon the subject's sensory apparatus, 
rather than with the object itself (whatever that might be) 
or whatever is occurring subjectively within the subject's 
neurological apparatus (Quine 1960, p.31). 
It can be seen, then, that his philosophy of language is 
neither purely nominalist nor purely realist, but a unique 
combination of these two which quite consistently reflects 
his holistic empiricism. It is in this respect that he can 
be further distinguished from the traditionalists, for they 
were more simply orientated towards some form of naive 
realism"). It now remains to show whether or not his 
empiricism is sound; that is, whether or not it produces an 
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adequate account of the fact that the vast majority of 
children do acquire language. 
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3.7 Critique 
As before, what constitutes an acceptable criticism of a 
system such as this must be couched within its own 
categories. This point is made, by implication at least, 
against Quine by Bennett when he says of his critique of 
some mentalist theories of meaning 
It is not clear to me how mentalism can be 
refuted by an argument which has behaviourism 
as a premiss; and I can imagine a mentalist 
accepting Quine's argument and using it 
contrapositively, as a reductio ad absurdum 
of the behaviourist approach to meaning 
(Bennett 1976, p.261). 
In fact there seems to be some ambiguity here with the 
concept "mentalism". Quine uses it to identify those 
meaning theories which posit "mental objects" as referents 
for terms (for example, Quine 1960, p.165), whereas Bennett 
seems to think that it refers to what he calls "the mental 
realm" (op.cit. p.80), which then allows him to talk of 
"mental items as theoretical entities" (ib. p.3). The 
position that Quine is criticising, as has already been made 
clear, is a mentalism which talks of mental items as real  
entities, namely Ideas, a point that Bennett appears to 
ignore. This apart, Bennett's comment is a fair one in 
that, if Quine were attempting external criticism of 
Bennett's conception of mentalism this would indeed be 
invalid. Such criticism would, in a similar way, misfire if 
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levelled against Quine's position. What has to be 
identified, as with the traditionalists, is some sort of 
internal inconsistency, which would include an inability to 
account for the fact of first language acquisition. 
It is probably fair to say that the vast majority of 
published criticism of Quine's work has concentrated on his 
philosophy of language, in particular his arguments 
concerning the indeterminacy of translation. Bennett, for 
example, believes that he can refute the thesis by 
suggesting that we have far more evidence than Quine allows 
to construct an adequate translation of a tribe's language 
(ib. p.261). However, this further evidence is nothing more 
than what Quine already allows. What counts for Bennett as 
"abundant behavioural evidence" (ib.) is itself necessarily 
ontologically based. Quine could thus easily meet Bennett's 
criticism, either by including Bennett's "evidence" under 
the assumptions he already accepts for such translation to 
proceed, or by showing that it predicates Bennett's ontology 
upon the natives. 
Another critic, Blackburn, appeals in a similar way to the 
fact that "indeterminacy may afflict the bleak physicalist 
outsider looking at me, but to me and to my fellow-speakers 
there is no shadow of indeterminacy to be seen" (Blackburn 
1984, p.281). As a matter of fact this does not seem to be 
the case, for such shadows are cast upon many of our 
concepts (cf. Gallie 1956). Moreover, it is important to 
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recognise that Quine's argument works on two levels: the 
outsider suffers from a radical indeterminacy when looking 
in at another linguistic community, but as an insider to his 
own community he suffers from a weaker indeterminacy, both 
kinds being resolved by reference to the appropriate 
Observation Sentences. Blackburn appears to have ignored 
the two kinds of indeterminacy as well as the manner in 
which Quine proposes they should be resolved. 
The way in which Quine is able to deal with such critics 
well illustrates the difficulty of treating aspects of 
Quine's philosophy of language in isolation from his work as 
a whole. However, the common factor in the replies 
suggested above is clearly his meaning theory, which in turn 
depends upon his account of first language acquisition, and 
criticism of this aspect of his work is less easy to meet. 
Harrison, for example, is correct in linking a criticism of 
Quine's indeterminacy thesis to his accounts of meaning 
theory, when he argues that there is an indeterminacy for 
Observation Sentences in radical translation, in that they 
do not allow the translator to perceive the connections that 
exist beyond such Sentences (Harrison 1979, p.116). Quine, 
however, could defend himself by arguing that there is 
indeed only a "significant approximation of stimulus 
meanings" (Quine 1960, p.40), not a perfect synonymy, and so 
radical translation proceeds in a halting, if not lame, 
manner. 
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Nevertheless, there are internal weaknesses in Quine's 
account of first language acquisition and its corresponding 
meaning theory and these hinge on the concepts of reference 
which he employs. As has already been shown (pp.68-71) he 
uses two meaning theories, both of which are, in a sense, 
reference theories. The first involves a straightforward 
reference of Observation Sentences to their stimuli, the 
second the holism of the remainder of language "referring", 
or cohering, with itself. Of these two theories the first 
is the more basic in that the second can only develop once 
the first has produced Observation Sentences. The question 
then arises as to whether or not the referential meaning 
theory for the anchor line of Observation Sentences is a 
sound one, for if it is not then the holistic reference 
theory is left, as it were, free-floating. 
The basic problem that Quine must deal with concerns the 
nature of the relationship between the linguistic 
Observation Sentences to the stimuli they are supposed to 
report. Quine talks about three distinct areas, words, 
stimulations and things (Quine 1960, p.26), but the last is 
connected to the first in that there is "talk of things" 
rather than, presumably, things themselves. How, then, are 
words connected to stimulations? 
One answer that he gives, for Observation Sentences, is in 
terms of conditioning. This psychological account, unlike 
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the psychology assumed by traditional empiricists, is open 
to criticism for Quine is aware of Chomsky's attacks and 
deals rather poorly with them. For example, he accepts that 
there is an innate base to his empiricism (Quine 1969a, 
pp.95-96) and seems to think that such an acceptance is a 
sufficient answer to Chomsky's criticisms. However, leaving 
aside Chomsky's conception of the nature of language for the 
moment, one major problem that Chomsky identifies for those 
who accept Skinner's categorisation of language is that the 
detail of Skinner's system is too ambiguous to be 
meaningful, for 
if we take his terms in their literal 
meaning, the description covers almost no 
aspect of verbal behaviour and, if we take 
them metaphorically, the description offers 
no improvement over various traditional 
formulations 
(Chomsky 1959, p.51) 
This ambiguity is as true of the key terms "stimulus" and 
"response" (ib. p.31-36) as it is for the term 
"reinforcement" (ib. pp.36-37). 
I have argued elsewhere (Gilroy 1980) that Chomsky's claim 
that these terms are "empty" and have "totally lost whatever 
objective meaning" they had (ib. p.37), is a sound one and 
so will pass over the detail of Chomsky's criticism. The 
point is that merely to accept that there is an element of 
innateness in empiricism is not enough to meet these claims 
of ambiguity within the psychological framework explicitly 
accepted by Quine. 
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It is, however, possible that Quine could hygiene out these 
ambiguities and produce a set of definitions which would 
make Skinner's terms more healthy. Such a move would then 
focus attention on another, related, answer that he gives to 
the question as to how Observation Sentences are linked to 
their stimulations. 
Quine claims that there is a "keying of language to external 
stimuli" (Quine 1969c, p.81), for it is the point at which 
these sentences can be "correlated" with their stimuli (ib. 
p.89), and so be related directly to their "nonverbal 
reference points" (Quine 1974, p.37). These non-verbal 
referents are certainly not Ideas and so, he believes, the 
standard criticisms of sense-data do not apply to his thesis 
(ib. p.41). 
However, two such criticisms, suitably re-phrased, do seem 
to pose a problem for his theory. The first would be that 
if meaning is stimulus-dependent then it should be possible 
to relate a particular stimulus to its meaning, a 
non-linguistic referent to its linguistic label. Quine does 
attempt something like this when he talks of "ocular 
irradiation" as being what he means by 'visual stimulation' 
(Quine 1960, p.31), so that one could observe the 
stimulation of a sense-organ, in this case the eye, and 
correlate it with what was uttered. 
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The difficulty here, of course, is in being sure that any 
particular stimulation is even logically necessary for the 
utterance, let alone logically sufficient. Furthemore, this 
difficulty is compounded when, as is usually the case, more 
than one sense-organ is stimulated at a given time. In fact 
Quine recognizes that as soon as the other senses are 
brought in then combinations of stimulation are possible 
which are not physically observable on the organs 
themselves, and it is a great pity that he decides to "pass 
over the detail of this" (ib. p.33), as a closer examination 
of this aspect of his account might have led him to realise 
that even at the level of Observation Sentences there is 
more to meaning than mere stimulus. 
To put this criticism another way, from Parmenides' Way of.  
Seeming to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, the problem of linking 
non-linguistic referents to their linguistic expressions has 
recurred almost, as it were, as a sine qua non of their 
reference theories of meaning. Given these two categories 
something more than a device drawn from the categories 
themselves must be used to link them. The category-bridge 
that is usually posited, ostension, leads to the second 
criticism of his thesis. 
As has been shown, Quine is heavily dependent upon ostension 
for both his meaning theory and his account of first 
language acquisition. He is, of course, well aware of 
Wittgenstein's criticisms of ostension (Quine 1974, p.44), 
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but seems to believe that these can be met by suggesting 
that the pointing finger, for example, heightens "the 
salience of a portion of the visual field (ib.) and that 
mistakes do occur when learning "the pointing custom" (ib. 
p.45). 
In order to avoid the criticisms of ostension that 
Wittgenstein advances Quine requires an account of ostension 
that would make it in some sense an innate, unlearned, 
biological ability. As such it would be a member of neither 
of the two categories it purports to bridge as it would be 
neither a non-linguistic referent (that is, some sort of 
"external stimuli" - Quine 1969c, p.81) nor a linguistic 
expression, but rather a biological "given" that allows for 
the "correlation" or "keying" of language to the stimuli 
(op. cit.). If he could provide such an account of 
ostension then, as it would not have to be learned (and so 
would not neccessitate some further explanation of what was 
required for it to be learned), it might well provide the 
basis from which learning begins. 
Quine clearly wants to accept that pointing is necessary to 
enable the first stages of language to occur. However, he 
also accepts that ostension is itself a "custom" and, as 
with all customs, it has to be learned. As such it cannot 
be used to account for what precedes learning as its 
aquisition post-dates the first steps of learning. It would 
follow that nothing he has said will allow ostension, in 
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itself, to bridge the category-gap between non-linguistic 
referents and their linguistic expressions for, qua custom, 
it is itself a part of the latter, linguistic, category. 
Quine is attempting to argue, in effect, that Observation 
Sentences are keyed to their referents by an aspect of 
language which is neither an Observation Sentence nor a 
referent, but a "custom", a part of the coherence meaning 
theory he accepts for the rest of language. If, however, 
customs are in some sense a part of the category of 
Observation Sentences then he would seem to have fallen prey 
to a similar regress that affected the traditionalists 
(p.26), a direct result of his double-translation account of 
language acquisition (p.67). If stimuli are the fount of 
Observation Sentences' meanings then first language 
acquisition consists in keying stimuli to Observation 
Sentences (and then linking Observation Sentences to the 
remainder of language). If, however, the "keying" is itself 
part of the category of Observation Sentences then either 
there is no account of the way in which these sentences gain 
their meaning, or the account given is couched in terms of 
Observation Sentences themselves. That is, in the same way 
that the traditional empiricists' meaning theory generated a 
regress of Ideas Quine appears to be generating a regress of 
Observation Sentences (where Observation Sentences provide 
the meaning of other Observation Sentences and so on), a 
regression that only becomes clear when one concentrates on 
his account of first-language acquisition. 
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It can be seen, then, that the modern empiricism that Quine 
advocates has, within its own terms, a debilitating problem 
of accounting for the initial acquisition of language. This 
problem infects his meaning theory and, through his 
philosophy of language, his empiricism itself, for once the 
account he gives of the initial acquisition of Observation 
Sentences is cast into doubt, then their use as a means of 
resolving the problem of the indeterminacy of translation 
and of naturalizing epistemology is also cast into doubt. 
In effect he is left with a holistic theory, but without its 
empirical base in Observation Sentences. Such a theory 
necessitates that language be first acquired, but cannot, 
within its own terms, account for that acquisition. It 
remains to be seen whether modern rationalism can deal any 
better with this problem. 
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SECTION IV - MODERN RATIONALISM 
Either then he has at some time acquired the 
knowledge he now has, or he has always 
possessed it. 
(Plato, Meno) 
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4.1 Introduction 
Perhaps the best-known representative of modern rationalism 
is Noam Chomsky whose work has recently been identified as 
providing "one of the intellectual landmarks of the 
twentieth century" (Matthei and Roeper 1983, p.67). For 
this reason alone one would be justified in examining his 
account of first-language acquisition: moreover, in doing 
so, one is examining psycho-linguistic theories of language 
and its acquisition, and so considering material which is 
relevant to this thesis in its own right. 
As will become obvious, Chomsky's non-philosophical 
background is very apparent and causes confusions for the 
philosopher-reader and, indeed, within his own work. For 
example, there are positions he adopts concerning the 
absence of a priori assumptions in rationalism and the 
existence of innate knowledge in children and adults which 
are supposed to distinguish his thesis from Quine's (Chomsky 
1966, pp.109-110, footnote 114). These positions, however, 
have been dismissed as being no more than "tossing out a 
shoal of red herrings" (Cooper 1973b, p.158), and as "an 
incoherent thesis" (Cooper 1975, p.88) or, at best, as an 
aspect of philosophy he "often mis-states ... and hardly 
ever gets ... into sharp focus" (Bennett 1976, p.158). 
These criticisms, and others, will be examined later, but it 
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should be noted that philosophical naivety and incompetence 
are not necessarily synonymous. 
However, this said, Chomsky's apparent ignorance of much 
modern work in the fields of philosophy of language and 
meaning theory relevant to his own concerns and, crucially, 
Frege's (in particular the way in which Frege allows one to 
operate with an Idea-free and holistic philosophy of 
language), gives his rationalism a very traditional 
emphasis. This becomes obvious when he criticises Quine's 
empiricism, for he talks of it(1)  as being "narrowly Humean" 
(Chomsky 1969a, p.53), which indicates a lack of 
appreciation of the modern, post-Fregean, movements towards 
the kind of philosophy of language identified above, as does 
the praise he heaps on Cartesian linguistics (1966). 
Modern empiricism's requirements, then, as identified 
earlier (pp.53-54), are not quite paralleled by Chomsky's 
rationalism, the divergence being, as will be shown, as 
important as it is slight. Moreover, because its "global 
and systematic character" (Searle 1971, p.10) is located 
firmly within Chomsky's background in linguistics, the 
direction of travel on the common thematic circle must be 
reversed (see p.54) so that one begins with an examination 
of his philosophy of language and ends with an account of 
what he takes to be an acceptable rationalism. 
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4.2 Chomsky's Philosophy of Language  
As Quine's philosophy of language is, for Rorty, "impure", 
Chomsky's too is "explicitly epistemological "(Rorty 1980, 
p.258), although not in the same way as Quine's is. Despite 
his concern with epistemology, Chomsky might with some 
justice argue that his is actually a form of "pure" 
philosophy of language, in that instead of attempting to 
deal with "problems about how to systematize our notions of 
meaning and reference in such a way as to take advantage of 
quantificational logic "(ib. p.257), which is Rorty's 
definition of pure philosophy of language, his programme 
consists of taking advantage of advances he pioneered in 
linguistic theory, in particular his work on 
transformational grammar, in order to make comments about 
meaning and reference in the context of first language 
acquisition. 
The question of its level of purity is of some interest for, 
if Rorty is correct, the greater the level of purity the 
lesser the chance of contamination with epistemological 
problems. The answer to this question hinges on how close 
quantificational logic is to transformational grammar, a 
point that Chomsky himself somewhat belatedly raises some 
twenty years after his first publications and which he in 
fact restricts to surface representations of his grammar 
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(Chomsky 1980, pp.147-148). 
	 This, however, is a problem 
which will be dealt with in detail later, although it should 
be noted that the epistemology which does intrude into his 
work appears, superficially at least, to be perfectly 
consistent with that of the traditional rationalists and 
their talk of innate ideas and knowledge. 	 Again, though, 
it must be stressed that this is perceived from the 
perspective of linguistics, as is everything he writes which 
seems philosophically exciting. 
Chomsky's philosophy of language is, in effect, a theory of 
grammar which contains an implicit philosophy of language. 
There are four staging posts to this destination and, like 
much of Chomsky's work, they are interconnected. 
1. Grammar 
For Chomsky, grammar is a "fundamental aspect of linguistic 
behaviour "(Chomsky 1957, p.15), in that it is "a device 
that generates all of the grammatical sequences (of a 
language) ... and none of the ungrammatical ones" (ib. 
p.13). 	 The apparent circularity here, of defining 
"grammar" in terms of itself, "grammatical sequences", is 
only avoided by giving "grammar" a technical, meta-use. 
There is an important ambiguity in the term, such that it 
can refer to the various rules of a particular language that 
allow its separate parts to be conjugated (Chomsky 1959, 
p.56), but it can also refer to something far more basic, 
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being "essentially a theory of the sentences of a language" 
(Chomsky 1961, p.120). 
It is this second, meta-aspect, of the term which supposedly 
avoids the charge of circularity, for it is, in effect, a 
definition of the language-generating device, rather than of 
that device's products. This becomes clear when, in later 
publications, he speaks of grammar as being "a system of 
rules that determine a certain pairing of sound and meaning" 
(Chomsky 1968, p.125), this being distinguished from a 
"sentence's ... other grammatical properties" (ib. p.150 - 
see also 1980, p.65). There is, then, a linguistic dualism 
proposed here, such that a language can be seen as operating 
using its particular rules of grammar, but the use of these 
rules and the rules themselves are a function of a 'grammar' 
which defines an individual's language. Thus when Greene 
defines Chomsky's undestanding of 'grammar' only in terms of 
the generative device (Greene 1972, p.34) she misses a 
dualism which, as will be shown, is fundamental to both his 
philosophy of language and his theory of first language 
acquisition. 
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2. Creativity 
A feature of children's language which has obviously struck 
Chomsky as being of great significance is the fact that they 
can produce more than they hear. It is this feature which, 
amongst other factors, leads him to reject Skinner's 
explanation of children's language learning which is couched 
solely in terms of environmental feedback (Chomsky 1959, 
p.42). Chomsky's conception of language is identical to his 
identification of the "fundamental contribution of ... 
'Cartesian linguistics'" to modern linguistics, namely "that 
human language, in its normal use, is free from the control 
of independently identifiable external stimuli or internal 
states" (Chomsky 1966, p.13). It is, he claims, only this 
freedom that allows one to account for the observable fact 
that a child's "knowledge of the language ... goes far 
beyond the presented linguistic data" (Chomsky 1965, p.33). 
For Chomsky this "creative aspect of language is its 
essential characteristic" (Chomsky 1964, p.51), the "central 
fact to which any significant linguistic theory must 
address itself" (ib. p.50). Skinner's account ignores the 
astonishing difference between the limited input to a child 
and the child's resulting almost limitless variety of output 
of language (Chomsky 1967, pp.122-123), whereas Chomsky's 
deals explicitly with what he sees as a purely empirical 
matter. He does this by connecting his identification of 
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the creative aspect of language to the dualism of his 
conception of grammar; more simply, if language is to be 
seen as grammar-dependent (see pp.91-92) and an individual's 
use and understanding of it is virtually limitless in its 
possibilities, then if follows that this creative aspect of 
language requires an account of grammar which will not be, 
so to speak, input-specific. 
3. Surface and Deep Language Structures  
Chomsky's dualism of grammar, coupled to his conception of 
the creativity of the language user (and, it must be said, 
his training as a linguist), produces an inevitable dualism 
of language expressed in terms of the surface and deep 
structures which all grammatical sentences are supposed to 
possess(2). Ordinary grammars (the so-called phase 
structure - 1957 -, constituent structure - 1961 -, 
taxonomatic - 1965 -, or surface structure grammars - 1968) 
are minimally acceptable as a way of structuring ordinary 
language, but fail to be completely acceptable for a variety 
of reasons, in particular in that they are "extremely 
complex, ad hoc, and 'unrevealing', that certain very simple 
ways of describing grammatical sentences cannot be 
accommodated ..., and that certain fundamental formal 
properties of natural language cannot be utilized" (Chomsky 
1957, p.34). 
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For these reasons Chomsky claims that such grammars, and 
their attendant linguistic theory, are "fundamentally 
inadequate" (ib.). This is, in brief, because they are 
"intrinsically incapable of yielding the systems of 
grammatical knowledge that must be attributed to the speaker 
of a language" (Chomsky 1965, p.54). He uses a host of 
examples to make this point about their inadequacy, all of 
which hinge on the fact that only to examine the surface 
level of a sentence, its actual words, is to miss the 
vitally important ways in which the sentence gains its 
meaning from elements which are "present" on a deeper level 
(see, for example, Chomsky 1968, pp.36-37), those "deep" 
elements being common to other, similar, surface sentences 
which they generate. 
The deep structure of language was originally described in 
terms of "the kernel of the language", to which "every 
sentence of the language will either belong ... or will be 
derived from ... by a sequence of one or more 
transformations" (Chomsky 1957, p.45). This developed into 
talk of "base Phrase-markers ... regarded as the elementary 
content elements from which the semantic interpretations of 
actual sentences are constructed" (Chomsky 1965, p.117), but 
the detail of this argument need not be developed here. 
The point is that Chomsky is clearly accepting dualism, but 
for him this is a dualism of language. He expresses this in 
terms of language having surface and deep structures, his 
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variation on the cartesian pineal bridge between these two 
aspects of his work being that of transformational rules. 
These rules are the necessary link between the deep and 
surface structures of language, in that 
one major function of the transformational 
rules is to convert an abstract deep 
structure that expresses the content of a 
sentence into a fairly concrete surface 
structure that indicates its form ... The 
transformational component is solely 
interpretive 
(Chomsky 1965, pp.136-137)(3). 
Thus the monistic phrase structure grammars which he 
criticizes as inadequate are to be replaced with a dualistic 
transformational grammar which includes both phrase 
structure and transformational rules, the latter providing 
the necessary bridge from the deep to the surface 
representation of language. 
4. Linguistic Universals 
Chomsky asserts that "the main task of linguistic theory 
must be to develop an account of linguistic universals" 
(Chomsky 1965, p.28), and he distinguishes, as he must to be 
consistent, between substantive and formal universals. The 
former "concern the vocabulary for the description of 
language", whereas the latter "involve rather the character 
of the rules that appear in grammars and the ways in which 
they can be interconnected" (ib. p.29), an example of the 
latter being the existence of transformational rules, of the 
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former that every language must contain ways of 
distinguishing between the first and the third person. 
As is to be expected, given that his concern is with 
linguistics, he sees the task of a theory of language as 
being, at heart, the identification of the "deep underlying 
similarities ... that are attributable to the form of 
language as such" (ib. p.35). This is, in effect, a 
linguist's Occam's Razor, in that particular features of 
languages do not have to be repeatedly described for each 
laguage but can, instead, be "reduced to universal 
properties of language" (ib. p.36). 	 In fact Chomsky 
actually defines "explanatory adequacy" in terms of the 
discovery of linguistic universals, a discovery which he 
sees as an empirical, rather than an a priori, matter (ib.), 
for the discoverer is simply extrapolating an hypothesis 
about a specific language's grammar and the testing of it 
against the data of other languages. If it holds then this 
hypothesis can be abstracted from the particular language 
and applies to "language in general" (ib. p.46) and at that 
point has reached the status of a linguistic universal. 
Chomsky clearly finds it difficult to separate talk about 
language from talk about grammar, such that it appears to be 
the case that these two terms are practically synonymous 
(for example, to learn a language is, in effect, to 
construct a grammar - Chomsky 1959, p.57). Indeed, this 
assumed synonymity is one of the basic criticisms that will 
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later be levelled against him, but it does make clear that 
what has so far been called a philosophy of language is, for 
Chomsky, a philosophy of grammar. It is still a 
meta-inquiry into the presuppositions of language (cf. 
pp.2-3), but whereas Quine, for example, can be seen as 
having a philosophy of language which uniquely combines 
nominalism and aspects of realism (cf. p.75), Chomsky's 
philosophy of grammar is less easy so to categorize. 
He himself identifies it as "a rationalist conception of the 
nature of language" (Chomsky 1967, p.127), but he does so 
for a reason that does not fit particulaly well with what 
has gone before. He claims that seventeenth century 
rationalist philosophers identified, in effect, his 
transformational grammar as a way of dealing with the three 
central aspects of linguistic competence (the creative use 
of language, founded on an abstract deep structure which is 
universal - ib. p.126). It is far from clear that this is 
what the traditional rationalists saw themselves as doing 
(see pp.30-42 and Cooper 1972), but even if Chomsky's reply 
to this were that it is clear (see Chomsky and Katz 1975, 
pp.78-79) it requires some further explanation as to why a 
transformational philosophy of language is necessarily 
rationalist. 
To put this point a different way, traditional rationalism 
can be formally identified as a thesis concerning the status 
of our knowledge of the world (see p.21), whereas Chomsky's 
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thesis deals primarily with our knowledge of the grammar of  
language, a distinction that he blurs when he equates "a 
rationalist conception of acquisition of knowledge" with his 
account of the particular acquisition of grammar (Chomsky 
1967, p.127). What, then, is his philosophy of language? 
The answer to this question is one that a combination of the 
four issues identified earlier (pp.91-97) makes clear. The 
creativity aspect of first language acquisition and his 
distinction between language's deep and surface structures, 
combine to produce a theory about the nature of language's 
"universal properties" (Chomsky 1965, p.35). This theory is 
couched in terms of "formal" linguistic universals (ib. 
p.30) which are connected to the non-universal surface 
structure of particular languages by the operation of 
transformational rules which "generate" the appropriate 
surface structure of a language (Chomsky 1961, p.129). 
This is, he claims, "a rationalist conception of the nature 
of language" (Chomsky 1967, p.127), although the reason that 
he gives for this attribution, the emphasis placed upon 
innate schemata rather than on experience, is singularly 
inappropriate. What actually identifies his position on 
language as being rationalist is not so much the weight 
given to innate mechanisms as opposed to experience (indeed, 
Quine has made it clear that empiricists accept that innate 
mechanisms are an integral part of their position - Quine 
1969a, pp.95-96), but rather its opposition to nominalism. 
Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition - p.100 - 
It is clear that the conception of language just sketched is 
some form of a realist one in that the identification of 
linguistic universals is supposed to identify the underlying 
structure of language, such realism having a grammatical 
base. In one sense at least this follows a long tradition 
of linguistic realism - as Palermo remarks, "we had accepted 
the Platonic notion of forms as soon as we had accepted the 
idea of deep structure as basic to language" (Palermo 1978, 
p.175) - and this is a point that Hook also raises when he 
attempts to argue that the acquisition of such universals 
requires an acceptance of Plato's doctrine of recollection 
(Hook 1969, p.162). 
However, Chomsky would be right to reject one Platonic 
interpretation of his work, that it requires "some sort of 
representation of what we mean that is outside the realm of 
the words that we choose to express it" (Matthei and Roeper 
1983, pp.81-82), for deep grammar is, in principle, 
expressible using the surface structure of language, as are 
the 'ideas' that Matthei and Roeper refer to, whereas 
Platonic Forms are inexpressible. Attempts to identify 
similarities between Chomsky and middle-period Plato require 
careful qualification, for the matching of the surface 
structure (cf. the world of senses) to the deep structure 
(cf. the world of forms), is not a simple matter of 
one-to-one representation. This said an element of Plato's 
realism can be discerned in his work(4), in that the 
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existence of grammatical universals is supposed to give 
meaning to the contingent expression and use of language, as 
Plato's Forms were supposed to give meaning to the sensible 
world. 
The question as to whether or not Hook is right to argue 
that such universals require a doctrine of recollection will 
be dealt with later. A modern (that is post-Fregean) 
rationalist philosophy of language, conceived of as a study 
of language qua language (cf. p.2), could well be a 
philosophy of grammar and could also consist of isolating 
universals of language in much the same way that Kant, 
Strawson and Quinton have, in their different ways, 
attempted to identify synthetic a-priori universals. 
Chomsky's work, then, could indeed be seen as a further 
example of such universal metaphysics, although his own 
emphasis on innate structures (rather than mine on 
grammatical universals) does not help such a modernist case. 
However, this aside, it now remains to see what theory of 
meaning develops within such a philosophy of language. 
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4.3 Chomsky's Theory of Meaning 
Given the dualist nature of his philosophy of language one 
might expect that his meaning theory would be some sort of 
translation account of how language's deep structure 
generates its surface structure's meaning. In fact Chomsky 
shifts his position slightly on this topic. 
He begins by claiming that "grammar is autonomous and 
independent of meaning" (Chomsky 1957, p.17). This fits 
badly with his philosophy of language in that, as a 
philosophy of grammar, it is explicitly excluding questions' 
of meaning form its remit and so appears to leave unanswered 
the question of where meaning is in fact to be located. In 
fact the context of this claim makes it clear that he wants 
questions of grammar to precede those of meaning, which is 
to remain consistent with the philosophy of language already 
identified. He is, in effect, making meaning (the semantic 
aspect of language) dependent upon grammar (the syntactic 
aspect of language), rather than the reverse. 
This becomes clear when he later claims that part of 
understanding (that is, attributing meaning to) a new 
sentence consists of "determining the process by which this 
sentence is derived in this grammar" (Chomsky 1959, p.56), 
rather than deriving a grammar from the meanings one already 
has. Here "grammar" is meant to refer to the deep structure 
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of language, so that: 
the meaning of a sentence is based on the 
meaning of its elementary parts and the 
manner of their combination ... the 
grammatical relations expressed in the 
abstract deep structure are, in many cases, 
just those that determine the meaning of the 
sentence 
(Chomsky 1965, p.162). 
It is interesting, however, that his listing of what will 
constitute an adequate theory of linguistic structure makes 
no mention of meaning, only of grammar, which again shows 
the synonymy he assumes between "deep" grammar and meaning, 
and which is quite consistent with his philosophy of 
language (ib. p.31). In fact his interpretation of 
Descartes' conception of an Idea indicates that meaning is 
indeed deep-structure dependent (Chomsky 1966, p.98, 
footnote 70), and is communicated in discourse "because of 
the virtual identity of this underlying system in speaker 
and hearer" (ib. p.71). This is a view shared by, amongst 
others, H. and C. Cairns, when they define an individual's 
linguistic competence in terms of the ability "to encode his 
own thoughts into understandable utterances and to decode 
the speech of others" (Cairns and Cairns 1976, p.187). It 
is, however, not a position that Chomsky retained (pace  
Bennett 1976, p.252). 
It is not clear why Chomsky felt the need to replace his 
translation account of meaning with an interactive one, for 
the philosophy of language which provides its base does not 
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alter. He still wishes to retain the view that it is 
grammar which "determines a certain pairing of sound and 
meaning" (Chomsky 1968, p.125), and not the "conditions of 
use, linguistic context, frequency of parts, etc." (ib. 
p.150). What alters, however, is the new stress on the way 
in which: 
both deep and surface structure enter into 
the determination of meaning. Deep structure 
provides the grammatical relations ... that 
enter into the determination of meaning. On 
the other hand, it appears that matters of 
focus and presupposition, topic and comment, 
the scope of logical elements, and pronominal 
reference are determined, in part at least, 
by surface structure 
(ib. pp.110-111). 
It is as if Chomsky has a dualistic conception of meaning 
which parallels his dualistic philosophy of language or 
grammar. The first elements of meaning are the "surface", 
concrete, aspects of language and these can be specific to a 
language: the second element, however, is the "deep", 
abstract aspects of language, which are universal and upon 
which surface meanings, via transformational rules, 
ultimately depend. Meaning, however, is still 
grammar-dependent (Chomsky 1980, p.59) and, deep-structure's 
universals are logically and empirically prior to 
surface-structure's actual, concrete, language. 
Either of these two meaning theories are very similar to the 
conception of logical form which identified the work of both 
Russell and the early Wittgenstein, although strangely 
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enough Chomsky himself resists equating his deep-structure 
with logical form (ib. p.147). They involve either a 
one-stage or, in 1980 (ib. p.145), a two-stage "mapping" of 
meaning from the abstract to the concrete level of language 
(Hacking 1975, p.90), the two-stage account being neatly 
described as a "dog-legged theory" (Blackburn 1984, p.43). 
There is a real danger, however, that Chomsky might generate 
a regress of mappings within either his one or two-stage 
theory. Blackburn correctly emphasises that, to avoid this 
problem, Chomsky requires "a manner of representation which 
is guaranteed, whose mere presence ensures that it also 
represents the right thing. There must be a medium which 
carries its own interpretation with it" (ib. p.44), this 
being achieved by "positing interior mental objects" 
(Chomsky 1980, p.13). 
It should be noted that, although he occasionally uses the 
term 'Idea' to refer to such "objects" (for example, 1966, 
p.98, footnote 70, or 1967, p.128), he prefers to talk about 
sentences having a "mental representation" (Chomsky 1969b, 
p.58) which is "part of the innate condition" (ib. p.63), 
and so appears to avoid a straightforwardly traditional 
Ideational theory. What he requires is a term to identify 
the abstract "internalized system of rules", which are 
synonymous with knowing a language (Chomsky 1968, p.27), 
which are akin to the traditionalists' Ideas (Chomsky 1966, 
p.40), but which are distinguishable from them in that they 
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are "in the mind" (Chomsky 1980, p.91) and are not acquired 
from the external world. As he says, they are, as the rules 
of transformational grammar, "represented in the mind as a 
'real object'" (ib. p.120). Such a term might well be 
transformational representations, so producing a meaning 
theory which could be typified thus: 
Language has meaning 
via the interaction between the 
universal deep and the particular 
surface languages' structures 
mediated by universal transformational rules 
or, more simply: 
UDS 	 + UTR 	 + PSS 	 = LM 
Universal Universal 	 Particular Language's 
Deep 	 Transformation Surface 	 Meaning 
Structure Rules 	 Structure 
where UDS and UTR are seen as being the transformational 
representations of meaning" (ib. p.65), the mind's real 
objects. 
This appears to be an atomistic theory of meaning, in that 
"the meaning of a sentence is based on the meaning of its 
elementary parts and the manner of their combination" 
(Chomsky 1965, p.162). It is, however, more complex than 
Dale, for example, has suggested. Although there is some 
truth in asserting that, for such a theory, "the meaning of 
each word is a collection of basic elements of meaning" 
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(Dale 1976, p.172), Chomsky does talk of sentence meaning 
and also adds the mediating factor of transformational 
rules. Dale's account is that of a traditional referential 
meaning theory, whereas Chomsky's, as has been shown, has a 
subtlety provided by his transformational representations. 
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4.4 Chomsky's Theory of First Language Acquisition  
His account of the acquisition of language is perfectly 
consistent with his philosophy of language-as-grammar and 
his transformational representation variation on a 
translational meaning theory, and is in opposition to that 
of empiricists, in particular Skinner and Quine (see Chomsky 
1959 passim and 1964, pp.80-81, respectively). As he says, 
"The child who learns a language has in some sense 
constructed the grammar for himself on the basis of his 
observation of sentences and non-sentences" (Chomsky 1959, 
p.57), this being the "extremely complex and abstract" 
grammar of deep-structure (ib.). 
Given his philosophy of language this assertion is not so 
much a "fact" as a logical consequence of what has gone 
before and requires some further explanation of the 
operations of this "hypothesis-formulation activity of 
unknown character and complexity" (ib.). This is provided 
by his transformational grammar (Chomsky 1964, p.62), which 
allows the child to construct language using his "tacit 
knowledge of ... (linguistic) universals" (Chomsky 1965, 
p.27). 
Given Chomsky's definition of "language" the child's tacit 
knowledge of deep-structure universals is inferred as a 
necessary precondition for having a knowledge of language, 
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and so Davis' criticism that he cannot ascribe such 
knowledge of linguistic universals to the child (on the 
grounds that a condition for such a description is that the 
child must be able to tell us of them - Davis 1976, p.82) 
misfires. The detail of his "strong ... claim ... about the 
innate concept-forming abilities of the child and the system 
of linguistic universals that these abilities imply" (ib. 
pp.30-37), is given in terms of a language acquisition 
device (ib.), which is an "innate human faculte de language  
..., an empirical hypothesis" (ib. p.37). 
Thus, for Chomsky, the real problem of language acquisition 
is that of describing the innate ability which will 
accommodate the existence of linguistic universals without 
at the same time forcing a universal account onto the 
obvious variety of the surface structures of languages (ib. 
p.58). That is, the problem of language acquisition is, in 
effect, the problem of making universals particular, of 
making "one's innate ideas and innate principles" actual 
(ib. p.59). It is, then, a matter of being "genetically 
programmed" to acquire language (Aitchison 1976, p.32), 
although Aitchison's definition of language as "biologically 
controlled behaviour" (ib. p.88) is certainly not one that 
Chomsky would accept. 
It should be noted at this point that the creative aspect of 
language which so impresses Chomsky (for example, 1968, 
p.166) is accounted for here. A child's "innate 
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interpretive principles" (Chomsky 1966, p.62) function in 
such a way that they allow him to go far beyond the 
linguistic data that he might actually observe (Chomsky 
1967, p.126), and this explains the creative aspect of 
language use. 
In one sense, of course, there is no account of first 
language acquisition, for if the acquisition of the surface 
structure of language is dependent upon the deep structure 
of language then the problem of first language acquisition 
is, in effect, the problem of the acquisition of deep 
structure, a point that Chomsky himself makes (ib. p.125). 
However, he also wants to say that these "are not learned" 
(Chomsky 1966, p.59), or invented (Chomsky 1968, p.88), that 
"there is no more point asking how these principles are 
learned than there is in asking how a child learns to 
breathe ... they constitute an empirical assumption about 
the innate basis for the acquisition of knowledge" (Chomsky 
1969b, p.64). At this point he is clearly making use of the 
remainder of his philosophy of language to give some 
substance to his view that the language faculty is some sort 
of mental organ, "analogous to the heart" (Chomsky 1980, 
p.39). 
Another interpretation of the reason for such an account, 
however, is that, given what has gone before, in particular 
his theory of meaning, he cannot give an account of how deep 
structure is first acquired without positing an even deeper 
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structure to provide its base. This variation on Plato's 
Third Man argument is, in effect, an infinite regress which 
Chomsky has to halt by an appeal to something which is 
itself not learned (cf. Oksaar 1977, p.31). It follows that 
he cannot have a complete account of the acquisition of 
language (as he defines language), because one aspect is 
acquired, the other is assumed. This important problem will 
be dealt with more fully in what follows. 
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4.5 Chomsky's Rationalism 
It is clear from Chomsky's work that he sees himself as a 
rationalist, but what is not so clear is quite what sort of 
a rationalist. His emphasis on "the contribution of the 
child to language learning" (Chomsky 1959, p.58) and the 
innate or tacit aspect of knowledge is certainly 
rationalist. Moreover, there are times when he appears to 
use the terminology of the traditional rationalists, with 
his talk of "the doctrine of innate ideas" (Chomsky 1967, 
p.128), "the mental representation of sentences" (Chomsky 
1969b, p.58), of the mind as some sort of organ (Chomsky 
1980, p.39), and with his attempt to show that the 
traditional rationalists were in fact modern rationalists in 
disguise (Chomsky 1966). 
However, what identifies him as a modern rationalist is the 
emphasis he places on linguistics, which is consistent with 
the conception of a possible post-Fregean rationalist 
philosophy of language outlined earlier (pp.100-101). It is 
this emphasis which leads him to talk of "mentalistic 
linguistics" (Chomsky 1965, p.193, note 1) and of his 
"rationalist conception of the nature of language" (Chomsky 
1967, p.127). Thus what has been called his 
"neo-rationalism" (Stern 1969, p.191) is to be distinguished 
from traditional rationalism by its emphasis on 
transformational linguistics rather than on mind, as Chomsky 
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(and, for that matter, Stern) claim. It is this 
Transformational Rationalism which leads him to criticise 
the extreme Empiricism of Skinner (Chomsky 1959) and the 
Holistic Empiricism of Quine (Chomsky 1969a) and both of 
which, incidentally, misfire in so far as they represent an 
external, rationalist, criticism of empiricist 
presuppositions. 
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4.6 Critique  
Given this transformational philosophy of language, meaning 
theory, rationalism and account of first language 
acquisition it remains to show whether or not it can be 
criticised internally. Rorty's criticism of impure 
philosophy of language is difficult to apply here because, 
although Chomsky argues that there is an aspect of his 
theory which "maps directly onto ... logical form" (Chomsky 
1980, p.147) and which is, presumably, purified of 
epistemology, the transformational aspect is, in part at 
least, an epistemological thesis. It is, therefore, a 
theory which mixes pure and impure philosophy of language 
(cf. p.95-96) and, for Rorty at least, is a mix of 
traditional and modern approaches to the subject (cf. p.17). 
As will become obvious this cocktail is not necessarily one 
that is acceptable to all, although it does allow Chomsky to 
give some semblance of coherence to his various theses by 
shifting from a modern to a traditional account of his 
concerns whenever one will not bear the weight he places 
upon it. 
As has already been shown, his philosophy of language 
depends upon four aspects of his account of 
language-as-grammar, and so a criticism of this aspect of 
his work is best developed by concentrating on each of these 
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in turn. 
(i) Grammar 
It was remarked earlier that there is a whiff of circularity 
in Chomsky's dualist account of grammar (pp.91-92), which is 
supposed to be dispelled by distinguishing two logically 
distinct concepts of "grammar". Abelson, for one, has 
argued that depth grammar "is itself an innate idea" and so 
can provide nothing more than a circular "support" of innate 
ideas (Abelson 1969, pp.218-219), which is a rather clumsy 
way of putting the same point. Indeed, Chomsky could easily 
refer to other aspects of his work which support the 
existence of depth grammar in isolation from any hypothesis 
about innate ideas and so slip Abelson's formulation of the 
problem. 
The question is, given a distinction between surface grammar 
and that which generates it, deep grammar, is it possible to 
define one independently from the other? 
This problem, which is analogous to the problem of 
identification facing those who accept a duality of body and 
mind, is not one that Chomsky seems to think important. Yet 
if these grammars are not clearly distinct then some form of 
what might be termed linguistic materialism could result 
(see p.100) and the same problem crops up again when he 
deals directly with the two types of structures. Suffice it 
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to say that if his philosophy of language can be shown to be 
monistic, rather than dualistic, then the remainder of his 
work loses its dualistic flavour too. For the time being, 
given how little he says on this part of his subject, it is 
probably best to assume that there is a distinction so as to 
see where the argument leads. Notice, however, that the 
existence of such a distinction is assumed by some of what 
follows, rather than argued for and, moreover, produces a 
similar distinction for the concept of "language" (in that, 
if grammar is the "fundamental" aspect of language and there 
are two distinct grammars then, presumably, there are two 
distinct languages). 
(ii) Creativity 
This term is certainly far from fixed in its meaning and its 
slipperiness lends support to Chomsky's use of it. Amongst 
other things it can be used to indicate the obvious fact 
that a child's language does go beyond the actual instances 
of language he observes. In this sense as a speaker the 
child avoids merely parroting what he has heard already, 
creating new sentences for himself. Similarly he is no mere 
computer, able to understand only the sentences he has been 
programmed to understand("), for his understanding is of new 
sentences as well as old. 
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There is, then, a creativity of language, in terms both of 
the output and the input of the child's linguistic universe. 
This is certainly one aspect of the concept that Chomsky 
uses, but on its own will clearly not support the weight he 
wishes to place upon it, as he recognises in arguing that 
such creativity produces a suspicion, rather than confirms a 
hypothesis, about the nature of a child's language use 
(Chomsky 1967, pp.122-123). A second aspect of the concept 
is thus required, that which make linguistic creativity 
"knowledge-dependent". 
The second interpretation of the concept makes the point 
that the child can "produce and understand instantly new 
sentences that are not similar to those previously heard ... 
nor obtainable from them" (Chomsky 1965, pp.57-58). It also 
builds in the view that this understanding requires some 
sort of "knowledge" of these sentences' grammar (as both the 
production and understanding of a new language qua grammar 
is a production and understanding of a new grammar). 
Creativity, in this sense, is a creativity of grammar, an 
important point that Chomsky does not make explicit. 
There is, than, a dualism involved again here. The first 
use of "creative" could be explained in terms of a child's 
operation of language's surface grammar: the second, 
however, requires the use of deep grammar, a 'requirement' 
which is no more than an assumption of this particular 
interpretation of the concept (cf. Cooper 1975, p.104). So 
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the apparent connection between the language user's 
creativity (an empirical fact) and his knowledge of deep 
grammar (a linguist's fiat) is no more than the result of a 
conceptual ambiguity. Both are a linguist's fiat once it is 
recognised that creativity, in its second sense, is being 
given an interpretation which matches it to the particular 
conception of language-as-grammar Chomsky advocates. 
Thus the acceptance of the view that a child uses language 
creatively does not necessarily lend support to the case he 
wishes to make about the nature of language. This criticism 
of a central aspect of Chomsky's work is made the stronger 
by being generated from within his own presuppositions. The 
particular interpretation of "creative" which Chomsky gives 
the concept does indeed appear to support his thesis 
concerning the deep structure of language, but this is only 
an appearance, based as it is upon a definition of 
"creative" which assumes the thesis it is meant to support. 
Platts is probably right to suggest that "creative" should 
be replaced with "boundless" or "novel" (Platts 1979, p.46), 
as this reduces the apparent force of Chomsky's claim about 
knowledge, although Chomsky could build in a similar 
epistemological component to these replacements and so 
reintroduce the fallacy of petitio principii. However, it 
is clear that this aspect of his philosophy of language 
either states an obvious fact about language use, or assumes 
a view of language which is, to say the least, contentious. 
In either case it adds little weight to his thesis 
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concerning the philosophy of language. 
(iii) Surface and Deep Structures  
As has already been shown, the necessity that Chomsky 
accepts as supporting his positing the existence of deep 
structure is a linguist's necessity, based as it is upon a 
particular view of grammar (pp.94-95). It has been argued 
that this is, at best, a weak necessity, for some linguists 
claim that they can make the surface structure of language 
provide all that deep structure is supposed uniquely to 
produce (for example, Braine 1963). Even if such claims 
were to be found unsound the empirical "necessity" of his 
concept of creativity has just been shown to be, in effect, 
the necessity of tautology. This leaves only a thesis 
concerning the nature of language-as-grammar, in essence 
that "linguistic usage can only be fully explained by a 
two-level theory" (Greene 1972, p.190). 
It may well be the case that, contra Braine, a grammatical 
analysis of language does require a two-stage theory and it 
certainly would then seem to follow, if grammar and language 
were virtually synonymous, that an analysis of language 
would require a similar dualism of analysis. Two questions 
immediately raise themselves: are grammar and language 
virtually synonymous and, if they are not, does an analysis 
of language require a two-stage theory? 
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Unfortunately, Chomsky's assimilation of these two aspects 
of linguistic use (grammar and what it is a grammar of) is 
not clearly stated, but rather assumed. That is, for 
Chomsky, questions concerning aspects of language (for 
example, the question as to what identifies two sentences as 
being synonymous) are to be answered by an appeal to matters 
concerning grammar, but that court of appeal has yet to be 
identified as the relevant one. It might, for example, be 
better to identify other aspects of language as a means of 
explaining problems within language, rather than assuming 
that some sort of external grammatical analysis will resolve 
these problems. This assumption is further to be resisted 
as it produces the problem of identifying an explicit, 
underlying, grammatical "referent", for example, the single 
structure which makes two "surface" sentences synonymous 
(cf. Cooper 1975, p.89). As can be seen, the language-user 
is simply being defined as a grammar-user, with no clear 
support being given for this definition. 
In fact the implausibility of this definition is recognised 
by Chomsky himself, who stresses that the ordinary language 
user does not necessarily have the grammarian-linguist's 
knowledge of either the surface or the deep structure of 
language (Chomsky 1969b, p.154). Such a claim seems to 
suggest that there is a distinction to be drawn between 
grammar and language, for if one can use language correctly 
without knowing of its deep and surface grammars then this 
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knowledge appears irrelevant for language use. To impute 
some sort of innate knowledge of these grammars to a speaker 
is to do no more than provide a linguist's structuring of 
one aspect of language: it does not appear to show that all 
aspects of language use are grammar-generated, only that 
some are grammar-descriptive. In effect, a tool for 
describing uses of language appears to be replacing that 
which it purports to describe. 
Perhaps Chomsky could produce arguments to support the 
emphasis he wishes to give to grammar over language. Even 
if he could, however, there is another internal difficulty 
with this aspect of his work which concerns the nature of 
the need to link the deep and the surface structures of 
language. The analogy with Descartes' appeal to the pineal 
gland was made earlier (p.96) and it suggests that there is 
a similar internal weakness with Chomsky's thesis. Given 
that the deep and surface structures of language are 
irreducibly different in kind (after all, the former 
expresses that which the latter cannot, at an abstract 
rather than concrete level) then clearly they need to be 
linked in some way. 
The problem is, however, that the transformational rules 
which provide the link are not a part of the deep structure 
of language, but operations upon them. Indeed, when 
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discussing what he terms the "creativity" of language 
Chomsky stresses that the fact that it is possible to move 
from a finite "input" of language to an infinite "output" of 
language supports his thesis that there must be an innate 
knowledge of the grammar required to link the deep and 
surface structures of language (Chomsky 1967, pp.125-126; 
Chomsky 1968, p.29). Leaving aside the question as to 
whether or not this is in fact a real difficulty which has 
to be faced or rather the result of an ambiguity in the 
concept of creativity (see above, pp.117-118), it would 
seem, given his dualism of language, to follow that 
descriptions of these rules would have to be couched in the 
expressions provided by either the deep or surface structure 
of language. 
That is to say, the transformational rules which purport to 
link deep and surface structures of language can only find 
expression in one of the two exhaustive categories of 
language. If this were the case then it would seem to be a 
category mistake to use as a link that which can only be 
explained in terms of one of the two categories concerned. 
Moreover, this suggests that it might be better to see 
language in monistic terms and so avoid the problems that 
have bedevilled dualistic conceptions of language, a point 
that will be developed later. Plato's Forms and Chomsky's 
deep structures, therefore, share an important, internal 
problem in that, on their own terms, they are divorced from 
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that which they are supposed to explain, sensible or surface 
meanings. An appeal to grammatical operations upon deep 
structures does little to asist that explanation, except 
pile confusion upon confusion. 
(iv) Linguistic Universals  
Given what has gone before it should be clear that Chomsky's 
acceptance of linguistic universals is in fact no more than 
an acceptance of certain grammatical universals (p.96ff). 
Thus what at first reading appears philosophically 
significant can be seen on closer analysis to be no more 
than an "imposition of universals through translation" 
(Cooper 1975, p.178), for a particular view of grammar is 
being used to translate other, surface, grammars into its 
own particular structure. Various languages may well share 
a common grammatical deep structure, but this is more a 
comment on the linguist's original starting point than on 
the languages themselves. In fact Chomsky appears to 
recognise this point when he asserts that his discovery of 
linguistic universals is an empirical one (p.120), although 
quite how universal an "empirical universal" could be is 
another matter (cf. Cooper 1975, pp.165-166 on the "bizarre 
uses of the term"), especially as he accepts that 
"universals of grammar 'tolerate exceptions"' (Chomsky and 
Katz 1975, p.85). 
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The problem here is clearly still internal to his thesis and 
so grips that much more tightly. If he could show that 
there were universals of language then, given the disparate 
nature of languages, this would support the view that 
languages had some universal, and thus common, base of 
sorts. The existence of such universals would then, in 
turn, support his conception of creativity, rescuing it from 
the level of straightforward fallacy. 
However, if all that he has succeeded in doing is to 
indicate that a linguist's particular grammatical framework 
can be made to apply to most languages then on its own this 
conclusion does nothing to support his concept of creativity 
and, at best, indicates that there may be a universal sortal 
tool for languages. There is clearly no need for a language 
user to have knowledge (of whatever sort - cf. Cooper 1975, 
pp.58ff) of this tool to be a competent language user. 
There is an obvious distinction to be made between the way 
in which languages are used and how they are to be sorted, a 
distinction which Chomsky blurs. This is not to say that 
such a distinction means that "no coherent principles 
underlie language" (Matthei and Roeper 1983, p.154), only 
that to claim that the only kind of "coherence" is a 
two-stage grammatical one is of nothing like the same status 
as the claim that the coherence in question is one provided 
by linguistic universals. 
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This so-called rationalist conception of language (p.99) is, 
then, in many important ways better described as a 
rationalist conception of grammar. It is, however, less 
persuasive than it might at first appear because if its four 
elements are themselves internally weak, then the result of 
their combination (p.99) is also weak. If Chomsky is 
involved in a search for some sort of synthetic a priori  
knowledge (pp.110-111) then the apparent contradiction of 
using contingent empirical work to produce non-contingent a 
priori conclusions is one that he should at least comment 
on. Finally, as will now become evident, the weaknesses 
identified in this philosophy of language carry through to 
the other aspects of his work under consideration. 
His meaning theory is, as has already been shown, a 
translational one (p.102ff), from deep to surface grammars. 
However, given the problems already identified with this 
duality of grammar then it is to be expected that there are 
also problems with language's meaning being explained by 
reference to grammar's deep structure. 
One important difficulty is the "pineal problem" examined 
earlier (p.96 and p.102). If meaning is deep-structure 
dependent how does it bridge the gap to the surface of 
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language when the expression of the 'bridge' seems to be a 
part of language's surface structure? A second. A second, 
related, difficulty concerns the later version of his 
meaning theory (p.104), for if "grammatical relations" are 
merely ways a linguist describes languages, rather than 
parts of those languages' meanings, then it would appear 
that meaning is to be found in the surface of language and 
can thus easily be acquired at the same time as the concrete 
aspect of language is acquired. These difficulties combine 
to suggest that there is no need to go beyond the surface 
structure of language to account for either its meaning or 
its acquisition (hence the suggestion that his dualism could 
be seen as a materialist account of language - p.116). 
Even if these points could be met the disguised referential 
theory which is at the heart of his theory of meaning is 
also internally weak. The transformational representations 
(p.106) are referents of meaning in the sense that, for 
Chomsky, they are the mind's "real objects" in acts of 
meaning. The similarity between them and the 
traditionalists' Ideas is, of course, one that Chomsky notes 
and, unfortunately, brings with it a similar problem, namely 
how to move from this mental category to the physical 
expression of its meanings. 
An appeal to transformational rules is of little use here as 
these rules seem to be a part of one of the categories they 
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are meant to be escaping, not a bridge between them. Notice 
this is not the modern problem of privacy, which in any case 
is one Chomsky finds a "pseudo-argument" (Chomsky 1980, 
p.13); rather it is a disguised problem of a category shift. 
In passing it is worth noting that this atomistic (or, at 
best, sentential) meaning theory tends to support the 
disguised category shift, by claiming that ordinary language 
is to be giving meaning by reference to something other than 
language. A more thoroughgoing holism, such as Quine's, 
points away from deep structures to the actual use of 
language in order that meaning might be identified. 
It is one of the main theses of this work that a philososphy 
of language is only adequate, on its own terms, if it can 
account for the first acquisition of language. This account 
may be either implicit or, as is the case with Chomsky, 
explicit. The internal weaknesses already identified, 
however, make it clear that his theory of first language 
acquisition, and thus his philosophy of language, is 
seriously flawed. 
If "language" is to be described in terms of "grammar" then, 
in a very real sense, Chomsky does not have an account of 
the first acquisition of language, only of grammar. 
Moreover, even if, in spite of all that has already been 
criticised, he still wanted to argue that the first 
acquisition of language depended upon the acquisition of 
grammar then, again, his attempt to avoid a "Third Man" 
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regress of grammars by introducing a grammar which is not 
itself dependent upon a further grammar might well halt the 
regress. Unfortunately the introduction of such a 
regress-free grammar results in Chomsky asserting that this 
deep grammar is already "on board", so to speak, which 
means, as he recognises, that it cannot be acquired (p.110). 
Consequently he does not, and cannot, account for the 
acquisition of deep grammar. 
This crippling deficiency in his work is one that he 
attempts to resolve by talking of an innate language 
faculty, its existence being an "empirical assumption" 
(Chomsky 1969b, p.64). It should be clear by now that this 
is certainly not an empirical assumption, but rather a 
logical conclusion forced upon him by his philosophy of 
language and, in particular, by his meaning theory. As such 
it is logically valid, in that it follows from what has gone 
before, but its empirical validity is less easy to accept. 
This is, in part, because empirically speaking its atomistic 
approach "isolates language acquisition from other areas of 
knowledge and from the socio-cultural environment of a 
child" (Oskaar 1977, p.139). As important, however, is the 
empirical fact that it is language which is in fact acquired 
by a child, rather than grammar (cf. Cooper 1975, pp.37-38), 
and this empirical point means that Chomsky's system forces 
him to address (and even then not deal with) the wrong 
question. Furthermore Chomsky cannot even consider the 
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"right" question, namely how language is first acquired, 
without inevitably translating it into another question, the 
acquisition of grammar. It is indeed "a serious dilemma if 
the most powerful and successful descriptive system provided 
by linguistics is one that cannot be learned" (Villiers and 
Villiers 1978, p.67). 
The "dilemma" identified here is not merely an externally 
imposed one (that is, it is not simply the result of this 
thesis refusing to accept Chomsky's equation of "language" 
and "grammar"), for even the criticisms advanced here which 
are internal to his work show that on his own terms deep 
grammar cannot be acquired. It is not even that Chomsky has 
retreated to "innateness" to postpone the problem (Putnam 
1967, p.116). Unless he accepts the doctrine of 
recollection (pace Hook 1969, p.162), and then 
satisfactorily resolves the regress of recollections which 
that involves, he can only attempt to speak of what Hook 
claims is unintelligible, of some sort of faculty "inherited 
with the germ plasm" (ib.). 
It is this vagueness, incidentally, which leads to confusion 
concerning his use of the concept of "innate" (see, for 
example, Wells 1969). As interpreted here he means by this 
term biologically "innate", as opposed to epistemologically 
"innate" (another modern rationalist, Vendler, well aware of 
the ambiguity inherent in this term replaces it with 
"native" - Vendler 1972, p.140), although Chomsky's view 
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that the deep structure of language is in some sense an 
innate part of our genetic structure is, to say the least, a 
desperate way to make his form of rationalism attempt to 
account for the acquisition of language. 
Lyons claims that the verdict to be returned on Chomsky's 
work is "not proven" (Lyons 1970, p.114). Given what has 
been argued here this is clearly too generous a verdict. 
There are serious internal difficulties with his philosophy 
of language and meaning theory. Even if these could be 
resolved 
	
that resolution could not produce an account of 
the acquisition of a first language or, for that matter, of 
deep grammar without at the same time casting into doubt the 
rationalism within which it is couched. Modern 
Transformational Rationalism is, then, to be rejected on its 
own terms as incapable of accounting for a phenomenon, the 
first acquisition of language, that it recognises as of the 
first importance. 
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SECTION V 
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF MEANING, THEORIES OF LANGUAGE 
ACQUISITION, AND THEIR PROBLEMS. 
You will usually find that the enemy has 
three courses of action open to him. And 
of these he will adopt the fourth. 
(von Moltke) 
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Before moving on to the more positive side of this thesis it 
is worth pausing in order briefly to summarize what has gone 
before, the more so as the substantive points made in 
previous sections will here be used to develop a position 
which is intended to avoid the kinds of criticism that have 
been levelled against the empiricists and rationalists 
already examined. 
The thesis was introduced in Section I by pointing out that 
the vast majority of work on first-language acquisition is 
produced by linguists and psycho-linguists, not 
philosophers, and that all three share the common un-argued, 
assumption that their data is propositional language (that 
is, verbal communication). 
Section II developed the nature of valid criticism. It was 
argued that, given the nature of these presuppositional 
connections, attacks on them could only succeed if they were 
internal, working within the appropriate presuppositions. 
External attacks on the presuppositions themselves simply 
misfired. However, one phenomenon which all but the most 
solipsistic sceptic is forced to accept is that language is 
certainly acquired by the child. It follows that if it 
could be shown that a particular philosophy of language, 
theory of meaning or description of first-language 
acquisition did not, on its own terms, allow for language to 
develop this would constitute a valid and damning criticism 
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of the position. A less-worryingly destructive, and still 
valid, criticism would consist of showing that there was 
some internal inconsistency between the particular 
philosophy of language and its theory of meaning - less 
worrying because it could, presumably, be met by tinkering 
with one or other of those links in the chain leading to, or 
from, the account of first-language acquisition. However, 
if this tinkering resulted in loss of contact with that 
account then, of course, the more destructive criticism 
would be released to prey upon the position. 
The second major point of this section was to defend my 
concern, qua philosopher, with this area by arguing that an 
account of first-language acquisition contains an implicit 
(or, in some cases, an explicit) theory of meaning which, in 
turn, can generate a philosophy of language, these last 
being properly the concern of a philosopher. So described 
one is moving from the specific to the general, but the 
connections are tight enough to allow for mutual 
implication, thus facilitating the alternative movement from 
the general to the specific, from the theoretical to the 
substantive. A second justification for the philosopher's 
concern with accounts of first-language acquisition followed 
in that, qua philosopher of language or meaning-theorist, he 
is, implicitly or explicitly, presenting an account of 
first-language acquisition. Thus one major point was 
established in Section II, that philosophers are properly 
concerned with accounts of first-language acquisition"-). 
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Having established the nature of valid criticism, the 
validity of the philosopher's concern with first-language 
acquisition, and, in passing, the relevance of particular 
kinds of philosophical debate for linguistics and 
psycho-linguistics, Section II continued by applying the 
first two theses to traditional empiricist and rationalist 
philosophers in order that they could be substantiated. The 
general conclusion reached was that, contra the standard, 
post-Fregean criticism of the traditionalists' use of the 
concept "Idea", the only attack which they could not fend 
off was one directed at their accounts of first-language 
acquisition. 
The two theses were then applied to the more subtle, 
post-Fregean, empiricist theory of Quine in Section III and 
to the modern rationalist, psycho-linguistic theory of 
Chomsky in Section IV. These, it was argued, both fail to 
account adequately for first-language acquisition, although 
for reasons peculiar to other aspects of their particular 
meaning theories and/or philosophies of language. 
As a consequence of the arguments presented in the preceding 
four sections the position now reached is one which requires 
the development of a third thesis, namely, a philosophy of 
language and meaning theory which would allow for language 
to be acquired by the child (or, conversely, an account of 
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first-language acquisition which would rest upon a meaning 
theory and philosophy of language which were internally 
sound). Two possible candidates for this third thesis will 
now be examined, the first Davidson, the second 
Wittgenstein, and both will be rejected, one more firmly 
than the other. This will lead to von Moltke's fourth 
course of action, the development of a philosophy of 
language, a theory of meaning and an account of first 
language acquisition which will be based upon a different 
and, it is hoped, justifiable assumption about the nature of 
the data relevant to communication. 
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SECTION Va - DAVIDSON 
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5a.1 Davidson's Formal Semantics  
It is often useful to attempt to trace the influences on a 
philosopher's thought in order that the developed theory 
might be seen more clearly in its embryonic state. Given 
the complexity of Davidson's work this approach is 
particularly helpful. There are, in effect, three major 
figures who affect Davidson's thought in their different 
ways, Frege, Tarski and Quine (cf. Ramberg 1989, chapt. 3, 
passim). 
Frege's influence can be seen in Davidson's development of 
the argument that "sense" (meaning) is public and is given 
holistically "in the context of a proposition" (Frege 1884, 
p.Xe). This results in a public referential theory of 
meaning where "the truth value of a sentence is its 
referent" (Frege 1892, p. 216), which has been examined 
above (Section III, pp.47ff) as a watershed in the 
abandonment of the centrality of the concept 'Idea' for 
meaning theory. In the context of Davidson's thought, 
however, Frege's work can be seen as first linking the 
concept of reference to the theory of truth, a link which 
Davidson opposes (that is, contra Frege, it is not reference 
but "truth ... (which provides) the bridge between 
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non-linguistic and linguistic concepts" - Ramberg 1989, 
p.37). With Frege, if understanding the meaning of a 
proposition consists of understanding how its truth-value, 
its referent, is determined then it would appear that the 
meaning of a proposition results from understanding the 
conditions which determine that proposition's truth-value. 
Moreover, this meaning must be context-free (that is, must 
not be dependent upon an individual's intentions or social 
context), otherwise the whole thrust of Frege's argument 
would have been deflected and "sense" would have reverted to 
the private referential domain. Thus two aspects of 
Davidson's formal semantics can be seen in gestation, the 
first being the connection made between a sentence's meaning 
and its truth value, the second being the formal, 
context-free, nature of truth. 
Tarski's influence can be seen operating on the detail of 
the theory of truth, in that he identifies one condition 
that any theory of truth must satisfy. In context this is 
the result of a resolution of the liar paradox (Tarski 1944, 
p.58). Tarski's resolution hinges on the removal of the 
paradox's self-reference with the aid of a distinction 
between language and meta-language, this being achieved by 
making it clear that a sentence such as "'This is p.137' is 
true" is part of the latter, thus making truth not a part of 
the grammar of a sentence but a part of its semantics or 
meaning. 
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For Tarski, then, a sentence is true (and is so stated in a 
meta-language) if it is related to what is the case; but 
this is no crude correspondence theory, as he rejects talk 
of "facts" as being "misleading" (ib. p.71). Instead of 
connecting a sentence's truth to knowledge of a "fact" 
outside language he connects it with the aid of the concept 
of "equivalence" to the language itself, making epistemology 
irrelevant to this semantic conception of truth. So instead 
of the sentence, "This is p.164" being true if in fact this 
were p.164 Tarski produces the equivalence statement "This 
is p.164 is true if and only if this is p.164". On this 
account of truth, then, identity statements (equivalences) 
take over the role of the concept of truth(2). 
In so doing a criterion has emerged for a satisfactory 
theory of truth, the ability to replace sentences in a 
language with their equivalence statements. Thus, with 
Harrison, Tarski provides "a goal of analysis" where the 
production of equivalence statements would identify whether 
or not, for any given language's sentences, we could 
"understand their logical structure, and be in a position to 
state their truth conditions" (Harrison 1979, p.129). This, 
then, is a "criterion of success, or adequacy, for formal 
semantics" (ib.) and these "equivalences of the form(T)" 
(Tarski 1944, p.55) are at the very heart of Davidson's 
work. 
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Quine's work has already been examined in some detail 
(Section III) and so will only be mentioned here. His 
concept of radical interpretation, especially as it applies 
to a rejection of speakers' beliefs and meanings as 
explaining such interpretation, is an influence which finds 
expression in Davidson's "Principle of Charity". This 
"principle" is Davidson's basic tool for rejecting the 
intensional concepts that the alternative philosophy of 
language of Grice and Searle(3) rests upon and, crucially, 
for bridging the gap from the area of formal language which 
Tarski concentrated on to that of natural language. Indeed, 
it could be argued that without such a bridge Davidson's 
work is, in effect, merely a philosophy of formal language 
and is irrelevant to the concerns of philosophy of language 
per se.  As will be shown this is a criticism that Davidson 
is well aware of and he uses his Principle of Charity to 
allow him, amongst other things, to make reference to the 
intensional concepts of belief and meaning which seem, at 
first sight at least, to be so much a part of language. 
All three of these influences are acknowledged by Davidson 
(1984, p.xx) but there is one other which deserves mention 
as it is less clearly identified, yet helps explain his 
acceptance of aspects of the work of Frege, Tarski and 
Quine. An alternative theory of meaning to Davidson's, 
provided by "those who undertake to define or explain 
linguistic meaning on the basis of non-linguistic 
intentions, uses, purposes, functions and the like: the 
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traditions are those of ... Wittgenstein and Grice" 
(Davidson 1974a, p.143), is rejected on the grounds, amongst 
others, that the non-linguistic area is explicated in terms 
of meaning. 	 Davidson claims that such an alternative is 
hopelessly flawed in that it makes use of the very concept, 
meaning, that it is supposed to be analysing. In reaction 
to this alternative he believes that what is required is an 
explanation of meaning which does not use intensional 
concepts and so presuppose meaning - such a theory must be 
"explicitly semantical in character ... a theory of truth in 
Tarski's style" (ib. p.149) and it is this which Davidson 
presents. 
Having provided a framework for Davidson's work it now 
remains to describe that work with the triad of assumptions 
used before, to explain why it should be seen as a 
compromise between Quine and Chomsky and then to attempt an 
internal critique. 
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5a.2 Davidson's Philosophy of Language 
For Rorty Davidson has produced "a purified and 
de-epistemologized conception of the philosophy of language" 
(Rorty 1980, p.259) in that he, like Wittgenstein in the 
Tractatus, has attempted "to systematize our notions of 
meaning and reference in such a way as to take advantage of 
quantificational logic" (ib. p.257). Such a pure philosophy 
of language concentrates on "the inferential relations 
between sentences" (ib. p.259), "diagramming the relations 
among the sentences" (ib. p.308) and, for Rorty at least, 
avoids the infection of epistemology if only because it 
avoids reference to the specific contexts of language use. 
The philosophy of language is "pure" in that there are 
logical questions which precede empirical questions 
concerning what is to "count as knowing a language" 
(Davidson 1965, p.7) and it is these which Davidson is 
concerned with. One could add that another factor in his 
work which would allow for the ascription of this epithet is 
his initial concentration on formal language which would 
inevitably bring Rorty's grail of purity that much closer. 
Having said this, however, it is clear that Davidson is 
concerned with natural languages and so moves some distance 
from that grail. Thus Davidson, qua formal semanticist, 
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identifies the philosophy of language in two ways. Firstly, 
the philosophy of language defines "the formal properties" 
of expressions so as to pick "out the class of meaningful 
expressions" and, secondly, it specifies the meaning of 
every sentence" in a way that depends effectively and solely 
on formal considerations" (ib. p.8). Yet he subsequently 
asserts: 
The main, if not the only, ultimate concern 
of philosophy of language is the 
understanding of natural languages ... 
interpreted formal systems are best seen as 
extensions or fragments of the natural 
languages from which they borrow life. The 
inevitable goal of semantic theory is a 
theory of a natural language couched in in a 
natural language. 
(Davidson 1973a, p.71). 
This apparent contradiction in his view of what is an 
acceptable philosophy of language can be resolved once it is 
realised that, unlike Tarski, he believes that it is 
possible to connect the formal to the natural (Davidson 
1967, pp.27-28). This is to be achieved by redefining "the 
central problem of philosophy of language" (Davidson 1977b, 
p.219) so as to utilise Quine's holism and abandon "the 
concept of reference as basic to an empirical theory of 
language" (ib. p.221). 
With Quine, Davidson is clearly not a realist, as he rejects 
any reference to reality (ib. p.225); on the other hand, 
again with Quine, he wants the inscrutability of reference 
to be a point about reference, not reality, so he is no pure 
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nominalist either, with the relativism that such nominalism 
would imply (Davidson 1979, p.234). It is as if the 
combination of holism and empiricism (although not Quine's 
brand of empiricism, for here it is a sentential, not 
sensory, empiricism of "finite ... semantical primitives" - 
Davidson 1965, p.9) inevitably produces a combination of 
nominalism and realism(4)  which for reasons that will become 
clear, one might better term sentential empiricism. Given 
this philosophy of language a particular approach to meaning 
is generated. 
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5a.3 Davidson's Theory of Meaning 
Strictly speaking Davidson does not have a theory of meaning 
as classically conceived or, if he does have one, then it 
could be called a redundancy theory, for problems of meaning 
drop out of consideration, being replaced by problems 
concerning truth. This, of course, is an inevitable 
consequence of his philosophy of language and is produced by 
a unique aggregation of the work of Frege, Tarski and Quine. 
The first intimation of a difference between his meaning 
theory and those provided by others is provided by the 
question he sets himself to answer. He does not see himself 
as dealing directly with the questions, "How do words 
mean?", or, "What is meaning?" which, as has already been 
indicated usually produce some form of reference theory. 
This kind of question is rejected on the grounds, amongst 
others, that "'Theory of meaning' is not a technical term, 
but a gesture in the direction of a family of problems" 
(Davidson 1977b, p.215). What Davidson sees himself as 
doing is identifying and dealing with the more important 
problems, summarised by attacking the question, "What is it 
for words to mean what they do?" (Davidson 1984, p.xiii). 
The difference between this and the previous questions, is 
literally, one of interpretation, for he sees the answer to 
his question as being "a necessary feature of learnable 
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language" (Davidson 1965, p.3). However, the answer that he 
in fact provides is, to begin with at least, an answer to 
another question, "what it is for a theory (of meaning) to 
give an account" of how sentence meaning depends upon word 
meaning (Davidson 1967, p.17). This, then, is going to be a 
search for a "clear and testable criterion ... for a natural 
language" seen as identifying "reasonable demands that may 
be put on a theory of meaning" (ib. p.35), as opposed to 
what has gone before, a pseudo-technical inquiry into 
meaning itself. 
There are, asserts Davidson, two demands that must be 
satisfied. The first is that any such criterion must 
"provide an interpretation of all utterances, actual and 
potential", the second that it must be "verifiable without 
knowledge of the detailed propositional attitudes of the 
speaker" (Davidson 1984, p.xii). In effect, then, these 
demands can be seen as a re-working of Quine's problem of 
radical interpretation. If "uninterpreted utterances seem 
the appropriate evidential base for a theory of meaning" 
(Davidson 1974a, p.142) then the problem, as Davidson sees 
it, is to explain the move from uninterpreted to interpreted 
speech so as to include all utterances (demand one, above) 
and to achieve this in a non-circular way (two, above). 
This would result in a semantic theory based upon "evidence 
... described in non-semantical terms" (ib.). 
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It follows that if meaning is to be seen in terms of 
interpretation then it becomes necessary for Davidson to 
give an account of interpretation. This he does, at first 
with reference to "a necessary feature of a learnable 
language" (Davidson 1965, p.3) and later more directly when 
he deals with the theory of interpretation itself (Davidson 
1973b). Of course this treatment of meaning as 
interpretation results in a confirmation of Davidson's whole 
approach to meaning theory, for the central problem becomes, 
inevitably, a matter of giving an account of sameness of 
meaning, of interpreted and interpretation(). 
Given this as the problem which meaning theory has to 
resolve then it is clear that sameness of meaning cannot be 
explained by reference to meaning without assuming the point 
at issue. Davidson accepts that Frege has shown it is the 
sentence, rather than the word which, as a name, carries 
meaning, but Frege's "switch from reference to meaning leads 
to no useful account of how the meanings of sentences depend 
upon the meanings of the words ... that compose them" 
(Davidson 1967, p.20): in fact, of course, given Frege's 
argument that the basic unit of meaning is the sentence then 
he cannot, without inconsistency, go beyond that base to 
individual words. 
Thus Davidson concludes that "meanings as entities" drop out 
of consideration in a theory of meaning because they cannot 
"give the meaning of every sentence in the language ... they 
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have no demonstrated use" (ib. pp.20-21). To provide such 
meaning one must go beyond the sentence to the context of 
the language itself, such holism being implicit in the 
suggestion that an adequate theory of meaning must entail 
all sentences of the form "'s means m'" (ib. p.22). 
However, this level of generality requires that "m" cannot 
be replaced by some sort of singular term, so Davidson 
replaces it with "that p", where "p" is a sentence in the 
language and, as such, is unable to name a meaning. 
This still leaves the connection "means that" with all the 
problems of intensionality (especially circularity) that 
Davidson claims it brings. His "radical" way of dealing 
with the problem is to enlist the aid of Tarski's 
equivalence statements, for "s means that p" could, with the 
appropriate theory, replace 'p" with a sentence equivalent 
in meaning to "s". The obvious candidate for equivalence is 
"s" itself (if "p" is part of the language of "s", or a 
translation of "s" into the language of "s" if it is not). 
The troublesome "means that" is then left for Davidson to 
"sweep away" (ib. p.23); "s" is given the predicate "is 
true" and "p" a "sentential connective", as opposed to an 
intensional one. The result is "s is true if and only if 
This attempt at an extensional theory (one cannot add "of 
meaning" as this would be a contradiction in terms, an 
extensional theory of intensional "meaning") can, therefore, 
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be represented in the following way: 
1 s means m (in a holistic context) 
2 s means that p 
3 s means s (where "p" is part of the language of "s") 
4 s = s 
5a s is true 
5b if and only if p 
so 6 s is true if and only if p 
This, claims Davidson, allows for an explanation of the 
meanings of sentences as dependent upon the meanings of 
words in that he has provided a recursive definition of 
truth in that language (that is, he has provided a condition 
for such an explanation in the terms of a mathematical-style 
definition), which provides a way of testing the truth 
values concerned with certainty, the condition being in the 
form of Tarski's equivalences(T). So a test for "the 
adequacy of a formal semantical definition of truth", that 
it generates only true biconditionals of the form "s is true 
if and only if p" (which, in Tarski's case, is applied only 
to the formal language of mathematics), is here being 
offered as a test for an account of meaning in language per  
se. 
His conclusion is that he has produced, in a "mildly 
perverse sense" a theory of meaning which makes no use of 
meanings and his summary is worth quoting at length: 
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There is no need to suppress, of course the 
obvious connection between a definition of 
truth of the kind Tarski has shown how to 
construct, and the concept of meaning. It is 
this: the definition works by giving 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
truth of every sentence, and to give truth 
conditions is a way of giving the meaning of 
a sentence. To know the semantic concept of 
truth for a language is to know what it is 
for a sentence - any sentence - to be true, 
and this amounts ... to understanding the 
language. 
(ib. p. 24). 
It follows that whereas Tarski's equivalence statements 
analyse truth in terms of meaning (where "is true" is 
virtually synonymous with "means"05)  Davidson has "the 
reverse in mind" as he is taking "truth to be the central 
primitive concept ... detailing truth's structure, to get at 
meaning" (Davidson 1984, p.xiv). An example he uses makes 
this point well. He is only concerned with identifying a 
theory which entails the following and all other, trivial 
sentences, "'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is 
white" (Davidson 1967, p.25, footnote 9). It is, he claims, 
Tarski's theory which is successful in entailing such 
sentences, where "a theory of meaning takes the form of a 
truth definition" (ib. p.27). 
Complex though all this seems it does appear to have three 
"desirable characteristics" (Davidson 1970, p.57), namely: 
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1. it accounts "for the meaning (or conditions of truth) of 
every sentence by analysing it as composed in truth-relevant 
ways, of elements drawn from a finite stock" 
2. it gives "a method for deciding, given an arbitrary 
sentence, what its meaning is" and 
3. it does so in a non-circular way (Davidson 1970, p.56). 
The first and second characteristics meet the two conditions 
laid down earlier (p.144), the third characteristic adding 
to the second condition. These are "desirable" in that by 
explaining "how an infinite aptitude can be encompassed by 
finite accomplishments" (Davidson 1965, p.8) the theory 
allows for language to be learned, and by giving in a finite 
way its infinite meanings the theory allows for language to 
be understood. Moreover, it does all this without 
circularity. 
However, this is only described so far in terms of 
translating "s" and "p" within the same language which, 
superficially at least, lends support to his rejection of 
intensional concepts, for within a language one can easily 
explain meaning sententially by finding straightforward 
synonyms. The acid test would seem to be in retaining an 
extensional account of interpretation when explicating the 
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phenomenon of translation from one language into another. 
Davidson, of course, is well aware of this problem arguing 
that unlike the previous case, the test as to whether the 
theory of meaning for the alternative language is correct is 
no longer trivial. The goal is the same, the "infinite 
correlation of sentences alike in truth" (Davidson 1967, 
p.27), but there is no "direct insight into likely 
equivalences" (ib.). By maximising both the foreign 
speaker's self-consistency and our agreement with him, this 
being the Principle of Charity, one is then able to map what 
sentences the foreigner holds true onto what oneself holds 
true. 
This system is, as can be seen, identical to the more 
obvious, internal-translation, case but it makes clearer the 
way in which the intensional concepts are being excluded 
from consideration. The mapping proceeds by assuming that 
the logical form of the foreigner's language is identical to 
our own, so allowing for Convention T to apply "as a grid to 
be fitted on to the language in one fell swoop" (Davidson 
1973b, p.136) and continues by addressing those aspects of 
language which are not clearly held to be true or false. 
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Such an approach is intended: 
to solve the problem of the interdependence 
of belief and meaning by holding belief 
constant as far as possible while solving for 
meaning ... by assigning truth conditions to 
alien sentences that make native speakers 
right when plausibly possible, according, of 
course, to our own view of what is right. 
(ib. p.137) 
The consequence of this process is that one creates a 
"partially interpreted theory", producing "very thin 
evidence"")  to support the first mapping move. 	 Given the 
nature of Convention T, such evidence is in effect all that 
is needed to minimise Quine's indeterminacy, for once the 
core of true statements is mapped the rest of language is 
generated from it, a useful function of the holistic 
approach to truth. 
Davidson puts this point a different way when criticising 
conceptual relativism. He argues that we cannot begin to 
interpret without making assumptions about beliefs, but such 
assumptions can only be valid as a consequence of 
interpretation, so we must "assume general agreement on 
beliefs" (Davidson 1974b, p.196) and then assign truth on 
the basis of agreement in shared true sentences (in our own 
language) or with a contrived theory of truth (for another 
language). This "foundation ... in agreement" is his 
Principle of Charity and is "a condition of having a 
workable theory ... Charity is forced on us" (ib. p.197). 
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A theory that, as his does, "reconciles charity and the 
formal conditions for a theory" ensures communication 
between different languages. It does this by providing a 
bridge between them, the Principle of Charity, which 
operates by the translator assuming the correctness of 
"holding truth constant between the languages" (Ramberg 
1989, p.76). For Davidson, the concept of truth 
underpinning interpretation is an absolute one and it is 
only the expressions of truth which are, with Tarski, 
relative to a given language. In this way Davidson's 
Principle of Charity is not merely some sort of "pragmatic 
constraint on choice between different interpretations, but 
a precondition for interpretation" (ib. p.77): as such it 
"is forced on us...if we want to understand others" 
(Davidson 1974b, p.197) and so has to be applied across the 
whole of language (Davidson 1973b, p.136, footnote 16). 
Moreover, this approach to meaning goes beyond Tarski's own 
strictures concerning the non-application of Convention T to 
natural languages, which of course Davidson is well aware of 
(Davidson 1967, pp.27-29). His response to this problem is 
to criticise the assumption that there are two discrete 
kinds of language, formal and natural. The phenomenon of 
language can be treated in differing ways, depending upon 
one's "interests and methods"(Davidson 1970, p.59). It 
would follow that attempting to provide a "formal theory of 
truth for a natural language" (ib. p.55) is, contra Tarski, 
not in some sense a hopeless task. Indeed, at the level of 
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providing a formal theory of truth for a language, elements 
of a natural language can be seen as being part of a formal 
system, especially as the formal theory is necessarily 
couched in the natural language's terms and, for those who 
understand it at least, is a part of the natural language 
under consideration (cf. Davidson 1967, p.29). 
In these two ways, then, Davidson believes he has avoided 
Tarski's basic criticism that to apply Convention T to 
natural language is to transform ordinary language. There 
is no transformation of language, only an explanation of the 
precondition for interpretation, running alongside the view 
that there is no hard and fast distinction to be made 
between natural and formal languages. 
This, as he recognises, is a re-working of Quine's meaning 
theory (Davidson 1973b, p.136, footnote 16). That aspect of 
Quine's theory that makes mention of observation sentences 
(what has been termed here his Stimulus meaning theory - 
p.73), where "meaning is firmest" (Quine 1969c, p.89), finds 
its parallel in Davidson's "grid" of Convention T(8): that 
aspect which explains the rest of language (Quine's 
Coherence meaning theory - ib.) is paralleled in Davidson's 
Principle of Charity(9). Thus, instead of arguing for a 
theory of meaning which eventually rests upon the foundation 
of shared sensory experiences, Davidson argues for a 
foundation constructed from truth conditions. As he says, 
"What I have added to Quine's basic insight is the 
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suggestion that the theory (of meaning) should take the form 
of a theory of absolute truth" (Davidson 1977b, p.225)(3-°). 
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5a.4 Davidson's Account of First-Language Acquisition 
Given these accounts of the nature of philosophy of language 
and meaning theory it is possible to identify an account of 
first-language acquisition although, unfortunately, it is 
more implied than developed explicitly. In accord with the 
second major argument of this thesis Davidson proposes that 
a theory of meaning must, by giving "a constructive account 
of the meaning of the sentences in the language", be a 
"necessary feature of a learnable language" (Davidson 1965, 
p.3) and continues by criticising various meaning theories 
on the grounds that they do not allow for language to be 
"learnable". 
The implication is that he is going to provide an 
alternative to "shaky hunches about how we learn languages", 
whereas what is actually presented is a consequence of his, 
and Quine's, holism (that the first steps to learning 
language are best described not "as learning part of the 
language; rather it is a matter of partly learning" - ib. 
p.7) followed by an examination of what is to count as 
knowing a language. The consequence of this examination is, 
naturally enough, not an empirical account of language 
acquisition but rather an explanation of the formal 
constraints that such an account must operate within. 
Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition - p.155 - 
The central constraint is that of explaining how infinite 
meaning is possible from a finite set of given meanings and 
Davidson's explanation is that one must "discover a finite 
basic vocabulary in the verbal phenomena" so as to allow the 
meaning theory "to prove useful to a creature with finite 
powers" (Davidson 1984, p.xiii). This base consists of a 
"finite number of semantical primitives" (Davidson 1965, 
p.9), such primitives being defined as an expression in a 
sentence whose rules of meaning are not determined by 
meaning rules in sentences where they do not appear (ib.). 
If one removes the negatives from this definition then the 
identity with Convention T becomes clear: 
Semantical Primitives: dfn. 
an expression in a sentence whose meaning rules are 
determined by meaning rules in a sentence where it 
appears. 
Convention T: dfn. 
's' is true iff p 
It would follow that once these primitives were acquired 
then, as with Quine's Observation Sentences, there would be 
a base of meaning from which to grasp the remainder of 
language, for to acquire a semantical primitive is at one 
and the same time to acquire meaning. It is for this reason 
that Davidson claims that his theory of "meaning-as-knowing-
the-semantic-concept-of-truth" is empirical, for it can be 
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tested by showing that it does in fact give the basic 
structure of what is required to speak and understand 
language. It does this by "relating the known truth 
conditions of each sentence to those aspects ("words") of 
the sentence that recur in other sentences" (Davidson 1967, 
p.25), through moving from the finite known to the infinite 
unknown roles of words. It should be noted, however, that 
he does not explain the acquisition of these primitives in 
either of the two papers referenced above. 
At this point the earlier identification of Davidson's work 
as a possible compromise between Quine's empiricism and 
Chomsky's rationalism becomes clearer. In a sense Davidson 
has moved away from empiricism as soon as his "primitives" 
become sentential rather than sensory. If to that move one 
adds the emphasis on creativity (the need for an explanation 
of the infinite in terms of the finite), provided by the 
logical structure of Convention T, then the next step is 
inevitable, where "we see the natural language as a formal 
system ... (with) linguists and analytical philosophers as 
co-workers" (Davidson 1970, pp.55-56). 
Thus Chomsky's "deep-structures" would, to all intents and 
purposes, be identical to the logical form generated by 
Convention T (Davidson 1984, p.xv), a point of similarity 
which is reinforced when, speaking of a modified, 
Tarski-style, theory of truth, he says, "To belong to a 
speech community - to be an interpreter of the speech of 
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others - one needs, in effect, to know such a theory and to 
know that it is a theory of the right kind" (Davidson 1975, 
p.161). 
The picture here is much more rationalist than Davidson's 
acknowledgements to Quine might lead one at first to 
believe. Language acquisition is a matter of interpreting 
what is not known into what is, for, "The problem of 
interpretaion is domestic as well as foreign ... All 
understanding of the speech of another involves radical 
interpretation" (Davidson 1973b, p.125). However such 
interpretation does not proceed with the aid of some sort of 
translation manual, in that reference to the interpreter's 
own language is "otiose" once one realizes the universality 
of the structure of Convention T, hence "the only 
expressions a theory of interpretation has to mention are 
those belonging to the language to be interpreted" (ib. 
p.130). 
Although at no point does Davidson drift into talk of innate 
knowledge it should be clear from the above that what is 
taken to be "given" is, in fact, a theory of truth that 
satisfies Convention T; without such a theory (coupled to 
the Principle of Charity), communication-as-interpretation 
is impossible (Davidson 1974b, p.197). This, then, is not 
so much innate as rather a pre-condition for such a view of 
communication and the move towards rationalism is 
accelerated by the abandonment of reference as the point of 
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contact between "linguistic theory and events, actions, or 
objects described in non-linguistic terms" (Davidson 1977b, 
p.219). 
If some sort of empiricist reference is not the point of 
contact and, presumably, a rationalist's innate knowledge of 
linguistic deep-structure is also to be rejected (on the 
standard grounds that it prevents language being learned - 
although see what follows), then all that is left to explain 
the contact is the sentential Convention T, where one starts 
with some T-sentences and tests them against the rest of the 
language to see if they are in fact held to be true (ib. 
p.222), adjusting as one proceeds. It is, then, the concept 
of truth a \ la Convention T that "brings us back" from talk 
of language to talk of the world (Davidson 1973a, p.65), not 
innate knowledge or sensory information, and it is this 
which, within Davidson's work, is supposed to account for 
first-language acquisition. 
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5a.6 Critique 
As Davidson himself recognizes, what he is presenting is a 
metaphysic (Davidson 1977a, pp.213-214) and so, as before, 
valid criticism can only be internal to his system in that 
it must operate within the framework he accepts. The 
"purity" of his philosophy of language, for example, can be 
criticised by pointing out that it only is pure when, with 
Tarski, it remains at the formal level (assuming that truth 
can be explained in some formal way). However, as soon as 
Davidson begins to relate his philosophy of language to 
natural language then it loses its purity and takes on the 
epistemological concerns of the traditionalists. This 
problem becomes particularly clear when he says that 
knowledge of Convention T is a pre-requisite for membership 
of a "speech community" (Davidson 1975, p.161). 
However, the results of such criticism based upon notions of 
epistemological purity are in fact criticisms of Rorty's 
conception of the philosophy of language, not Davidson's. 
Indeed, Davidson's emphasis on natural language as the 
central concern of the philosophy of language (Davidson 
1973a, p.71) shows how far Rorty is from understanding 
Davidson's work and so this possible criticism misfires. 
Rorty's comments, however, do identify an area of possible 
tension. Davidson, as has just been indicated, is 
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presenting a "philosophy" of language which rests upon two 
pillars, a philosophy of formal language and the Principle 
of Charity. It could be argued (for example, by Tarski), 
that the move from the first of these supports to the domain 
of natural language is invalid if only because formal 
language is by definition logically consistent and natural 
language is not (Tarski 1944, p.60). 
At this point it becomes clear that the picture presented by 
the metaphor above is a false one. The Principle of Charity 
is not a support so much as a bridge (see p.139) which 
allows Davidson to make reference to the inconsistencies of 
natural language (see, for example, Davidson 1974b, p.197) 
within his general position on the philosophy of language. 
It is, indeed, a category shift to move from the formal to 
the natural, but this shift is one that he justifies (as it 
is part and parcel of his meaning theory it will be examined 
in what follows). 
For this reason it is probably best not to identify Davidson 
as a Formal Semanticist (as Strawson - 1970 - and Harrison - 
1979 - amongst others hold), but rather as a Sentential 
Empiricist (see pp.141-142). As such he can then be seen as 
making use of the insights of Formal Semanticists, such as 
Tarski, so as to continue Quine's task of modernising 
empiricism through a radical holism. It remains to be seen 
whether such empiricism has a meaning theory consistent with 
its account of first-language acquisition. 
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Generally speaking it is Davidson's meaning theory which has 
borne the brunt of most criticism. Hacking, for example, 
argues that it is a mistake to think that "means" and "is 
true if and only if" are directly reducible one to another 
as "provability" of T-sentences is required (Hacking 1979, 
p.142). This requirement is necessary so as to avoid the 
situation where two halves of a sentence might be true, the 
whole sentence would thus be true but, in an important 
sense, incorrect. Thus in his example, "The German sentence 
'Schnee ist weiss' is true iff the sun rose yesterday", both 
halves of the sentence are true, but "means" cannot be 
substituted as the connective. Even provability is not 
enough, as "I know what lots of sentences mean, but know few 
enough proofs of T-sentences" (ib. p.143). 
Davidson, as Hacking recognises, is not making this harder 
claim, only that he can "go from truth to something like 
meaning" (Davidson 1973a, p.74), this being achieved by the 
requirement that "there be just one systematic system of 
translation" (Hacking 1975, p.155), the twin evils of 
indeterminacy and incompatibility being avoided by the 
structure provided by a theory of truth and the agreement 
assumed by the Principle of Charity. Developed in this way 
Hacking believes that Davidson's work shows that "knowledge 
itself has become sentential" (ib. p.181), a position 
Hacking is happy to accept. 
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As has already been shown, of course, Davidson would also be 
able to accept this conclusion. Moreover, unlike Hacking, 
Davidson resists a drift to some form of sentential 
relativism that it might imply (see Hacking 1982), as he 
claims that his account allows him to "re-establish 
unmediated touch" with the world (Davidson 1974b, p.198). 
So, although on the surface Hacking appears to be arguing 
that there is no meaning theory here ("Davidson resuscitates 
meaning by administering the kiss of death" - Hacking 1975, 
p.179) what in context Hacking is claiming is that there is 
no theory of meaning-as-entities. There is, however, a 
theory of meaning-as-sentences and this is one that Hacking 
is happy to accept. 
This aspect of Davidson's account of meaning seems to have 
been missed by Hamlyn when, in criticising Davidson, he 
says, "meaning is a property of sentences; hence the idea of 
a semantic theory of truth is an incoherent hybrid" (Hamlyn 
1970, p.128). Davidson's theory of truth is semantic in 
that, with Tarski, its original context is that of a formal 
language, but it is related to ordinary sentences in the way 
described earlier. Thus the account of truth embedded in 
the new context of a natural language is supposed to bring 
with it an account of meaning. It is, then, indeed a 
hybrid, but it has yet to be shown that it is "incoherent". 
A more worrying criticism is that of Harrison, who 
concentrates on the idea of "solving for meaning". He 
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points out that the Principle of Charity is the tool used to 
"hold belief steady", but "the notion of truth-telling is 
itself derivative from the notion of an utterance" as, by 
implication, only the utterance of an assertion can be true 
or false (Harrison 1979, p.138). It would seem to follow 
that the application of Convention T to the task of 
translating a foreign language presupposes a knowledge of 
truth for that language which, in this theory's terms, means 
to presuppose meaning. In this way a reductio ad absurdum 
of Davidson's theory of meaning is apparently produced, as 
it would seem only to be able to explain meaning when 
meaning is already known('--). 
Davidson can probably avoid this conclusion by stressing 
that he is not defining truth-in-a-language, which is indeed 
relative "to times and speakers" (Davidson 1967, p.35), but 
rather "truth predicatehood" (Davidson 1973a, p.65). That 
is, Convention T is an absolute pre-condition of truth 
statements, but it is not itself a particular truth 
statement (the distinction here is that between a 
meta-language and an object-language, where his definition 
is couched in the meta-language and is a pre-condition for 
the application of truth in object-languages). Meanings, 
then, are not being assumed, only their pre-condition. 
In emphasising the distinction Davidson can lend support to 
his claim that the "truth of sentences remains relative to 
language" (Davidson 1974b, p.198) and "explicit appeal must 
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be made to speakers and their circumstances in giving a 
theory of truth" (Davidson 1977a, p.213), whilst still 
retaining his formal, objective, context-free Convention T. 
Such a defence, then, is analogous to the defence that 
Chomsky might make to such a criticism, namely that Harrison 
is criticising a dualistic theory as if it were a monistic 
one, ignoring the way that deep-structure (Davidson's truth) 
and surface-structure (Davidson's truth-in-a-language) 
inter-relate. However, as will be shown, the development of 
Harrison's criticism is not so easily answered. 
Another critic, Blackburn, has criticised previous meaning 
theories as being "dog-legged" (Blackburn 1984, p.40), in 
that language is given meaning by being interpreted in some 
other guise (traditionally, Idea) which has meaning within 
it. This avoids a regress of interpretation, but if the way 
in which meaning is so contained is not explained then 
meaning is not explained, only assumed, the assumption being 
hidden in the convolutions of the dog-leg (ib. p.43). 
Now it could be argued that Davidson's account of meaning is 
of this sort, where there is an unexplained end to 
interpretation, his variation of the "medium which carries 
its own interpretation with it" (ib. p.44) being Convention 
T. This possibility is in fact mentioned in Blackburn's 
early discussion of dog-legged theories (ib. p.66). In 
reply to the early criticism Davidson could stress, as was 
suggested he could against Harrison, his distinction between 
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pre-suppositional and particular language (the form of 
language as opposed to particular expressions within a 
language - 1967, p.31). 
In this way the dog-legged metaphor could be dismissed as 
being too simplistic, for meaning is not given in the 
uninterpreted base (Convention T): it is used in the 
language under consideration, mediated by the constraints of 
the common base (its commonality being "natural" - Davidson 
1965, p.8 - and "intuitively obvious" - Davidson 1973a, 
p.66) and not translated into it. In fact, given Davidson's 
acceptance of the sentential nature of meaning he could 
argue, with Hacking, that meaning was located in the 
sentence, which was in turn located in the language, so no 
interpretation of meaning takes place at all. In this way 
Davidson could defend himself by showing that his account of 
meaning does not even begin to move in a dog-legged fashion. 
Blackburn's detailed criticism is slightly different 
however, taking the alternative conclusion to the dog-legged 
one. He accepts that if Davidson's approach worked then 
"the fine-grained property of meaning (would emerge) ... 
from the discipline of finding a coarse-grained property" 
(Blackburn 1984, p.285). However, the approach hinges upon 
"a regressive theory of understanding (ib. p.299), for his 
explanation of our understanding of new sentences is given 
in terms of a formal derivation working on a prior 
understanding, which itself was generated from a still prior 
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understanding, and so on. 
This criticism can be met by Davidson in two ways. Firstly, 
he could point out that Blackburn's formulation of his 
position appears to suggest that he is introducing some sort 
of intensional concept, understanding, to replace meaning. 
Davidson is careful to make no direct mention of such a 
concept at this level of explanation and, as an intensional 
concept, its introduction would run counter to the whole 
position he is advocating (such concepts are shelved until 
meaning is "solved"). If "meaning" were substituted for 
"understanding" the nature of the misfire becomes clearer - 
there is no regressive theory of meaning because there is no 
theory of meaning. 
Secondly, and following from this, Davidson could also point 
out that his explanation of the "elasticity of language" is 
not purely in terms of Convention T and so is not purely 
formal. Admittedly, the functioning of a natural language 
is constrained by the logic of the formal language, but 
Davidson's point is that this constraint is empirically 
testable because, in one's own language at least, it 
produces trivial propositions (Davidson 1967, p.25). The 
formal theory does not explain the particular meanings so 
much as identify the structure of that language. In 
another's language the theory will not work at all without 
the Principle of Charity. The understanding that results is 
self-certifying, not regressive, because it is testable 
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within the language being interpreted. Thus his account of 
meaning appears to be defensible against two major critics. 
In fact, of course, having identified what his account is 
supposed to do he has, in effect, identified criteria that 
it must meet to be successful. Those who introduce new 
criteria, or interpret his criteria in a way that Davidson 
does not intend, can hardly fail to be surprised when their 
criticisms (expressed in terms of his failure to meet their 
criteria) misfire. The two basic problems he identifes as 
criteria that his account has to meet do appear to be met, 
namely: 
1. Is Convention T universal? 
By definition it is, as it is a formal condition for truth. 
This is no hidden petitio principii, because the formal 
condition can be tested empirically. 
2. Does the Principle of Charity explain the application of 
conclusions regarding formal language to informal 
language (at heart the central difficulty for this 
approach to natural language)? 
It appears to because, if language is perceived 
holistically, then to understand a part of a language (with 
the aid of Convention T) is to have an entry into the 
particular truths or meanings of the remainder of that 
language. It does not matter that "contexts are not 
extensional" (Blackburn 1984, p.287); the intensional 
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(meanings and the like) is brought in on the backs of the 
extensional Convention T and the universal nature of 
agreement that is presumed by the Principle of Charity. 
In meeting these problems (in effect bridging his version of 
the fact/value gap) he does appear to have met two and a 
half of his three criteria for success. He has 
1. defined formally "the class of meaningful expressions" 
(Davidson 1969, p.8) 
2. given a non-circular account of meaning 
3a. thereby explaining how another language can be learned. 
It now remains to see whether he can meet the second part of 
his third criterion, to 
3b. explain how one's own language can be learned. 
Harrison correctly points out that both the anthropologist 
and the pre-linguistic child have the same "fundamental data 
for any interpretation", uninterpreted sentences and the 
contexts of their utterance (Harrison 1979, p.131). As has 
already been shown, the anthropologist has the additional 
data of having a language to work from, so has at least a 
working knowledge of the constraints of Convention T which 
he can then apply to the alternative language under 
consideration. But the crucial difference is that the 
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pre-linguistic child has, by definition, no access to such 
data. Bereft of access to a conception of the nature of 
Convention T, on Davidson's account of the matter at least, 
the child has nothing with which to begin the process of 
translation and so, in the face of all the evidence to the 
contrary, should remain without language. 
What is required is an explicit account of first-language 
acquisition which explains how a child with no working 
understanding of the grid of Convention T comes to make use 
of it. In terms of what was described earlier (p.152) the 
concept of a precondition for interpretation is a meaningful 
one when there are at least two languages, that to be 
interpreted and that of the interpreter. If, as seems to be 
the case with the pre-linguistic child, there is only one 
language, that to be interpreted, there would seem to be no 
preconditions which provide a framework for the 
interpretation to be successful (or not, as the case might 
be). 
Indeed, this is a point which Davidson himself appears to 
recognise, by implication at least. In the context of 
arguing for the autonomy of meaning over convention he 
states that much of language is learned from "playmates and 
parents" but that its acquisition cannot depend upon their 
contingent abilities (Davidson 1982, p.274), and needs to be 
mediated by Convention T ("the theory of truth for the 
speaker" - ib.). Unfortunately, he says nothing about how 
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this precondition for language is first acquired and the 
absence of such an account leaves unclear whether or not he 
can satisfy his own demand that he explain the acquisition 
of one's first language (criterion 3b - p.168). 
This is not the same point that Putnam makes and which 
Harrison seems to conflate with the previous criticism (ib. 
pp.136-137). Putnam argues that Davidson's holism reverses 
the actual way in which language is learned, for children 
move from understanding individual words to sentences 
(Putnam 1975, p.261, quoted in Harrison ib. p.136), to which 
Harrison adds the criticism that we do not in fact only 
approximately grasp the syntactical structure of our own 
language and then confirm it by using operations mediated by 
Convention T. 
Davidson can easily deal with these points for his argument 
qua holistic philosophy of language cannot, without turning 
its back on the advantages that Frege brings in rejecting 
unitary meaning, accept that meaning is word-dependent. 
Consequently, any descriptive account of first language 
acquisition which identifies a move from the child first 
learning individual words to then learning combinations of 
words needs to give an explanation of meaning which allows 
for such dependency. That this would be a problem has 
previously been indicated by the difficulties that atomic 
theories of meaning face in attempting to explain the public 
nature of meaning. 
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Harrison's addition can also be met, perhaps along the lines 
that similar criticisms of Chomsky's transformational 
grammar are met. What Davidson is describing is a logical 
condition of knowing language, so to state that this is not 
in fact the way we do learn language misses the point. The 
way we in fact learn language operates within this 
constraint, not necessarily with it (Chomsky's variation on 
this defence would be to point out that innate knowledge 
need not be explicitly known, but the actual use of a 
language reveals that it exists). 
However, neither of these suggested responses to possible 
criticism actually provide a clear account of first-language 
acquisition. Because, as has already been indicated, 
Davidson's account of interpretation is inappropriate in 
discussing the situation of the pre-linguistic child, some 
other account is required to explain how, within his general 
position, Davidson is able to explain why it is a child does 
begin to act, if only implicitly, as an interpreter. 
Having himself identified the need for an explanation of 
first language acquisition as a criterion of success for his 
work, he would have to accept that his work is at present 
not fully realized. His account of truth is, possibly, "up 
to accounting for all the linguistic resources of the 
speaker" (Davidson 1984, p.xv). Yet he leaves it unclear 
how the very creation of those resources in one's own 
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language first occurs (criterion 3b - p.168). As will be 
shown later (pp.323ff), it is possible to provide an account 
of first-language acquisition which seems to fit within his 
general position. The realisation of this possibility is, 
of course, necessary to avoid the charge that his work is 
not so much flawed as seriously incomplete (in that it has 
not met the second part of his third criterion for a 
successful theory of language - see p.178). Indeed, this 
possible incompleteness could reintroduce the problem of the 
relevance of an apparently formal theory of language, for if 
it cannot explain how language begins of what use is a 
language-based theory of truth? 
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SECTION Vb - WITTGENSTEIN 
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5b.1 Introduction 
The original dichotomy between Formal Semantics and 
Communication theorists was, as may be recalled, drawn by 
Strawson who resolves it by opting for the latter approach 
to meaning, castigating the former's as "unrealistic to the 
point of unintelligibility - or, at least, of extreme 
perversity" (Strawson 1969, p.189). For him this is the 
result of realizing, with Harrison (see p.163) that the act 
of saying, or asserting, a T-sentence necessarily involves 
some sort of reference to belief, the later Wittgenstein 
being cited as an example of such a theorist. It is, then, 
natural to turn from an examination of Davidson's work on 
meaning to Wittgenstein's and if any other justification 
should prove necessary the all-pervading influence of 
Wittgenstein's work on modern British and American 
philosophy would alone be sufficient to explain the 
inclusion of a figure whose most influential work was first 
published nearly forty years ago. 
Given the nature of Wittgenstein's work it is necessary to 
make a number of methodological preliminaries clear. As is 
well known, only two of the variety of publications that 
bear his name were intended for publication by him, the 
Tractatus and the Investigations, and so these texts will 
form the core of what follows, the remainder of the corpus 
being used to justify or expand points that might otherwise 
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appear weakly argued or unclear. This restriction follows 
McGinn's approach (McGinn 1984, pp.xii-xiii, note 6), as 
does the method of separating exposition from the wealth of 
commentary and criticism. The first restriction allows one 
to draw mainly on material that Wittgenstein had himself 
polished for an audience, rather than on notes that might 
well need extensive development; the second allows one, 
temporarily at least, to hold at bay "the distractions of 
exegetical disputation" (ib. p.xiii). Thus these two 
restrictions combine, allowing for a clear picture of his 
position to be presented, unclouded by the contributions 
that can be made by the detail of primary and secondary 
sources. 
This said it becomes necessary here to abandon the 
conventions of the Harvard referencing system, for the 
original dates of publication of all but the two texts 
previously mentioned usually bear little resemblance to the 
date when they were written. For this reason abbreviations 
will replace dates for all of Wittgenstein's work (see Note 
1 for the abbreviations, the tentative date of production 
and the definite date of first publication). 
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The interpretation offered here is that his work is 
internally consistent (this is a natural criterion for 
preferring one route over another through the maze of his 
work) and also that his thought can be seen as moving from 
an early to a later stage with the aid of an interface 
provided by a stage of reflection. It should be noted that 
this is taken as being very much a movement, a gentle 
continuum, rather than as a violent reaction of rejection to 
all that was present in his early work. 
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The Early Wittgenstein  
5b.2 The Philosophy of Language  
Wittgenstein's first publication, the Tractatus, is clearly 
influenced by Frege's work. With Frege his approach is 
holistic, for "If I know an object I also know all its 
possible occurrences in states of affairs" (T 2.0123) and it 
is also one which rejects Ideas, for "There is no such thing 
as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas" (ib. 5.631). 
His early philosophy of language, as a result, is to be seen 
as setting "a limit to the expression of thoughts ... in 
language" (ib. p.3), and its emphasis on propositions is, 
although differing in detail, also consistent with Frege's 
philosophy of language, as is his statement of realism ("the 
world is all that is the case" - ib. 1). 
A realist (in the traditional sense identified by Stoutland 
- 1989, pp.96-99), propositional philosophy of language is 
inexorably driven towards the search for a language purified 
of the anti-realist ambiguities of ordinary language (ib. 
3.3230, and so the early Wittgenstein's philosophy of 
language can be seen as an attempt to improve Frege's 
conception of "a sign-language that is governed by logical 
grammar - by logical syntax" (ib. 3.325). It is for this 
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reason that here he believes he has found "the final 
solution of the problems" because logic deals in such a 
finality where "we cannot make mistakes" (ib. 5.473). This, 
then, is an early Formal Semantics, where ordinary language 
can be analysed into, and from, its elementary propositions. 
As such it follows that ordinary language's propositions are 
to be seen as truth functions of so-called "elementary 
propositions" (ib. 5). 
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5b.2 The Meaning Theory 
As before, the detail of this theory and its divergence from 
Frege's(2), is inappropriate here as the purpose of this 
section of exposition is to show what points of contact, if 
any, there are with the later thought. The dualism of 
Formal Semantics generates a dualistic meaning theory, where 
meaning in everyday language, through a truth-functional 
analysis, is to be found in the "simplest kind of 
proposition", which "asserts the existence of a state of 
affairs" (ib. 4.21). At this elementary level propositions 
and what they represent meet, this meeting being alluded to 
by the analogy with pictorial relationships (the meeting 
place cannot be described directly, otherwise the mode of 
description would itself be an example of what could not 
exist, a language beyond language). Thus meaning is, at one 
level, provided by the connection between pictorial form and 
reality (ib. 2.222), at another by "the results of 
truth-operations" on these deeper level elementary 
propositions (ib. 5.3). 
However this formal account of meaning is, here and there 
added to by comments which appear at first sight to be more 
sociological than logical. Thus he states that a sign 
without use is "meaningless" (ib. 3.328), although it should 
be noted that in context this is a "logico-syntatical" use 
(ib. 3.327), which stresses the dualism of his meaning 
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theory. Later, as a parenthetical aside on the nature of 
philosophy, he says, "In philosophy the question, 'What do 
we actually use this word or this proposition for?' 
repeatedly leads to valuable insights" (ib. 6.211). This 
point, however, runs counter to the general argument he 
presents, for the transcendental nature of logic (ib. 6.13) 
means that actual use with its roots in the specific is 
irrelevant to the theory of meaning he develops. 
Similarly, although his talk of ordinary language being "a 
part of the human organism and is no less complicated than 
it" and as dependent upon complex "tacit conventions" (ib. 
4.002) appears to be leading away from Formal Semantics, in 
context it can be seen that he is in fact making a point 
about the way in which such complexes disguise the real form 
to which they are connected by logic. That is, he is well 
aware of a distinction between the "essential and accidental 
features" of a proposition and he is making use of both of 
these features (ib. 3.34). 
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5b.3 First Language Acquisition 
At this stage in Wittgenstein's thought there is, as has 
already been indicated, a conception of language which 
distinguishes the logically simple base of language from 
language per se. Ordinary language can itself be acquired 
working from the base of elementary propositions and 
truth-functions, but these last "must go without saying" 
(ib. 3.34) because they are presumed in any explanation (ib. 
4.121)(3). Moreover, elementary propositions cannot be 
taught, as what refers to them linguistically is itself an 
elementary proposition ("an elementary proposition is a 
truth-function of itself" - ib. 5). Consequently these 
propositions must be understood without explanation (ib. 
4.02), each "shows its sense" (ib. 4.022) and, like a 
picture, represents its aspect of reality (ib. 4.011-4.012). 
This, then, is a development of the traditionalists' 
double-translation account of meaning and 
language-acquisition (see pp.23ff), but here the 
traditionalists' "Ideas" are replaced by elementary 
propositions. These "picture" the world so, although not 
physical referents (as with the traditional empiricists), 
they are still the referential base from which ordinary 
language springs. 
Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition - p.182 - 
One half of the translation account is given, in 
considerable detail, namely how everyday language has 
meaning, the other by analogy with a pictorial relationship. 
The regression of Ideas of Ideas that the traditionalists 
faced (see p.31) is here supposedly halted with the notion 
of a "complete analysis" (ib. 3.25) but at a considerable 
cost, for both this base and the method by which it 
generates ordinary language cannot on its own terms be 
acquired, a reductio ad absurdum(4)  of the whole position. 
This central problem with the early work is not, however, 
one that is identified during the transitional stage of 
Wittgenstein's work. 
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The Middle-Period Wittgenstein 
5b.4 The Philosophy of Language  
Such a period of transition in a person's thought means, 
almost by definition, that it is difficult to pick out a 
clear position as the constant movement of thought prevents 
fixed points being readily identified. This said, it is 
still possible to make out some important landmarks. 
A propositional holism is retained, but developed still 
further, for now it is not the single proposition which is • 
"laid like a yardstick against reality", but a "system of  
propositions" (PR p.317). This development eventually 
reaches a stage where he can assert, "understanding a 
sentence means understanding a language" (BBB p.5), which is 
as much a comment about the holistic nature of understanding 
(or meaning) as it is about language. 
However, such holism is tempered by the retention of 
realism, where language's meaning is derived "from the 
world" (PR p.80, s.47) although he is aware that, with the 
Tractatus, "The limit of language is shown by its being 
impossible to describe the fact which corresponds to (is the 
translation of) a sentence, without simply repeating the 
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sentence" (CV p.10e). That is, at this stage in his thought 
the realm of facts/reality does still exist, but there is an 
acceptance of the view that there seems to be no tool, other 
than ordinary language, with which directly to refer to such 
a realm. 
Facts then can be alluded to, but on their own can rarely, 
if ever, give meaning to language, because language is 
required to allude to facts. A traditional correspondence 
theory of truth and meaning, then, is being rejected on the 
grounds that such a theory generates a circular argument, a 
circularity that in the Tractatus had been halted by an 
appeal to elementary propositions. His new awareness that 
the fixed certainty of reality mirrored by logic need not be 
an integral part of his philosophy of language finds 
expression in, first his rejection of the "craving for 
generality" in favour of the "particular case" (BBB p.18) 
and, second, his rejection of essences in favour of an 
acceptance of "mere convention" (RFM p.23e, s.74). 
It can be seen, then, that by 1944 his thought in this area 
had developed into an extended holistic approach to 
language, coupled to a possible relaxation of the 
constraints of a traditional realism, in which sociological 
convention rather than logical form might provide an 
alternative philosophy of language. The stage then, is 
being set for a transition from the fixed, a-contextual 
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necessities of the Tractatus to the changing, contextual 
"necessities" that typify his later conception of language. 
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5b.5 The Theory of Meaning 
As his view of the philosophy of language shifted subtly so 
his theory of meaning altered, the one remaining consistent 
with the other. The view that a single proposition is 
understood, holistically, within a system of propositions 
could have remained within the early account of meaning, 
where the system is analysed down to a base system of 
elementary propositions. Instead he develops this view in 
terms of the "application" (PR p.10, s.14), "use" (ib. s.15) 
and "function" (ib. p.11, s.20) of language, although still 
not breaking completely with the notion of reality being 
pictured (ib. s.24). However the "inexpressible" is now no 
longer necessarily objects in the world, but "perhaps ... 
the background against which whatever I could express has 
its meaning" (CV p.16e), this view being developed as a way 
of criticising Frazer's realism, where for Wittgenstein 
there is a common base of "animal activities" in man, the 
rest of his actions having "a characteristic peculiar to 
themselves" (RFB p.67). 
The movement towards an extended holism is given 
considerable momentum by his reformulation of the 
traditional question, "What is the meaning of a word?" 
(containing as it does the implication that the answer 
should be given in terms of some sort of a referent) with 
"What is an explanation of meaning?" (BBB p.1). This second 
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question is answered not by postulating a mental or physical 
referent, with all of the untidy logical scaffolding it 
requires so as to build it on to ordinary language, but by 
identifying use as "giving life to the sign" (ib. p.4). 
At a stroke this removes the picture of language as a 
calculus (ib. p.25), as being based on some ideal language 
(ib. p.28) and as being constrained by "the simple and rigid 
rules" provided by logicians (ib. p.83). Once logic's 
shackles are cast off then it becomes obvious that the fact 
that ordinary language proceeds in the majority of cases 
without "strict meaning ... is not a defect", but rather 
just the way that things are (ib. p.27). Given a phenomenon 
where there are rarely essences it is singularily 
inappropriate to use a tool, logic, which generates essences 
and so language is then free to be seen as functional, 
instrumental (ib. p.67), where "the use of the word in 
practice is its meaning". 
What is retained is an explicit rejection of a regress of 
meaning, where further and further uses might be called upon 
to explain meaning. A practice is often rule-governed but 
the reasons for following those rules can end at a point 
where one simply follows them for no reason (ib. p.143), as 
a "custom among us, or a fact of our natural history" (RFM 
p.20, s.63), which have not been doubted and are so obvious 
as to go "unremarked" (ib. p.43e, s.141). In this way the 
area which the Tractatus concentrated on, where language and 
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reality meet to justify meaning, is now being dismissed as 
able to "take care of itself" (ib. p.67e, s.4). 
At this point the notions of language-game, symptoms and 
criteria can be seen as, amongst other things, replacing the 
logical perspective on meaning with a sociological one. An 
account of meaning which accords with the rigour of Formal 
Semantics is here seen as inappropriate, for neither rigour, 
nor form, nor for that matter, semantics are any longer 
appropriate to explain on their own the phenomenon under 
consideration. A socially based conception of meaning 
requires an account of meaning which is also socially based, 
the detail of which has yet to be provided. 
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5b.6 First Language Acquisition 
The early Wittgenstein, as has been shown, could not explain 
the initial acquisition of elementary propositions because 
they were presupposed by his conception of language. The 
rudimentary holism-of-the-system which identifies the 
transitional stage of his thought has a similar problem, 
because "any kind of explanation of a language presupposes a 
language already ... I cannot use language to get outside 
language" (PR p.54, s.6). So his own summary of this view, 
"the use of a language is something that cannot be taught" 
(ib. p.9, s.6), needs to have added to it the phrase "in 
language" to allow for the presuppositional nature of the 
problem to be made clear. 
This is not to say, however, that language still cannot be 
acquired, for with the rejection of elementary propositions 
comes the possibility that first language acquisition may 
well not be based on language. So, citing Goethe's Faust, 
he states, "Language ... is a refinement, 'in the beginning 
was the deed 'H (CV p.31e) and later that, "The word is 
taught as a substitute for a facial expression or a gesture" 
(LC p.2), the teaching here proceeding via use. The point 
that language is no longer the basis of language is 
particularly well put when he says, "The child understands 
the gestures which you use in teaching him. If he did not, 
he could understand nothing" (ib. footnote 1). 
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Such a prelude to a more detailed account of the child's 
acquisition of his first language is a result, firstly, of a 
philosophy of language which no longer sees essences and 
logical form as its goal, and whose holism is expanding from 
the proposition to the system of propositions and, secondly, 
of a meaning theory which, as a consequence of this new 
perception of language, is no longer searching for 
referents, but rather identifying relevant uses, functions 
and practices. It follows that if a child no longer needs 
to build a monolithic referential language upon a 
referential base then the acquisition of a heterogeneous 
language can be seen in functional terms, where there are 
many different bases of language some of which may, indeed 
be linguistic. This, however, as with the philosophy of 
language and meaning theory, remains to be developed. 
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The Later Wittgenstein 
5b.7 The Philosophy of Language 
The gradual development of holism reaches its natural 
conclusion in his later work, propositions now being 
embedded not simply in language but in what might be called 
the total context, "the form of life". The "given" then is 
no longer the Tractarian "world", but the total social 
context and as such is the basis for all that one can do 
with language (PI p.226), being the "element in which 
arguments have their life" (0C p.16e, s.105). This extreme 
holism is, as has been indicated, a natural development from 
Frege and brings with it inevitable consequences for his 
theory of meaning and account of first-language acquisition. 
It also, of course, has consequences for his philosophy of 
language. It would be inconsistent to have this level of 
holism and yet still to be arguing for language's essential 
nature, and so he explicitly rejects the search for the 
"general form of propositions and of language" (PI p.31e, 
s.65). The search for generality is replaced with a search 
for specificity, the result being a description of 
language's infinite permutations couched in terms of 
language-games and family resemblances. The former are, 
amongst other things, particular ways language can be used, 
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the latter the only analogy that can explain the loose and 
shifting way in which they connect (ib. p.32e, s.67). Thus 
language consists of a "complicated network" of 
language-games (ib. s.66), where neither the network nor the 
notion of "game" can be tightly defined, other than to point 
to the fact that, qua games, they are located in a social 
context. The notion of a language-game, then, replaces that 
of "systems of propositions" and, in so doing, lays stress 
on the conventional, social, nature of language (ib. p.11e, 
s.23) and on its "indefiniteness" (ib. p.227e). 
It would also be inconsistent to view the philosophy of 
language as being primarily concerned with identifying the 
essential form of ordinary language, where some sort of 
"super-concepts" are to be reached as the goal of a final 
analysis (ib. p.44e, s.97). Consequently, such a view is 
also rejected, with ordinary language becoming, to all 
intents and purposes, the replacement for the ideal, 
"perfect language" (ib. p.45e, s.98), for "the crystaline 
purity of logic" (ib. p.46e, s.107). 
What is now realized is that such purity is not the result 
which analysis is aiming for, but rather a "requirement" of 
a particular way of viewing philosophy (ib.) and it is this 
requirement which is being rejected as inappropriate, for 
the translation from ordinary use into perfect "use" brings 
"the queerest conclusions" with it (ib. p.79e, s.194), as 
well as running counter to the holistic nature of language. 
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That is, if language is in fact as described here then it 
becomes necessary to realize that in philosophy one must 
recognize "as the solution something that looks as if it 
were only a preliminary to it" (Z p.58e, s.314), namely 
ordinary language. 
With this form of holism goes a rejection of a traditional 
form of realism, although not of realism per se(5). This 
rejection can be seen in his replacement of the analogy of 
picturing with that of family resemblance. With the former 
there is obviously something external to a picture which it 
reaches out to and which, in some sense, shapes judgements 
about it. However, with the latter the relationship is 
purely internal to the family concerned. There are, of 
course, reasons for identifying that relationship, even 
though they may change from one family member to another 
(PI p.32e, s.67) and it is these non-linguistic reasons 
which allow for an acceptance of aspects of realism and thus 
for talk of objects, truth and meaning. 
It is tempting to identify such a realism as linguistic, but 
to do so would disguise the way in which, as already 
indicated, this conception of language is socially based. 
It would, then, seem appropriate to term this philosophy of 
language Socio-Linguistic Realism, and so incorporate the 
crucial social dimension into the identification (cf. 
Stoutland 1989, pp.107ff). As will become clear later, this 
is not a crude linguistic relativism. Admittedly "others 
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have concepts that cut across ours" (Z p.68e, s.379) and it 
would then follow, if his philosophy were based purely on 
language, that conceptual (and/or linguistic) relativism 
would result. But as these concepts have a fixed, real, 
base of certainty "within a system" (0C p.16e, 105), they 
are not as arbitrary as standard criticisms of relativism 
would claim. So, although there is a relativity of systems  
(hence his wish "to rule out the view that we have the right 
concepts and other people the wrong ones" - RC p.55e, 
s.293), there is not a relativity of concepts, where 
concepts and language would be the base, the given, for on 
Wittgenstein's account concepts do not "reflect our life. 
They stand in the middle of it" (ib. p.57e, s.302). 
That is, there is a "given", namely our whole social system, 
which reflects, and is reflected by, our concepts and our 
language. This conception of the given can be seen as a 
form of realism, but relative to social systems. Such a 
subtle form of relativist realism (which is as much, or as 
little, a contradiction as Kant's conception of the 
synthetic a priori) is, then, the metaphysic which 
"obliterates the distinction between factual and conceptual 
investigations" (Z p.82e, s.458) for, on the one hand, a 
conceptual investigation will eventually strike the "facts", 
which provide those elements which traditional realists 
stress (such as truth, meaning and understanding) of that 
system and, on the other, a factual investigation will 
inevitably be couched within the concepts generated by a 
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system. 
The point being laboured here is that Wittgenstein's 
philosophy of language represents a resolution of the 
polarity produced by the traditional realism of the 
empiricists and the nominalism of the rationalists, 
comparable to the resolution produced by Kant of the 
traditionalists' polarity (cf. "Thoughts without concepts 
are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind ... Only 
through their union can knowledge arise" - Kant 1787, p.93, 
II, A51). The objectivity provided by realism and the 
stress on language provided by nominalism combine to. form 
Wittgenstein's Socio-Linguistic Realism, which can be seen 
as drawing on aspects of realism, nominalism (or, indeed, 
relativism) depending on the particular perspective 
adoptedos). It now remains to show what meaning theory and 
account of first-language acquisition develop from it. 
Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition - p.196 - 
5b.8 The Theory of Meaning 
It is tempting to think that Wittgenstein's meaning theory 
is no more than a translational account of meaning, in that 
questions concerning meaning are to be translated into 
questions concerning use. As will be shown this is a common 
interpretation of this central aspect of his work, but to 
summarise his theory as merely advocating "meaning is use" 
is to simplify it to the point of caricature. The notion of 
"use" does play an important role in his theory of meaning, 
but in conjunction with a number of other concepts which 
give the notion point and purpose. Indeed, without these 
other concepts it would be too open-ended to apply to 
problems of meaning at all. 
"Use" (or "application", or "practice") certainly plays a 
part in his meaning theory. Thus, synonymy of sense is 
given in terms of use (PI p. 10e, s.20) and the point is 
repeated in a number of places (to know the meaning of a 
word is to know its use or function - ib. p.12e, s.30/p.20e, 
s.43/p.22e, s.47: Z p.74e, s.418: OC p.10e, s.64). But it 
is worth noting that this simple point is made either in a 
negative context, as when he criticises his earlier view of 
language as having imposed a simplistic view of language's 
uses (PI p.12e, s.23), as having given logic precedence over 
language use (ib. p.46e, s.105-108) and so as having 
attempted to "reform language" (ib. p.51e, s.132), or 
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positively to move away from the simplistic formulation the 
theory to an examination of the other concepts which give 
sense to the slogan. Stylistically, then, the slogan can be 
seen as a bridge from his earlier view of meaning to his 
later. It is not in itself that theory of meaning, rather 
it leads one to that theory. 
The connection is well expressed when, having asserted that 
"a meaning of a word is a kind of employment of it" (0C 
p.10e, s.61) he then states, "That is why there exists a 
correspondence between the concepts 'rule' and 'meaning'" 
(ib. s.62). That is, if meaning is to be explained in 
terms of use ("Practices give words their meaning" - ROC 
p.59e, s.317) then those uses, because they are social 
practices, are rule-governed (ib. p.57e, s.303). The 
concept of use, then, is merely a sign-post to that of rule 
which, as will be shown is itself not sufficient to explain 
meaning. 
Rule-following is examined in considerable detail (in fact 
in far more detail than 'use' per se). One can, as with a 
game, follow language's rules "without ever learning or 
formulating" them; they can be mastered without necessarily 
being known, because observation of them in action is 
sufficient to prepare one to use them (PI p.15e, s.31), or 
to judge that another has mastery of them (ib. p.73e, 
s.180). Thus the early view that the language-user "is 
operating a calculus according to definite rules" (ib. 
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p.38e, s.81), or is "consulting a grammar" (Z p.55e, s.297), 
is replaced with a conception of rule which is altogether 
looser because it is founded not on logic but on social 
"purpose" (PI p.41e, s.87), or "customs" (ib. p.81e, s.199). 
This view of rules, then, sees them as shared, public (ib. 
s.202), applied in particular circumstances and perhaps 
tacitly known. They are not in some sense chosen by 
individuals from some smorgasbord of rules, but are followed 
"blindly" (ib. p.83e, s.219). Such sub-conscious 
rule-following prevents a possible regress of justification 
infecting the account by locating rule-following firmly in 
practice, in the social setting that is its "bedrock" (ib. 
p.85e, s.217). This explanation of rules, then, avoids the 
circularity of defining them in terms of a rule-based 
language (and, therefore, avoids the paradox of speaking 
about what cannot be spoken that bedevilled the Tractatus by 
describing them as conventionally-based. It is for this 
reason, for example, that he says, "Only in the practice of 
a language can a word have meaning" (RFM p.344, s.xxz). 
There are, however, certain locutions (especially those 
relating to sensations such as 'I am in pain') whose use 
suggests that they are not so much linguistic statements as 
more subtle forms of physical behaviour. In such a case the 
linguistic behaviour (in addition to other contextual 
factors, such as that the person concerned is not a 
congenital liar) comes to replace the purely physical 
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behaviour as the public criterion for third-party ascription 
of the appropriate sensation to the person producing the 
locution (cf. McGinn 1984, p.49). In this way the slogan 
"meaning is use" clearly highlights the functional aspect of 
Wittgenstein's meaning theory, so allowing the differing 
functions, and therefore meanings, that various locutions 
have to be made clear. 
At this point two further concepts need consideration in 
order that 'social context' and 'rule-governed' can be 
better explained as accounting for meaning, namely 
'language-game' and 'criterion'. Language game is first 
introduced as a "primitive" application of language which 
gives "a clear view of the aim and functioning" of its 
constituent words (ib. p.4e, s.5). Collections of 
language-games, of "language and the actions into which it 
is woven", he also terms the "language-game", so indicating 
that both the complex whole and the simple part are picked 
out by the term (ib. p.5e, s.7), embedded as they are in the 
social context, the "form of life" (ib. p.11e, s.23). The 
use of the analogy with "game" is justified in that it 
stresses that language-speaking is an activity (ib.) and 
that the various uses of language are such as to prevent one 
giving a clear-cut definition of language itself, except in 
terms of the overlapping network of similarities akin to 
"family resemblance" (ib. p.32e, s.67), for there is no 
"general form of propositions and of language" (ib. p.31e, 
s.65) as he had once thought. 
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The social context, then, is seen as being analogous to the 
concept of a game, in that it provides a structure for 
understanding the use of language and thus its shifting 
meanings. At this point one simply notes the 
"proto-phenomenon", that the context is what it is, 
providing a base for such-and-such meanings (ib. p.167e, 
s.654-655). What occurs within a language-game, a 
particular context, "always rests on a tacit presupposition" 
(ib. p.179e) that "a certain agreement prevails" (Z p.76e, 
s.430), but that agreement is not one that makes an "appeal 
to the majority" (ib. s.431), being a sociological, rather 
than judicial, agreement. 
It can be seen that in this way "the language-game ... is 
not based on grounds ... It is there - like our life" (0C 
p.73e, s.559). These tacit presuppositions concern our 
"inherited background" (ib. p.15e, s.14) and are a-truthful, 
being the system within which appeals to truth through 
"arguments have their life" (ib. p.16e, s.105). They are 
that in which we trust and so make language-games possible 
(ib. p.66e, s.509), being revealed by the way one acts, for 
acting "lies at the bottom of the language-game" (ib. p.28e, 
s.204). This "groundless" foundation (ib. p.24e, s.166) is 
one's form of life (ib. p.46e, s.358-359) and so the 
agreement that underpins language use is not traditionally 
metaphysical, being an activity (PI p.11e, s.22) which 
reveals an empirical "agreement" in forms of life (ib. 
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p.88e, s.241), "the given" (ib. p.226e). 
The social context of meaning, then, is a socio-metaphysical 
concept which provide a base for language-games to be build 
upon. Relativity of meaning is, clearly, a relativity of 
such bases for there is no objective, systemless, certainty 
(0C p.17e, s.108). Within agreements language-games, 
meanings, are objective because of the nature of their 
agreed rules, but outside the context of our particular 
agreements meanings are less clear and it is at this point 
that others have "concepts that cut across ours" (Z p.68e, 
s.379), for their "life would run on differently ... In 
fact, this is the only way in which essentially different 
concepts are imaginable" (ib. p.69e, s.388). The formal 
concept "rule", however, is presupposed as being shared(7)  
and it is this which now needs elaborating. 
Much has, of course, already been implied about language's 
rules through the analogy with "game", these points being 
developed through the notion of "criterion". The problem 
that remains is, in effect, that of explaining how it is 
that one understands that language-games are being used 
correctly, in accord with the appropriate socially agreed 
rules. 
Given what has already been said it would be quite 
inappropriate to hold a particular language-game up against 
either physical or mental reality to see whether it fitted, 
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as a picture might. Even sentences that appear to make 
direct reference to the physical or mental realm do not gain 
their rule-governed nature by means of that reference, 
because that they so refer is a function of the agreements 
within which they nest (PI p.88e, s.241-242). The correct 
use of a particular language-game's rule is identified by 
criteria, these criteria providing a way of seeing whether 
meaning in the game is understood (PI p.172e, s.692), even 
though they are "not always sharply differentiated" (Z 
p.83e, s.466). In general the use of an expression provides 
such a criterion (ib. p.77e, s.190), as does providing an 
explicit rule or the "picking up" of a rule implicitly. 
Criteria, then, are rules of language which are explicit or 
implicit, use-dependent, public and shared. They are not, 
however, providers of some form of logical necessity (here 
the criteria, there the meaning - cf. PI p.49e, s.120), for 
the criteria can be present when what they are criteria for 
are not (the correct move in chess, for example, can result 
by chance or by simply following instructions, not 
necessarily because the person moving the piece understands 
the meaning of what he is doing). Their necessity is a 
social necessity, where their certainty is "comfortable... 
not still struggling" (0C p.46e, s.357), rather than a 
logical necessity which in fact develops within such 
necessity (PI p.46e, s.108), and they provide a way of 
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giving an answer to the question, "How do you know that the 
language-game is being used appropriately?" - "By appealing 
to the agreed criteria". 
It is difficult to find a single term to describe such an 
account of meaning, for its subtleties do not easily fit 
into one neat title. Meaning is described as being 
primarily located in ordinary use, this being like a game, 
rule-governed (criterial) within the agreements of a 
particular social context, of a form of life. As such it is 
both fixed and relative, as are the purposes of games, 
depending upon whether one's perspective is within or 
without that particular set of agreements. 
In this way the concepts of use, language-game, social 
context, agreements, forms of life, rules and criteria are 
brought together to provide a description of meaning which, 
as with Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, is holistic 
to the form of life. In a sense this is a reference theory, 
where the referent shifts and alters depending upon the 
context and is picked out by use, criteria and context. But 
it is a reference theory like no other so far examined in 
that it allows for both the external empirical world and the 
internal mental world (as well as grammar and logic) to play 
their various parts in language. It is, then, best to 
identify such an account as a Descriptive account of 
meaning, leaving open-ended quite what that description is a 
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description of, other than, perhaps, to see it as consisting 
of obvious "remarks on the natural history of human beings" 
(PI p.125e, s.415). 
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5b.9 First-Language Acquisition 
In a sense Chomsky, Davidson and Quine follow Wittgenstein 
in seeing as important the problem of accounting for a 
child's acquisition of his first language. In 
Wittgenstein's case, however, he uses the problem (as does 
this thesis) as a yardstick to judge others' accounts of 
meaning. Thus Augustine's account of first language 
acquisition is criticised on the grounds that the meaning 
theory it relies on is only partially satisfactory, in that 
Augustine is using a language-game as if it were the 
language-game (PI p.3e, s.3). 
In so criticising the view that ostensive definition alone 
can explain the beginnings of meaning Wittgenstein can be 
seen as not simply rejecting ostension and the mental (or 
physical) labeling theory that goes with it. On the one 
hand he is rejecting the rationalist's picture of the child 
as an interpreter, with the child using a mental language of 
some sort to translate what is heard (ib. p.16e, s.32), 
whilst on the other he does accept that ostension can help 
meaning be understood (Z p.6e, s.24). 
Wittgenstein's even-handed approach is a result of his 
holistic philosophy of language. Augustine is certainly 
describing one way in which language is learned and so this 
description has to be incorporated into Wittgenstein's 
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holistic account of language. Augustine's problems lie in 
his "over-simple" (PI p.4e, s.4) view of language, which 
results in a particular view of meaning, the particular 
being mistakenly used as a general account of meaning and 
first language acquisition. That is, it is not simply that 
ostension is too vague to be used as a tool for language 
acquisition (PI p.14e, s.28), because it is clearly used as 
such, but rather that it has to be recognised that ostension 
takes place "with a particular training" (ib. p.4e, s.6). 
Given the meaning theory which is connected to what is 
argued here this training cannot proceed with either the 
mental or physical(B) realms as a base, so double or single 
translation accounts, and their problems, are avoided. 
Moreover, neither is the training in some sense mystical 
where, because of an alternative Tractarian meaning theory, 
for example, nothing can be said about the training. 
The nature of what is being trained, both the child and 
language (or meanings) provides the explanation of 
first-language acquisition. Language has already been 
described in terms of use, where rules, the group, the 
group's functions and form of life combine to provide 
context-dependent meaning. To acquire language, then, the 
child qua social creature, can be seen as acquiring another 
aspect of his socialisation. 
Wittgenstein is, however, careful to distinguish the 
situation of interpreting a foreign language (ib. p.82e, 
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s.206) from that of acquiring one's first language. In the 
second case the child has yet to acquire the crucial concept 
of "rule", whereas in the first the concept can be applied 
without difficulty to the new, second, language by 
extrapolation from the language the child already possesses. 
In a situation where the child's first language is being 
acquired the rules themselves cannot be taught, for they are 
a part of what is needed for teaching; nor can the 
agreements be taught, for they are the necessary background 
of teaching (0C p.22e, s.152). 
What is required is a means of teaching which does not make 
use of the presuppositions of teaching. This "logical 
circle" can be avoided in the case of straightforward 
interpreting by using examples, practice, "expressions of 
agreement, rejection, expectation, encouragement" and so on 
(PI p.83e, s.208). In the case of first-language 
acquisition, however, what is needed is "a great deal of 
stage-setting" (ib. p.93e, s.257) and that is provided by 
the fact that "how words are understood is not told by words 
alone" (Z p.26e, s.144), but also by training in the use of 
words and their rules (ib. p.33e, s.186 and p.59e, s.318). 
This occurs in particular contexts which the child has no 
need to learn to describe (ib. p.22e, s.116 and s.119), 
where what may also be acquired is the understanding of 
particular facial expressions (ib. p.39e, s.218)(9). 
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Thus, because of the interconnections between meaning, rules 
and use-in-a-context, it is possible to see that once the 
child has gained a toe-hold on use-in-a-context he can then 
acquire meaning, "practically, without learning any explicit 
rules" (OC p.15e, s.95). That first move, though, has yet 
to be explained. 
It could be argued that at this point the notion of form of 
life is crucial, because if that were shared then it would 
provide a common reference point between the child and his 
teachers. But this would be no more than to assume the 
point at issue, for if this is where language begins then it 
would appear that it is itself a part of language. 
However, Wittgenstein wants to make a distinction between 
"our word-language" and the other expressions we use, cries 
and the like, which are termed "language" by analogy with 
word-language (PI p.138e, s.494). Language-games, 
especially the most primitive ones are, he claims, 
eventually based on pre-linguistic behaviour (Z p.95e, 
s.541), which become recognised as a part of the particular 
language-game by reference to "its character and its 
surroundings" (ib. p.102e, s.587). The child "learns to 
react in such-and-such a way; and in so reacting it doesn't 
so far know anything", this coming at a later stage (OC 
p.71e, s.538). These reactions are trained in certain ways 
(which include ostension and, for that matter, "a kind of 
persuasion" - ib. p.34e, s.262) so as to bring the child 
Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition - p.209 - 
into "a community which is bound together" by shared 
certainties (ib. p.38e, s.298). 
These certainties are "the inherited background" (ib. p.15e 
s.94), the "groundlessness of language's beginnings (ib. 
p.24e, s.166), and they provide the "frame of reference" 
(ib. p.12e, s.83), within which language can be first 
acquired through "ostensive teaching" (PI p.4e, s.6). Given 
the context-specific nature of meanings then this is all 
that can be said at the general level; the acquisition of 
the techniques of particular language-games with the 
attendant appropriate reactions and training (Z p.112e, 
s.646) will need describing in a highly specific way, but 
within this framework('-°). 
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5b.10 Critique 
The progression of Frege's public, propositional holism is 
now complete. The Wittgensteinian holism of the total 
social context is a natural development from Frege's 
pioneering work. Moreover, his Socio-Linguistic Realism, 
with its Descriptivist meaning theory and account of first 
language acquisition as a training in an aspect of 
socialisation is, in effect, a consequence of this extreme 
form of holism. It now remains to see whether it is sound. 
(i) The Philosophy of Language  
Because philosophy of language is rarely, if ever "pure" its 
involvement with epistemology brings with it an involvement 
with metaphysics, these being "inextricably interwoven" 
(Hospers 1956, p.349), for questions about the nature of 
knowledge bring with them questions concerning the objects 
of knowledge. It follows that a particular philosophy of 
language is ipso facto a metaphysic, and this point has 
already been established by attaching the standard 
metaphysical titles of Empiricism and Rationalism to the 
philosophies of language previously examined. Indeed, the 
thesis that only internal criticism is valid is in effect a 
thesis concerning the nature of metaphysical debate. Is, 
then, Socio-Linguistic Realism a metaphysical position? If 
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it is not then it would appear that such a philosophy of 
language is categorially different from others examined and 
so could not be offered as an alternative to them. 
The nature of metaphysics has itself been the subject of 
considerable debate recently, but it would appear, with 
Strawson (1959, p.9), that there are at least two types. 
Revisionary metaphysics attempts to produce a better 
structure of our thought about the world by a "reallocation" 
of some concepts which, as "special concepts", plug holes in 
our everyday thinking (Williams 1957, p.57). The Tractarian 
metaphysics is clearly of this sort, where elementary 
propositions and logical form are utilized as special 
concepts to give what is perceived as a necessary structure 
to ordinary language. The difficulty here is that of 
justifying this new structure over the one that already 
exists in language, for "how strange that we should be able 
to do anything at all with the one we have!" (P1 p.49e, 
s.120). This difficulty, amongst others, leads one to 
Descriptivist metaphysics, which attempts to describe the 
actual structure of our thought about the world" (Strawson 
ib.) and this is what is presented in Wittgenstein's later 
work (cf. Gill 1971, pp.143-144). 
One problem with Descriptivist metaphysics is that what it 
is describing, in this case the use of language, cannot 
itself be the tool of that description - "use" cannot 
identify "use" without circularity - and so it would seem to 
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follow that this "sure guide" must eventually be abandoned 
(Strawson 1959, p.10). Strawson continues by arguing that 
such a metaphysic does not so much change concepts as 
examine the unchanging ones, the "indispensable core" 
concepts of most men (ib.). 
The difficulty here, of course, is that there is a natural 
tendency to move from description to revision, in that the 
identification of core concepts becomes, to all intents and 
purposes, the identification of special concepts. This is 
something that Wittgenstein avoids because "use" is not the 
only guide he identifies: with language firmly located in a 
social context Strawson's circularity is avoided, as is the 
drift to Revisionary metaphysics or to Rorty's "purity". 
Similarly the claim that metaphysical arguments are not 
characteristically deductive, for the necessary axioms 
"cannot themselves be proved in the system" (Williams 1957, 
p.49), is inappropriate when applied to Wittgenstein's 
version of Descriptivist metaphysics. There are no axioms 
as such for this form of metaphysics, only an 
interconnecting web of concepts which are mutually 
self-supporting (0C p.30e, s.229)("-). 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy of language, then, is not a 
rejection of metaphysics as such (contra Walsh 1963, p.132). 
As a Descriptivist he can be seen as re-working metaphysics 
by bringing "words back from their metaphysical to their 
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everyday use" (PI p.48e, s.109). He does this, not by 
proposing any theories about language, but by using everyday 
language to disprove theories that other philosophers have 
proposed (ib.). His criticism of such alternatives 
proceeds, as does this thesis, by showing that they cannot 
account for meaning and/or they cannot account for language 
being first acquired; in so doing, his criticism can be read 
as being internal to these alternative, revisionary, 
philosophies of language. Which is to say that his work is 
indeed metaphysical, but his criticism of other metaphysical 
arguments is not cross-categorial because, in effect, the 
point being made is that even Revisionary metaphysicians 
have to locate their work in the context of ordinary 
language for it to have any application (cf. Gill 1971, 
p.144). 
Descriptivism stands or falls by the closeness of fit 
between its particular description and what that purports to 
describe (what could be called its descriptive adequacy). 
In this case the fit between its account of, and the 
perceived facts of, meaning and first-language acquisition 
is the criterion for satisfaction (or philosophical 
persuasion). However, before this is examined other 
criticisms of the formal area of his philosophy of language 
need to be met. 
It has been argued that this approach makes a spurious 
"claim to neutrality", "spurious" because the very use of 
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language prevents such neutrality (Gellner 1959, p.52). 
This is little more than a misreading of Wittgenstein, for 
he makes it abundantly clear that language is 
system-dependent and so cannot be neutral in the 
transcendental sense that Gellner implies (0C p.16e, s.105). 
Similarly, Gellner's criticism that his philosophy of 
language is little more than a justification of the 
"idolatory of language" (ib. p.55) ignores that aspect of 
Wittgenstein's philosophy which stresses that there is more 
to understanding than words alone (Z p.26e, s.144), 
otherwise it would indeed be viciously circular. 
In fact, in a later work Gellner comes to recognise the 
system-dependent nature of this philosophy (Gellner 1974, 
p.14), but then rejects it in favour of a form of monism. 
This is not the place to examine Gellner's Critical Monism, 
but it is worth pointing out that his "conclusive and final" 
refutation of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language (ib. 
p.49) does not show that it is "empty and worthless" (ib. 
p.50) because it does not seem to deal with his philosophy, 
a philosophy which Gellner identifies as normative 
relativism (ib. p.48). The general criticism of relativism 
will be left to the following section (pp.319ff), but this 
is to assume that Wittgenstein is a relativist (with Dummett 
and Trigg, amongst others), whereas as described here his 
work is that of a realist, albeit of an unusual type. This 
is not merely to play with words but to make the important 
point that whatever target Gellner is aiming at it is not 
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that of Wittgenstein's later philosophy of language. 
It has to be said that even a cursory glance through the 
wealth of material on this aspect of Wittgenstein's work 
shows suprising lack of support for the realist 
interpretation advanced here(12). He has, for example, been 
described as a contextualist and instrumentalist (Naess 
1965, p.135) and this is certainly an accurate, although 
only partial, description of his account of meaning. As it 
stands, however, such descriptions ignore the realist aspect 
of his work, as do the terms institutionalist (Searle 1969, 
p.71), pragmatic (Fann 1969, p.71), anthropocentric (Pears 
1971, p.103), anthropological (Canfield 1975, p.394), 
culturalist (Margolis 1980, p.557) and constructivist 
(Richardson 1976, p.34). All of these terms emphasise one 
aspect of his philosophy of language, the social context, to 
the exclusion of others and so would allow the standard 
criticisms of social relativism to be applied to his work. 
On the other hand, those who emphasise the linguistic strand 
to his philosophy by identifying his work as criterial 
semantics (Harker 1972, p.303) or descriptive semiotics 
(Brown 1974, p.13) do so at the expense of allowing in 
criticism of his work which does not take full account of 
the social and, in the sense already described, realist 
aspects of his philosophy. These two sets of 
interpretations carry with them particular conceptions of 
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his acounts of meaning and first-language acquisition which, 
as will be argued, are not merely faulty: rather they are as 
lop-sided as their perception of his philosophy of language. 
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(ii) The Meaning Theory 
Before criticising Wittgenstein's account of meaning two 
necessary preliminaries need to be dealt with. The first is 
to defend the view that his later meaning theory is a 
development from his earlier work and the second that there 
is indeed a theory of meaning to be defended. 
It has been claimed that Wittgenstein's later work is a 
"complete repudiation of his earlier conception of language" 
and, by implication, meaning (Fann 1969, p.63) but, as has 
been shown earlier, this is too extreme a position to take. 
It is, rather, "a transfer of emphasis from pure to 
descriptive semiotics" (Brown 1974, pp.16-17) where the one 
does not exclude the other, the transfer being accomplished 
by the rejection of an atomist ontology in favour of one 
based on, amongst other concepts, forms of life. There is, 
then, a "radical modification, but not the abandonment" of 
the picture theory of meaning (Kenny 1973, p.224 - see also 
pp.225ff), marked by a new stress on use, language-game, 
rules and forms of life. 
The difference here is, in effect, a difference in 
Wittgenstein's conception of realism. His early realism was 
based on an objective ontology "given extra-linguistically 
as a condition of the possibility of language" and, as such, 
was a form of empiricism bringing with it an empiricist 
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meaning theory. His later socio-linguistic realism, 
however, is based on an ontology "determined 'from within' 
language as a by-product of determining the sense of 
propositions" (Harrison 1979, pp.239-240). This later form 
of realism brings with it a form of empiricist meaning 
theory, for there is, after all, something "real" and 
non-linguistic for it to relate to, a given (contra Ross 
1970, p.17). In this way it can be seen that he does not 
break completely with his earlier meaning theory. 
Others have claimed that there is either no theory of 
meaning in his later work (and so, by implication, no 
account of first language acquisition) or, at best, that it 
is "radically incomplete" (Fogelin 1976, p.207). Thus 
Cooper points out that there is here no "systematic account 
of meaning which can be called a 'theory'" (Cooper 1973b, 
p.42) and Harrison appears to take a similar view when he 
states that Wittgenstein was not "proposing an analysis of 
the concept of meaning in terms of some concept of 'use'" 
(Harrison 1979, p.270). 
These two criticisms are, however, more apparent than real 
and can be read as being consistent with each other. Cooper 
feels that an account can be systematised with the aid of a 
theory of speech acts (a view that will be examined in what 
follows). Harrison's point is, in context, not so much 
about meaning as about the view of philosophy as analysis, 
stressing as he does that Wittgenstein "is not trying to 
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define the concept of meaning at all: rather, he is 
explaining it by saying something about the location and 
nature of the point at which explanations of meaning 
necessarily terminate" (ib. p.236). 
The former, then, is in fact accepting that there is some 
sort of meaning theory present, the latter that the 
possibility of the notion of a positive, systematic analysis 
of meaning is being repudiated. It is the latter's 
interpretation that is accepted here, hence the 
identification of his work as being a Descriptivist account 
of meaning (p.203), for Wittgenstein's view of philosophy as 
not advancing theses (PI p.50e, s.128) would prevent such a 
positive analysis being offered. With McGinn: 
We should not, then, expect from Wittgenstein 
the sort of positive theory of meaning 
characteristically proposed by philosophers 
whose intentions are less therapeutic: 
Wittgenstein is not out to give a 'theory of 
meaning' in the usual sense of that phrase 
... Insofar as Wittgenstein has a positive 
account of meaning, it is an account whose 
chief purpose is to act as an antidote to 
mistaken or misleading conceptions of 
meaning. 
(McGinn 1984, p.1) 
However, as will be defended in what follows, this is not to 
accept the view that the account is "unsatisfyingly thin" 
(ib.) or that one cannot, without being "misguided", develop 
a fully-fledged theory of meaning from his work (Fogelin 
1976, p.207). There is a description of meaning provided in 
his work, not a traditional theory, and once the various 
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strands that make up this description are brought together 
then, in effect, one has a 'theory' of sorts which argues 
that description, rather than theory, is the only 
appropriate approach to the problem of meaning. 
For this reason Dummett's re-interpretation of Wittgenstein 
"in non-Wittgensteinian terms" is clearly mistaken. Dummett 
claims that Wittgenstein believes "the task of a theory of 
meaning is to ... render (language-speaking) surveyable by 
describing it in a systematic fashion" (Dummett 1981, p.29), 
but this, in fact, is no longer a Wittgensteinian theory of 
meaning for: 
1. there is no theory of meaning in Dummett's sense of the 
term 
2. surveyability is inappropriate when what is to be 
surveyed is not fixed 
3. systematising a non-systematic phenomenon is pointless. 
It is as if the view of philosophy as theorising had such a 
hold on philosophers that the alternative view of philosophy 
as describing has to be translated into the language of the 
theorisers. Such a translation is quite inappropriate, for 
it effectively destroys the viewpoint it translates (in that 
it is attempting an external critique) and, as can be seen 
with Dummett's reformulation above, this is especially the 
case with Wittgenstein's Descriptive account of meaning. In 
effect, to criticise it as being insufficient is to offer 
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criteria for sufficiency which are explicitly rejected by 
Wittgenstein himself, on the grounds that these alternative 
criteria do not do justice to the phenomenon they are 
describing. 
Having so far defended the view that there is a development, 
rather than a total rejection, of his early account of 
meaning and that there is indeed an account of meaning in 
his later work it remains to examine criticism of aspects of 
that account. These centre on the notions of use, 
language-game, criteria, forms of life and various attempts 
to identify and criticise his work as relativist, which will 
be dealt with in turn. 
Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition - p.222 - 
ii.i) The concept "use"  
As interpreted here Wittgenstein was not, except in the most 
superficial way, identifying "the meaning of a word - and 
the sense of a sentence - with its use(s) in the language" 
and so the claim that such synonymy is "mistaken" (Pitcher 
1964, p.251) is irrelevant as a criticism of his work. The 
point that "use" makes is to direct philosophy's attention 
away from seeking an analysis which would result in some 
sort of ideal meaning and, instead, to concentrate on the 
realities of actual meanings. To analyse meaning in terms 
of use in order that some sort of synonymy between meaning 
and use could be located is alien to the whole approach 
being advocated here. 
The alien nature of Pitcher's interpretation is particularly 
clear when he states "Wittgenstein seems to have been 
laboring under the traditional assumption - perhaps a 
hold-over from the Tractatus - that it is the job of the 
philosopher to give us the real meaning of certain important 
words" (ib. p.253), conflicting as it does with 
Wittgenstein's explicit criticism of this tradition (for 
example, PI p.44e, s.97). Indeed if this interpretation 
were accurate then the charge of circularity would be 
impossible to refute, for what would make a use 
"appropriate" would, of course, be meaning (Cooper 1973b, 
p.41). Once the s ynonymous relationship of Pitcher's 
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interpretation is rejected then the notion of use can be 
given its criteria of appropriateness by reference to the 
other links in this account of meaning and in this way avoid 
circularity being a problem. 
Hunter makes a similar error when he, correctly, argues that 
Wittgenstein is rejecting the view that there is some third 
thing, mental or physical, which can be identified as giving 
two words their same meaning (Hunter 1971, p.39) but 
continues, incorrectly, by interpreting Wittgenstein as 
explaining synonymy of meaning in terms of synonymy of use 
(ib.). 
All that is happening here, as with any form of reductive 
analysis (where the reduction of one concept into another is 
the favoured technique of that philosophy), is that the 
problems identified in the original concept are simply 
transferred under the guise of their resolution. So if the 
original question, in this case "What is meaning?", is 
answered with Wisdom's "Don't ask for the meaning, ask for 
the use" (Wisdom 1952, p.258)(13), the further question, 
"What is use?" is inevitably generated. Identifying 
different kinds of use is no answer to this problem for each 
'use' will itself produce problems of circularity (Findlay 
1961). The only answer would appear to be a rejection of 
reductive analysis for some form of descriptivism, where use 
is described in terms of some sort of context, rather than 
analysed into another concept. 
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However, one approach, that of locating use "in contexts - 
both linguistic and sociological" (Fann 1969, p.68) is an 
unfortunate way of expressing this point, if only because it 
separates these two contexts when it is clear that such a 
separation runs counter to the whole thrust of the 
Descriptivist argument - the linguistic context is ipso 
facto the sociological context (for example, RC p.59e, 
s.317). If these contexts were in fact treated by 
Wittgenstein as separate then there would indeed be real 
difficulty, where linguistic and sociological uses clashed, 
in avoiding the creation of some other court of appeal to 
mediate between them. Such a court could not be "use", 
because there would appear to be no other public contexts 
for use to appeal to. Once the separation of the linguistic 
from the social is rejected then the possibility of an 
appeal to some context-free "use" (which is clearly a 
contradiction in terms) is also rejected. The concept of 
linguistic use can then be explicated in terms of, amongst 
other things, non-linguistic social contexts without the 
charge of circularity being levelled. 
Thus one common interpretation of his account of meaning, 
that for Wittgenstein the "definition of meaning ... is 
'use" (Hardwick 1971, p.34), is here rejected and with it 
the view that this aspect of his philosophy is seriously 
flawed because it is at worst circular, at best "cursory" 
(ib. p.143). His remarks on use are no more than an 
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introduction to his general treatment of what he perceives 
are the problems of meaning and to fail to see this is to 
treat what he offers as an hors d'oeuvre as his piece de  
resistance. For this reason Pitcher, Cooper and Hunter's 
various re-workings of the meaning-as-use thesis in terms of 
speech acts are misfounded, if not otiose. They are otiose 
because, as will be shown, the important strengths of the 
speech-act theory are already contained within 
Wittgenstein's work (as one of the founders of that theory 
himself recognizes - see Searle 1969, p.71) and misfounded 
because that thesis is not the full account of meaning in 
his work. 
The deflection of criticism of this aspect of his work as 
being basically the result of a misapprehension is not 
appropriate when dealing with another type of attack. Such 
an attack emphasises the view that there is a clear 
distinction between "use" and "legitimate use", where only 
the latter is justified, and to think otherwise is to 
confuse a term's connotation with its denotation (Gellner 
1959, p.34). The proof that a society's use of a term is 
justified is given when that use is shown to find "the 
object to which it refers ... its denotation" (ib.). 
The difficulty here, of course, is that the onus is on 
Gellner to show how such a transcendent justification is 
possible, how to refer to the object "in itself", and this 
he signally fails to do. Indeed, in a later publication he 
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rejects total transcendence for a transcendence of the 
specific (Gellner 1974, p.20), of what he terms oceanic 
monism for critical monism (ib. p.22), and at this point it 
becomes difficult to distinguish his position from the one 
he purports to be criticising. 
There are, then two ways of criticising such an approach as 
Gellner's. The first is to show that its own positive 
position is, because of a misunderstanding, in fact the very 
position it thinks it is attacking. The second is to show 
that it requires some form of transcendental argument if its 
position is to be identified as a discrete one. However, 
such a transcendental argument is philosophically unsound 
(with Korner 1967), if only because of its "total 
vacuousness" (Watt 1975, p.45), and so the alternative 
position is unfounded. 
In fact, as will be shown, Gellner is qua realist attempting 
to criticise Wittgenstein qua relativist (or, as Gellner 
puts it, pluralist - Gellner 1974, p.4) and so at this level 
is providing an external, and therefore invalid, criticism. 
The subsequent weakening of Gellner's monism allows for a 
perfectly valid absorption of his viewpoint into 
Wittgenstein's, for the latter is not rejecting realism per  
se, as has been shown, but rejecting the total transcendence 
that Gellner himself objects to. The latter might well 
baulk at a system-dependent transcendence but that is 
precisely what his critical monism describes, unless its 
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"genuine knowledge" and the principles which identify it are 
transcendent and system free, which would then locate it 
firmly outside the tradition he sees as relevant. 
A less subtle form of this argument is that of an 
out-and-realist, such as Trigg, who asserts that "a 
fundamental distinction must be drawn between the way the 
world is and what we say about it, even if we all happen to 
agree. We could all be wrong ... What is true and what we 
think is true need not coincide" (Trigg 1973, p.1). 
The first reaction to such a statement is to question its 
justification, for it would seem to be the case that if 
everybody agreed on the truth-value of a particular 
statement then that is its truth-value, for by definition 
there is no-one available to provide an alternative. A more 
substantial criticism is to indicate that Trigg is able to 
make this point by systematically confusing "we" and "I", 
such that the system-dependence of language becomes 
individual-dependent, even though he does distinguish 
subjectivism from, for example, relativism (ib. p.3). 
As before, it must be acepted that if an absolute, 
transcendent objectivity were identifiable then the 
introduction of "use" would be the introduction of a 
signpost indicating the wrong direction for philosophers to 
travel. However, the nearest Trigg gets to providing a 
justification for that absolute objectivity is some form of 
transcendental deduction (ib. p.149), which would introduce 
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all of the attendant problems previously identified (see 
also Gilroy 1982, p.82). 
In fact his concluding remarks, that reality is both 
concept-dependent and provides objective criteria for 
judging between such concepts (ib. p.168), reveal the 
incoherence of his position. It is again an example of a 
Tractarian approach to the question of meaning which 
founders on the problem of identifying the necessary 
absolute objectivity within a system-dependent tool of 
identification, language. It is also an example of a 
misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's approach to meaning as 
being that of conceptual relativism (Trigg 1973, p.24), a 
misunderstanding which is compounded by accepting a 
superficial reading of his work as providing nothing more 
than a use theory of meaning. 
The exegesis provided earlier makes it clear that the use of 
an expression is given by providing a description of its 
function in a particular language-game and/or by providing 
an explicit definition of its use (pp.197ff). In the latter 
case use is predicted on a prior understanding of other 
meanings, so clearly cannot represent the underpinning of 
meaning; in the former case what is assumed is a practical 
understanding of the appropriate language-game. At this 
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point, then, problems concerning the nature of "use" shift 
to the concept "language-game". 
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ii.ii) 	 The concept "language-game" 
Wittgenstein's comparison of language with games, as with 
his use of the picture analogy in the Tractatus, serves a 
number of purposes, not least to enable a new question to be 
posed. Previously, the question, "What is meaning?" was 
answered by, "Meaning is identified by, use", so producing 
the question, "But what is use?" and with it the problems 
inherent in a reductive analysis. If, however, meaning is 
provided by language (amongst other things) then the 
original question becomes, "What is language?", followed by, 
"Language is identified by use". At this point is added, 
"and language-use is like a game", so avoiding any form of 
reductive analysis. Moreover, this addition allows for a 
description of language-use in terms, crucially, of implicit 
or explicit public rule-following (pp.198ff). 
The subtlety of this analogy has escaped some critics of the 
position. Walsh, for example, argues that "Wittgenstein's 
advocacy of the view that we should confine ourselves to 
particular language games does not satisfy. Not all 
language games, we feel, are equally well founded, even if 
they are all played" (Walsh 1963, p.132). This criticism is 
similar to Gellner's view that some justification of one 
language-game over another is required, which is provided by 
the fact that "thought is not bound and enslaved by any of 
the language games it employs" and so can stand outside them 
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in order to re-assess them (Gellner 1959, p.44). 
The difficulty that both of these criticisms face is that 
the act of passing judgement on language-games is itself a 
language-game (in Walsh's case that of metaphysics, in 
Gellner's that of critical monism, which is a form of 
metaphysics). That said it then becomes clear that such a 
language-game, qua meta-language-game, is almost a 
contradiction in terms. This contradiction is created by 
suggesting that everyday language can be judged by an appeal 
to some sort of supra-language, such a "language" being 
reached via some kind of transcendental argument. 
Another aspect of the concept of game is relevant here, for 
if there is no essence of "game" to be identified then there 
is no logically sufficient criterion of "game" to be 
identified either. In the absence of such a criterion then 
there is nothing to make some games "well founded" (for 
Walsh) and others not so founded, and nothing to provide the 
measure of asessment that Gellner requires. Similarly, the 
view that language use is to be assessed internally, by 
reference to its particular practice, is reached as a result 
of seeing that there is nothing else which can validly be 
used to assess language use (PI p. 8e, s.120). 
The notion of some sort of free-floating, unbound, thought 
is not one that Gellner defends and yet without such a 
defence it becomes difficult to see quite what this 
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language-game-free conception might be (PI p.107e, s.332), 
for any example he gives will be couched in the terms of 
some particular language-game. Thus these criticisms fail 
to see the strength of the analogy with "game" and, in 
particular, fail to see what metaphysics has now become. 
Another line of attack has the opposite failing in that it 
fails to see that the variety of language use is being 
compared to games, rather than being identified with them. 
Thus Cherry's major criticism, which develops Kenny's 
position (Kenny 1973, p.167) "that what goes on in a game, 
any game, can have no direct effect upon the world" (Cherry 
1976, p.57), falls short of its target. The language-game 
metaphor is intended to make a series of points about the 
nature of use not, at this stage, about the "world" and so 
the apparent fact that games do not directly affect the 
world could be matched by showing that much language-use 
does not either. 
Kenny's example of the game of chess is used to support his 
view that games have "syntactical rules", which certainly 
allows for his and Cherry's conclusion to follow. However, 
that is not the case with other examples of game (such as a 
solitary game of hitting a ball against a freshly-painted 
wall so as to add to the mottling effect). That is, if 
"game" is used in the non-essentialist way that Wittgenstein 
describes then it becomes clear that, as with language, some 
games do, and some do not, have syntactical rules. 
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In fact if the totality of language is to be accurately 
described in terms of language-games (PI p.5e, s.7) all that 
need be brought into focus is the fact that language as a 
whole is, like games as a whole, an activity and so may, or 
may not have effects on the world. The "world" here is, as 
with games, presupposed as given by language use and makes 
its use possible (0C p.66e, s.509) and whether this 
connection is direct or indirect is irrelevant. 
In passing it is worth noting that as described here there 
is not (contra Kenny 1973, p.166) a clear distinction 
between the middle and late Wittgenstein's use of the term. 
Admitedly, language-games are first introduced as being "a 
study of primitive forms of language" (BRB p.17) but they 
are also so described in the later work (PI p.4e, s.5) and 
the later work's use of them in the context of the totality 
of complex language use is also referred to when they are 
first introduced (BRB ib.). 
There is no inconsistency here, only a different emphasis 
and Findlay's view that the examples given of primitive 
language-games represent "one of Wittgenstein's more 
irresponsible fancies" (Findlay 1961, p.119), because there 
could not in reality be such a primitive language, is based 
on a gross misunderstanding of this aspect of his use of 
language-game. The "fancy" of the builders and their 
primitive language-games is introduced in order that the 
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notion of language as an activity can be explicated as well 
as the rule-bound nature of that activity. The hypothetical 
example, and that is all it is, then moves closer and closer 
to language use as we know it so as to make the further 
point that complex-language games have a history which is 
located in primitive first language-games, a point that is 
of crucial importance for his account of first 
language-acquisition. 
Viewed in this light the various criticisms of 
Wittgenstein's use of "language-game" can instead be read as 
criticisms of his account of meaning. That is, if meaning 
is seen as being explained in terms of use, and use in terms 
of language-games, then the general criticism of a 
circularity existing between meaning and use (for example, 
Findlay 1961, p.118) would indeed carry over to the 
connection between use and language-games. If the various 
defences to such criticism so far offered are sound then the 
use of this analogy is also sound, directing inquiries into 
meaning towards the notion of a rule-bound practice, where 
the rule-following may be conscious or sub-conscious 
(pp.197ff). 
These rules are rarely consciously chosen (and certainly 
never at the primitive level of first-language acquisition 
or at the "bedrock" of certainty - ib.). It follows that 
the view that "to play different language-games we simply 
choose different rules" (Brown 1974, p.55) is not in fact a 
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description of our day-to-day employment of language. If we 
did simply choose rules in this way then the circularity 
that Brown accepts (ib. p.57) would indeed follow, as the 
criterion for choosing one set of rules over another would, 
presumably, be the meaning they provided. In using 
language, in playing a language-game, one "just does 
something" (Canfield 1975, p.397) and the pattern of these 
actions described in terms of rules is superimposed on the 
action. For Brown, however, the reverse is the case, where 
rules are chosen and then they generate language-use, a 
rationalist view of meaning which Wittgenstein is at pains 
to reject. 
The notion, developed above, of a continuum of 
Wittgenstein's thought concerning the elucidation of meaning 
is also defensible in these terms, for Wittgenstein's 
approach in the Tractatus is similar to that which Brown 
reverses, the sole exception being that the pattern produced 
by one language-game, logic, is taken to be the only 
pattern. Language games, then, can now be seen as not 
merely "analogous to the elementary propositions in the 
Tractatus" (Finch 1977, p.69). The identification and use 
of elementary propositions was a language-game(3-4), albeit 
an unsound one (in that it ignored the fact that it was 
merely one game among many and so could not validly judge 
other games by its own rules). 
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Similarly, the analogy with "game" is consistent with the 
form of realism identified earlier (pp.217-218) for, within 
its own particular rule-structure a game's activities cannot 
be adequately described simply in nominalist, idealist or 
phenomenalist terms. On Wittgenstein's account there is 
still "reality" as such, but it is a presupposition of the 
various socio-linguistic activities of language, rather than 
a result of the absolutist ontology of the Tractatus, where 
Reality ("the world") generated the "acceptable" game of 
truth-functional logic and elementary propositions. In this 
sense reality can be seen as being understood only from 
within language as a presupposition of the various "games" 
that make up the language. 
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ii.iii) 	 Criteria 
In the same way that rules govern, or can be predicated 
upon, games so rules also relate to language. Given this 
aspect of the notion "language-game" it behoves Wittgenstein 
to give some more direct account of rules than is provided 
by an analogy, if only to ensure that an explanation of 
language's rules does not smuggle in some sort of 
circularity that an argument by analogy might disguise. 
Such an account is given in terms of criteria and in 
sufficient detail for at least one identification of his 
work on meaning to be labelled criterial semantics (p.215) 
although, as with much of what has been examined already, 
there is considerable misunderstanding as to its nature. 
The so-called Criterion Doctrine of Meaning, "the view that 
the applicability of a term must be based on the 
satisfaction of certain conditions (which conditions 
constitute the criteria for the application of the term)" 
(Richman 1965, p.66), is one which Richman, for example, 
wants to argue against. However, as he defines it, the key 
concept of "satisfaction" is interpreted solely in terms of 
"sufficient and/or necessary conditions" (ib. p.65) and it 
is this interpretation which has generated considerable 
debate. 
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Some want to argue that criteria do represent such 
conditions (Hacker 1972, p.258) and so for them what is 
required is a development of Wittgenstein's "criterial 
theory of meaning" which would correct what they see as his 
unsystematic and obscure approach to the subject (ib. 
p.309). However, it is clear from what has already been 
said (p.202) that logical entailment is explicitly rejected 
by Wittgenstein as a means of describing criteria. Indeed, 
if he were to accept such a description this would take him 
back to a Tractarian conception of meaning. 
Others take the alternative view that these conditions 
represent a "conventional tie ... in virtue of an implicit 
or explicit rule of language" (Canfield 1974b, p.298), where 
even logically necessary truths are no more, and no less, 
than such conventional ties (Kenny 1967, p.259). Such an 
interpretation would fit within the account given earlier 
(pp.21Off), especially if it were emphasised (contra  
Albritton 1959 and Kenny ib.) that there is no break between 
the middle and late period of his thought on the issue (with 
Wellman 1962, Canfield ib. and Richardson 1976). 
There is, however, a more drastic approach to this problem 
and that is to reject the Criterion Doctrine out of hand. 
From what has already been established about the nature of 
language-games (pp.231ff) it should be clear that Richman's 
definition of the doctrine makes inevitable the incorrect 
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prior identification of "certain conditions" which are then 
used as the basis for the subsequent application of a term. 
This priority is reversed by Wittgenstein ("the axis of 
reference of our examination must be rotated" -PI p.46e, 
s.108), for the application of a term usually occurs without 
reference to conditions and these conditions are only called 
up when questions as to the justification of an application 
occur. As before, if this were not the case then meaning 
would not be located in use, but in some logical realm of 
entailments. 
In this way it can now be seen that talk about the 
conditions for the application of a term being contingent 
upon other factors (the "defining criterion" view - Canfield 
1974a, p.77), or of these conditions being a different kind 
of necessity ("conditional necessities" - Pears 1971, 
p.109), whilst within the interpretation offered here is, 
strictly speaking, unnecessary. The account of meaning is 
not a form of the Criterion Doctrine, which it in fact 
criticises, and so there is no need to offer an 
interpretation within the terms of that doctrine or to be 
concerned with Hacker's criticism that it needs, qua 
criterial semantic, development. 
This is not to say that some explanation of criteria is not 
required or, for that matter, forthcoming, because once 
questions concerning the justification of certain uses arise 
then criteria come into their own. That is, they are not 
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(and cannot be) a framework which language-speakers use to 
construct the pattern of their language but once some part 
of that pattern is questioned then the pattern is justified 
by reference to criteria. 
So described it might appear that they serve the same 
function as his earlier elementary propositions, linking 
language to reality (the pattern to what it is a pattern 
of). Thus Finch describes them as "a way of linking 
language and the world" (Finch 1977, p.55) and his 
interpretation of them as both conventional and natural, 
where "both aspects come into existence together" (ib. p.56) 
would serve as a fine description of elementary 
propositions. 
This is not, however, the way that they are used in 
Wittgenstein's later account of meaning, for it is not the 
natural world that acts as the ultimate, court of appeal or 
measure to judge correct meaning/use, but rather the social  
world within which references to the natural world gain 
their sense (see pp.201ff). Criteria, then, provide for 
internal objectivity. In this sense they also provide for 
our logical entailments (cf. Hamlyn 1965, pp.10-11), but 
they are rarely called upon directly, for coherence with our 
other uses of language and our practices provides a 
continual guide to "correct" use. When they are used they 
do not, and cannot, justify the sort of absolute, external, 
Objectivity that traditional realists, for example, require. 
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They operate in the main implicitly, such that one might 
appeal to them by simply asserting, "Any 'reasonable' person 
behaves like this" (OC p.33e, s.254), where "reasonable" is 
community-dependent (ib. p.38e, s.298). Indeed, if they did 
not so operate then they could not fit within the general 
framework of "use", which would then allow for Finch's 
interpretation. 
At this level they describe rather than define meaning and 
so avoid the regress of definitions that regressive analysis 
generates, although it is true to say that they can also 
operate at the explicit level where a definition by means of 
a rule or referent can be given (with Canfield 1974a, 
pp.71-72). However, because this explicit level is 
definitional it eventually regresses to the implicit level 
where explanations end. This is because there is nothing 
then left as shared for an explanation to operate with, 
except shared practices (and if these are not shared then, 
as one has reached the end of reasons, one treats the person 
requesting justification as a "fool and heretic" and turns 
to persuasion rather than criteria to validate one's 
meanings - OC p.81e, s.611-s.612). 
Albritton, then, is wrong to identify them as providing 
"unnerving contingencies" (Albritton 1966, p.250) for, 
within the sets of language-games that make up the 
particular language-game, they provide the nerving 
certainties without which language could not operate. In 
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the same way as the analogy with "game" directed questions 
of meaning away from language and towards the practice that 
it is embedded in so criteria are, in the end, not simply 
linguistic but firmly rooted in practice, providing that 
particular language's "way of looking at things" (0C, p.29e, 
s.211). 
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ii.iv) Forms of Life 
This "notorious expression" (Baker and Hacker 1980, p.47), 
as with "criteria", has gained its notoriety by virtue of 
the wealth of interpretations it has generated. One 
approach is to claim that it is the "irreducible ultimate" 
which serves as the foundation for language and beyond which 
one "cannot penetrate" (Specht 1963, p.49), which leaves 
unclear quite what this "ultimate" is. Moreover, if it were 
in some sense "ultimate" then, as with elementary 
propositions, it would be incapable of being described. The 
fact that Wittgenstein does describe it is ipso facto to 
reject this interpretation. 
A variation on this approach is to identify it as a 
"logically primitive concept" where its use is such as to 
prevent, logically, the existence of meanings other than 
those which operate within the form of life, where the term 
is understood as the "human condition" (High 1967, p.102). 
Such an interpretation leaves it unclear how the 
identification of such a logical barrier to alternative 
meanings allows Wittgenstein to refer to situations which 
have meanings other than those within our form of life (for 
example, Z p.69e, s.379: OC p.17e, s.108: RC p.55, s.293), 
as well as implying that logic can set a limit to the human 
condition, whereas Wittgenstein is arguing for the very 
reverse of such a viewpoint. 
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This so-called "organic account", where "form of life" is 
synonymous with "something typical of a living being" 
(Hunter 1968, p.278), ignores the way in which the term is 
consistently used to locate meaning-as-use in a social, 
rather than a biological, context (with Finch 1977, p.90ff). 
In fact, given the biological uniformity of the species man 
it would be difficult to argue for alternative meanings 
without also making radical points about biology and this is 
something which Wittgenstein is clearly not doing. There 
may well be such uniformities and such similarities would 
allow different groups' social perceptions to overlap (cf. 
the notion of "limiting concepts" - Winch 1964, pp.110-111), 
but this is not primarily how Wittgenstein utilises "forms 
of life", if only because it would have to always be used in 
the singular. 
Given what has already been said about meaning it should be 
clear that "forms of life" is a term used to identify that 
point at which explicit definitions in terms of some other, 
shared, understanding of language give way to a 
justification expressed in terms of, "this is simply what I 
do" (PI p.85e, s.217). In the same way that a justification 
of a game's rules ends by an appeal to the practice of the 
game so the justification of language's rules end with an 
appeal to the communal nature of that activity, the form of 
life (with Kenny 1973, p.163). 
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That is, one language-game can be justified by reference to 
the language-game of which it is a part and that total 
language-game by reference to other social practices of 
which it, in turn, is a part()-53. In this way the 
circularity of some form of criterialism is avoided, for 
criteria are not themselves justified by reference to 
criteria within language, but rather by reference to other 
activities of which they are a part. The term "forms of 
life", then, can be seen as indicating that the criterial 
relation is not "a relation betwen sentences ... (but) a 
relationship between sentences and human activities" 
(Guttenplan 1976, p.26), and most certainly is not 
indicating a relationship between sentences and man's 
biology. 
Described in this way the criticism that the forms of life 
thesis requires an "independent criterion" to identify each 
form of life, because mere disagreement is "useless" as an 
explanation because of its circularity (Trigg 19763, p.66), 
withers away. To begin with this is not a thesis, only a 
shorthand description to identify the variety of human 
activities. Secondly, his request for an independent 
criterion gains what force it has from Trigg's acceptance of 
some kind of extra-social Realism. Once this type of 
realism is seen as self-contradictory (see pp.227-229) then 
the independence of criteria can also be seen as a chimera, 
for the variety of human activities prevents an independent, 
universal way of identifying them. 
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Moreover his general definition of the term as being "a 
community of those sharing the same concepts" (ib. p.64) is 
a travesty of the position, as is his later interpretation 
of "form of life" as synonymous with "language-game" (Trigg 
1985, p.18). A definition in terms of concepts introduces 
the very circularity that the term's emphasis on practices  
is introduced to avoid; a definition expressed solely in 
terms of language-game ignores the way in which language is 
merely one amongst other practices. Disagreement in 
language-use can be founded on differing definitions, as 
described earlier (p.201), and these can usually be 
resolved, or at least understood. Wittgenstein's point, 
however, is that there is a level of disagreement where 
resolution and/or understanding fails because there is no 
shared medium for agreement to occur. At this point one 
talks about alternative forms of life but, contra Trigg, 
this is very much the exception rather than the rule, 
otherwise the concept of agreement in meaning would be 
without use (0C p.46e, s.354). 
The various aspects of this account of meaning are, then, 
drawn together by the term "forms of life". In effect the 
slogan Wisdom recalled can now be seen not as offering an 
analysis of meaning in terms of use but, rather, of 
directing questions about meaning towards a different, 
social, context. The movement is linear (meaning -> use -> 
language-games -> rule-following -> criteria -> forms of 
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life), not circular and does, therefore, appear to avoid the 
charge of logical circularity. There are, however, other 
criticisms whose general thrust is either to show that this 
Descriptive account of meaning fails in not providing an 
adequate description of the phenomenon it is characterizing, 
or that, as some form of relativism, it is incoherent and 
these criticisms will now be examined. 
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5b.11 Critique 
(1) An Inadequate Characterization?  
Hardwick argues that Wittgenstein, in pointing out that use 
determines meaning, has only dealt with "one aspect of 
meaning" ,the pragmatic aspect and this is a result of his 
"insisting that language is a form of life" (Hardwick 1971, 
p.53). What is missing, acording to Hardwick, are those 
aspects of meaning concerned with syntax and semantics. In 
this way it could be argued that Wittgenstein has provided 
an incomplete description of meaning. 
Now it is certainly clear that Wittgenstein's early work 
does deal primarily with syntax, the "formal structure of 
language, and ... the rules with which signs are related to 
one another in a system of signs" (ib. p.50), whereas his 
later work rejects this aspect of meaning. The reasons 
behind that rejection have already been made clear 
(pp.191-192), not least being the impossibility of 
identifying a single structure for such multifarious 
phenomena. Hardwick's desire for an account of meaning 
which includes the syntactical dimension reveals, then, not 
an inadequacy in Wittgenstein's work but rather a 
fundamental weakness in Hardwick's own perception of 
language. 
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The semantic dimension of meaning (which deals with "the 
relations between the sign and that to which the sign 
refers" - ib. p.52) is, however, quite explicitly dealt 
with, although not in the precise form that Hardwick 
requires. Insofar as Wittgenstein is concerned to identify 
the nature, rather than the exact form, of the various rules 
which govern the denotative aspect (amongst other) of 
language-use through what he argues about language-games and 
criteria, then he is dealing with the semantic aspect of 
meaning. Admittedly he is not concerned with determining 
these rules (ib. p.53), except in the particular examples he 
chooses to concentrate on, but then his work is about the 
nature of meaning and not about the detail of one aspect of 
it. Indeed it could be argued that such detail would serve 
hardly any useful purpose for it would be so specific that 
semantics as a discipline would become little more than a 
series of context-dependent descriptions of various 
language-games' rules of interest only for the connoisseur 
or, perhaps, an anthropologist. 
In fact, of course, Wittgenstein does not claim that 
language is a form of life and it is difficult to see quite 
what this claim might mean, given the interpretation of 
"forms of life" argued for previously. In context Hardwick 
uses this claim to show that it results in a mistaken 
concentration on pragmatics, which suggests that "forms of 
life" is being taken to mean "all the psychological, 
biological and sociological phenomena which occur in the 
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functioning of signs" (Morris 1960, p.30). If these 
"phenomena" were seen as underpinning language-use then this 
would be identical to the interpretation already argued for, 
but describing them as simply occurring in language-use is 
to destroy the way in which a Descriptive account of meaning 
avoids circularity. That is, if language is simply, for 
Hardwick, one amongst other social phenomena then the way in 
which meaning is dependent upon certain of those phenomena 
is left unsaid, implying a circularity of using meaning to 
identify the appropriate "context" (Hardwick 1971, p.66) 
amongst all these phenomena. 
These arguments, then, fail to show that Wittgenstein has 
not adequately characterized language-use and, if anything, 
suggest that Hardwick is operating with a view of language 
that is at best one-sided, at worst simply inadequate. 
Indeed, his claim that there is a distinction between 
"language ... considered as a system of signs, and speech 
considered as particular speech acts" (ib. p.67), between 
the universal and the particular, leads him to argue that 
understanding particular uses of words comes only from a 
logically prior understanding of the universal general use 
(ib. p.69). No reason is offered for rejecting 
Wittgenstein's distinction between language-games and the 
language-game, the particular and the collection of 
particulars, and the Chomsky-style universals are in fact 
abandoned in his own description of how language is learned 
(ib. pp.126ff). Thus this strange view of language (strange 
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because it fails to match the phenomenon it purports to 
describe) is contrary to Wittgenstein's and is itself 
inadequate, as Hardwick himself, in rejecting linguistic 
universals, perhaps comes to realize. 
Another form of this charge of inadequacy is that which 
argues that a theory of speech acts is needed to elaborate 
what is in effect an unsophisticated "theory of the uses of 
language" (Cooper 1973b, p.38). Accepting Alston's view 
that an illocutionary act is the "most fundamental 
conception in ... the philosophy of language" (Alston 1964, 
p.39) Cooper then develops a theory of speech acts which he 
argues explains synonymy in a non-circular way. This is 
achieved in terms of "illocutionary act potential" (Cooper 
1973b, pp.204ff), where illocutionary force provides the 
linear, rather than circular, explanation of synonymy. 
Even as briefly summarised here, such an elaboration is, as 
Cooper would probably accept, at the very least assumed 
within Wittgenstein's work (as Strawson argues - 1969, 
p.172). It could also be claimed that speech acts are 
merely a variation on the theme of language games, for if 
illocutionary force is provided by the certainties of 
criteria located in a form of life then this elaboration is 
otiose. Indeed, given the problems that subsequent 
developments of speech act theory have produced, in 
particular the theory's apparent reliance on speakers' 
private intensional states, contra Frege (see Harrison 1979, 
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p.201), or the difficulty it has in explicating rules for 
the performance of such acts (ib. pp.177ff), it would seem 
safer to retain Wittgenstein's original account. This 
account, as has been indicated, is consistent with Frege's 
identification of the public nature of meaning and rejects 
an all-embracing analysis of "rule" which it claims cannot 
be provided. A development through a theory of speech-acts, 
then, is at best unnecessary, at worst unsound and does not 
on its own indicate that the characterization of meaning 
being offered is in some sense inadequate. 
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(2) A Relativist Account of Meaning?  
One interpretation of this account of meaning is that it is 
relativist, another that it is relativist and therefore 
unsound. An example of the former interpretation would be 
provided by Specht, who argues that the use of language-game 
brings with it "a certain relativism of language to people 
or to the specific linguistic community concerned" (Specht 
1963, p.140. Dummett would also accept this interpretation, 
as he claims that Wittgenstein is arguing for the view that 
"we have the right to make our words mean whatever we choose 
that they shall mean" (ib. p.29). In this way Wittgenstein 
can be seen as an "archetypal" relativist (Dummett 1981, 
p.28), and both Specht and Dummett find this form of 
relativism unproblematical. 
The interpretation offered in this thesis more closely fits 
with Specht's, for Dummett's expression of the position is 
far too subjectivist to fit with the remainder of 
Wittgenstein's thought. However, even Specht's formulation 
needs tightening, for the "community" concerned cannot be 
identified solely by language otherwise, as has been 
previously indicated, circularity becomes a problem. Such 
circularity is avoided by accepting as identifying features 
the relevance of the community's particular practices, its 
form of life. 
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The second interpretation of Wittgenstein's work goes 
further in claiming that not only is it an example of 
relativism but, as such, is unsound. The odium attached to 
"the abyss of relativism" (Martin 1974, p.2) is such that 
one might be better advised to abandon the term altogether, 
even if one accepts its implications. More seriously, as 
Wittgenstein's later work has here been defended as a form 
of realism, then a criticism of it as relativist can be seen 
as a mere calumny. 
This said, however, it is worth indicating the general 
nature of the criticism so as to show that it does indeed 
miss its target. Relativism, it is argued, "can neither be 
stated coherently nor held consistently" (Trigg 1976, 
p.220), for its very statement is its refutation (to say all 
x's are relative is to utter a non-relativist, objectivist, 
statement). It follows that in arguing for this position 
one must be involved in a basic inconsistency, that of 
self-refutation. 
Trigg claims, in his earlier work(i's), that Wittgenstein is 
a relativist (Trigg 1973, p.31) and in this he is in the 
company of, amongst many others, Gellner (1974, p.20). The 
literature on relativism is enormous, and will be examined 
in a subsequent work, but suffice it to say that even if 
relativism per se can be defended (see, for example, Korner 
1974, Hacking 1982, Okrent 1984, Devine 1984 and Unger 1984) 
the successful or otherwise, conclusion of such a defence is 
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irrelevant here. 
It has already been shown that Wittgenstein is not defending 
a relativistic thesis, but rather offering a description of 
the ways in which language is used. The only refutation 
that would be appropriate would be one couched in terms that 
made it clear that his description is in some sense 
inadequate (hence the defence offered in the previous 
section against such a charge) and so Trigg's criticism in 
terms of the problem of self-refutation manifestly fails to 
connect to this account of meaning. 
Wittgenstein's account of meaning involves more than mere 
conventions, bringing with it presuppositions about reality 
(cf. Harrison 1979, p.241), so to criticise it as being 
crudely anti-realist (which is the general definition of 
relativism) is, as has been argued (pp.191-192), 
inappropriate. Because the "relativism" being described 
here as Wittgenstein's is a relativism of social systems, 
not of concepts, language or reality, then its refutation 
can only be provided by showing that there is a virtual 
uniformity of all social practices. Ontology is certainly a 
presupposition of such practices (which include meaning) 
and, as such, is relative to them (unless some form of 
transcendental argument can be defended), but this is no 
conceptual or linguistic relativism and so arguments that 
apply to such accounts of meaning are irrelevant here. 
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Fittingly, the diametrically opposed view has also been 
suggested, that Wittgenstein's account of meaning is 
"individualistic" (McGinn 1984, p.200). Such an 
interpretation flies in the face of the intrinsically social 
nature of meaning that is described and, as with variants on 
the speech act theory, would run counter to Frege's public 
conception of meaning that is carried over from the 
Tractatus. Indeed, if it were individualistic then the 
criticism of relativism as a disguised subjectivism would 
take hold here and the realist aspect of the account of 
meaning would simply disintegrate. But it is as a 
description that it is offered and as such its "correctness 
... is therefore that it should agree with the practice that 
it seeks to describe (Dummett 1981, p.29). Nothing, has yet 
been established as a prima facie observation of 
incorrectness or, for that matter, internal inconsistency 
(see pp.248-249) and so one must conclude that this 
Descriptive account of meaning so far stands. It now 
remains to see whether it can adequately describe the 
practice of first-language acquisition. 
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(3) First-Language Acquisition 
There is, to say the least, some confusion as to what 
Wittgenstein's account of first-language acquisition is, 
caused in the main by not relating his account to the other 
aspects of his work considered here. For example Specht 
somewhat hesitantly suggests that the analogy with 
language-game is meant to show that "infant language 
learning ... already presupposes certain linguistic forms 
and techniques, and which, consequently, cannot precede 
language learning" (Specht 1963, p.70). Although Specht 
does not use the term "innate" his suggestion implies that 
these "forms and techniques" are in some sense innate , for 
it is difficult to see what else he could appeal to without 
simply assuming the point at issue (indeed, on the previous 
page he does seem to do precisely this when he interprets 
Wittgenstein as asserting that words' "typical modes of 
application" are first learned in primitive language-games, 
leaving unsaid how this learning occurs). 
Such an innateness hypothesis is developed by Brown who 
claims that for Wittgenstein it is the "capacity to follow 
linguistic rules, rather than the rules themselves" which is 
innate (Brown 1974, p.17). He develops this claim in terms 
of "innate mechanism which permits us to behave in 
accordance with rules without actually attending to them" 
(ib. p.40) which "permits language learning" (ib. p.80) and 
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which is a form of a priori innate knowledge, of "the innate 
order which lies behind our thinking in general" (ib. p.81), 
of "the rules-of-usage" (ib. p.82). 
Admittedly Brown qualifies this notion of "innate" such that 
it becomes a biological, rather than an epistemological, 
absolute (ib. p.80) but even so qualified it is grossly 
misleading to use the notion within Wittgenstein's general 
account of meaning. The whole essentialist assumption that 
there is a universal underpinning to our language is 
rejected by Wittgenstein (pp.191ff), as is the view that 
rules are innate and thus in some sense private (ib. p.82). 
Brown, then, has correctly identified "rules" as being a 
crucial part of Wittgenstein's account of meaning but has 
wrongly interpreted them as being a form of knowledge prior 
to language and thus biologically "innate". An innateness 
hypothesis makes mysterious precisely that which it is 
trying to describe by removing it from the realm of public 
description (see, for example, pp.128-129) and this is 
certainly not Wittgenstein's intention. Rather he can be 
seen as arguing that Brown has, in effect, reversed the 
correct priority. For Wittgenstein there are two 
perspectives to take into account, that of the person 
attempting to acquire their first language and that of the 
more sophisticated language-user. For the former the 
attempt at first-language use precedes grasping 
rule-structure: for those who have gone beyond the stage of 
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first-language acquisition rule-structure can be predicated 
upon language (and other social practices), that predication 
being, strictly speaking, unnecessary for the practice to 
continue. 
Because language appears to presuppose some sort of rule 
structure to provide criteria for correct use it is natural, 
when considering language use in the context of those who 
have gone beyond the stage of first-language acquisition, to 
think of first-language acquisition in terms of acquiring 
rules which then assist in the production of language. 
Given what has gone before it can be seen that Wittgenstein, 
however, changes the direction of the enquiry into first 
language acquisition. The question as to how language is 
first acquired is now not directed at how rules are acquired 
(the answer for some being given by the problematical 
"innately"), but how language-use is acquired, with rules 
being seen as provided by others as a gloss on actual use. 
There is a consistency here with what was previously argued 
regarding our understanding of the language of sensations 
(see p.198), for the third-person's understanding of another 
person's sensation language is not normally provided by 
reference to linguistic rules alone, but rather by accepting 
that in such cases the language concerned is a form of 
behaviour and to be understood as such. Rules may, at a 
later stage, provide some sort of structure to the language 
of sensation, but when such language is first acquired it is 
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acquired as behaviour, mediated perhaps by our "natural 
history", rather than as rules which produce the behaviour. 
Moreover, given Wittgenstein's extended treatment of 
rule-following (which explains how one simply relies on the 
appropriate context to see if a particular practice's 
continuation is being followed in accord with a rule, rather 
than on some hidden, innate, understanding (PI p.60e, 
s.154)), then Chomsky's key notion of creativity is also 
explained. However, this is not in terms of explicit 
rule-following (Brown 1974, p.83), which, as Chomsky has 
made clear, cannot at the surface-level provide the 
necessary creativity; rather it is in terms of a finite 
application of language, as opposed to a knowledge of 
infinite innate universals, and it is upon this application 
that others predicate rules and rule-following (PI p.58e, 
s.147). 
This rejection of Brown's interpretation of Wittgenstein is 
not, however, to reject the view that something must precede 
language acquisition. There is an aspect of Specht's 
formulation which, suitably altered, is a part of 
Wittgenstein's account of first language acquisition, namely 
the acceptance of Specht's claim that language learning 
presupposes a grasp of certain aspects of language, provided 
that these presuppositions are not seen as linguistic, but 
as consisting rather of other aspects of our social 
practices (pp.206-207). 
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Specht is misled into thinking that "linguistic forms and 
techniques" cannot be taught in language as they presuppose 
language, which is correct as far as it goes. If, however, 
these forms and techniques can be provided in a "primitive" 
fashion by other aspects of practice then no circularity is 
generated, only a linear movement from crude social 
practices to the complex ones of language-use. The term 
"language-game", then, embodies behaviours which are 
linguistic and non-linguistic, the latter providing a link 
to the former. Thus if language-use is seen as involving 
"an interaction between using words and behaving in 
non-linguistic ways" (Pitcher 1964, p.242) then language's 
initial acquisition can be explained as resulting from that 
interaction. 
On this account, then, being minimally engaged in social 
practices at however crude a level provides the infant ipso  
facto with a context which is rule-governed and it is that 
minimal engagement which forms the basis for training in 
further engagements with its particular community (p.207), 
leading eventually to the more developed practices of 
language use. The first acquisition of language is not 
simply "an introduction into a set of social practices" 
(Hamlyn 1970 p.67); it is indeed that introduction, but one 
that is facilitated by other social practices or, generally 
speaking, the "acculturation in the form of life of a 
community" (Baker and Hacker 1980, p.48). 
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A similar misunderstanding about the nature of what is 
acquired reveals itself in Hardwick's work. The need to 
define rather than describe the process of first language 
acquisition is again evident when he states that "language 
learning is a matter of learning rules for the use of 
words", where these rules "represent the conventions" of a 
particular "speech community" (Hardwick 1971, p.86). If 
Hardwick's interpretation of Wittgenstein were correct then 
Wittgenstein would face the debilitating problem of 
explaining how these conventions could be learned when they 
presuppose learning, a paradigm of Quine's problem of 
radical translation. 
Hardwick is aware of the difficulty, for he continues by 
attempting to resolve this irresolvable problem by arguing 
that, for Wittgenstein, "the rule and the use of the rule 
come together "at the level of word-function (ib. p.87), 
which he sees as non-linguistic (ib p.86). This is, as has 
been shown, a correct answer (assuming one added that 
word-function does not require knowledge of rules), but to 
the wrong question, for the presuppositions of learning 
cannot themselves be learned. A question posed in terms of 
learning rules cannot be answered without becoming involved 
with the problem of circularity, for learning itself is 
rule-governed. The novel question that has been posed and 
answered by Wittgenstein, without circularity intruding, is 
expressed in terms of developing the embryonic skills of 
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social interaction, whereby as one takes a part in such 
"games" one becomes more adept at them, language developing 
as a by-product of such interaction. 
This aspect of primitive language-games is clearly 
misunderstood by Hardwick, who claims that Wittgenstein's 
account is that the child first learns words which are then 
combined into sentences. Given this interpretation of the 
account it would follow that Wittgenstein's primitive 
language-games are "fruitless" and "an inadequate 
characterization of language" (ib. p.116). If this 
interpretation were correct then one would have to accept 
Hardwick's conclusion but, as has been already shown, this 
interpretation ignores those aspects of social practice 
which are indicated by "game" and which are involved before 
the first word is acquired. To say that we are here being 
given an account of how words are learned is certainly 
correct, but to ignore the account Wittgenstein provides of 
the "stage-setting" that occurs before that learning is to 
ignore crucial aspects of the account of meaning, in 
particular his account of language-games and forms of life. 
Thus the distinction which Hardwick makes between learning 
to talk and learning to talk a language (ib. pp.118ff), 
although important, can in fact be found within 
Wittgenstein's conception of "language-game". The 
acquisition of the appropriate motor skills of speech is, 
for both Hardwick and Wittgenstein, "affected by a social 
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context" (ib. p.121), by use, as is the acquisition of 
speech-with-meaning. Both proceed through the notion of 
use, for "the child learns the meaning of a word by learning 
what he can do with the word" (ib. p.129), the difference 
between them being expressed in terms of what is acquired, 
rather than how it is acquired, between different, but 
connected, types of language-game. For this reason one 
would agree with Hardwick, that his own account is 
"compatible with Wittgenstein's"; it is not so much that 
Hardwick is offering "a wider perspective" (ib. p.136) but 
rather the same perspective, albeit with more descriptive 
detail. 
Given the detail of Wittgenstein's Descriptive account of 
meaning the circularity implied in Wisdom's slogan which 
equated meaning with use is thus also avoided in his account 
of first-language acquisition (with Harrison 1979, p.234). 
As the child acquires "a set of ways of manipulating the 
world, into which linguistic moves fit in various ways "(ib. 
p.245) so the child acquires an ontology based upon the 
accepted operation of the language-games he plays. In this 
way Wittgenstein's work, viewed as a metaphysic, an account 
of meaning or as an account of first-language acquisition, 
can be seen as an alternative to what has been previously 
examined. Moreover, as defended here, it is neither 
internally inconsistent nor, apparently, incomplete. As far 
as its external validity is concerned then, given what has 
already been argued about such a criticism, all that can be 
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said is that given what it claims is the criterion for such 
validity then it would appear to have met that criterion of 
descriptive adequacy (cf. p.211). 
As it stands, then, is this a sufficient account of 
first-language acquisition? It would certainly appear to be 
a minimally satisfactory account, maximally so if one were 
to concentrate only on the area of his work which describes 
what develops from primitive language-games. What is 
required if the account is to be acceptable in toto is an 
elaboration of the non-verbal precursors of language and the 
following section will examine what such an elaboration 
might offer. Such an account is central to the thesis, for 
if the "basis of language is, in a certain sense, 
pre-judgmental for Wittgenstein" (McGinn 1984, p.55, 
footnote 52) then, qua description of that basis, something 
needs to be said about the non-verbal forerunners of 
language. Indeed, if nothing can be said about them then 
this would represent a major weakness in Wittgenstein's 
account of first-language acquisition, and, by implication, 
his account of meaning and philosophy of language. 
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SECTION VI - MEANING WITHOUT WORDS 
Experience and information joined in the brain to 
provide explanations. It was like writing the 
first draft of a poem: words formed on the page 
without passing through the conscious mind. 
(McCarry 1974, p.52) 
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6.1 Wittgenstein and the Non-Verbal Base  
It could be argued that the postulation of a non-verbal base 
to language is, like the parallel area of elementary 
propositions in the Tractatus(1), by definition beyond 
discussion for one would appear to be using language to 
identify what is at one and the same time both beyond 
language and also its base. Such a criticism fails to see 
that this non-verbal base is different in kind from the base 
that elementary propositions provided in the earlier work. 
There is no translational account being offered here where, 
by a series of logical operations, our actual language is 
translated out of a purer form of language. Rather, the 
non-verbal base provides experience of certain aspects of 
language, in particular the experience of participation in 
rule-guided social activity, and it is this practice which 
is used as the medium whereby the child begins to take part 
in the activity of language. 
In this way actual experience, not some theoretical formal 
base, mediates between language and non-language. Moreover 
this area of induction into a form of life can be spoken of 
(contra his earlier view that it was "inexpressible" CV 
p.16e). This is because it is quite unlike the area which 
elementary propositions bridged (which was in some 
indefinable way both verbal and non-verbal), although once 
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identified can be seen as simple and familiar (PI p.50e, 
s.129). Finally no hypothesis need be presented about this 
area, with all the problems such theorizing brings, only a 
description of what it is and how it operates. 
This said it becomes clear from a reading of his later work 
that Wittgenstein provided only a cursory glimpse into this 
aspect of his views on language. It must be said that this 
is at best a disappointment, at worst a major failing, in 
that work for, as argued above, the area is crucial and also 
well within the scope of his perception of philosophy which, 
at this point, "obliterates the distinction between factual 
and conceptual investigations" (Z p.82e, s.458). If one 
accepts that language is a "refinement" on its beginnings in 
non-verbal "deeds" (CV p.31e) then something certainly needs 
to be said about these unrefined practices. 
There are remarks scattered thoughout his later work on this 
subject, but nothing that could be called a sustained 
treatment and, more often than not, these remarks in context 
are not about the non-verbal base per se, but about meaning. 
Thus in the context of a discussion about feelings 
Wittgenstein makes the point that "the communication of 
feelings by gestures" requires a knowledge of "the criterion 
of having succeeded in communicating" (BBB p.185). This 
would appear to suggest that non-verbal communication 
requires not just the same kind of criteria as does verbal 
communication, but also a knowledge of those criteria. If 
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this were indeed his position then all that has already been 
developed and defended in his account of first-language 
acquisition would fall away, being replaced by some form of 
innate knowledge of criteria (with Brown 1974 - see 
pp.325ff). However, as Wittgenstein is here talking solely 
about experienced language-users such an interpretation is 
not sound as they are using their knowledge of language to 
understand the non-verbal area, not vice-versa. 
Elsewhere the term "natural history" is one that could well 
be seen as relating to the non-verbal base. Practice, for 
Wittgenstein, "is simply what we do. This is use and custom 
among us, or a fact of our natural history" (RFM p.20e, 
s.63). The connective "or" does not here represent an 
equivalence but rather an alternative, for elsewhere 
"natural history" is used consistently to refer to what one 
might call the biology of man (where, for example, "natural 
history" is connected to eating - PF p.12e, s.25 - and, in a 
different context, the names of plants - OC, p.71e, s.534). 
So practices are based on our customs and our biology such 
that when one is trying to translate the language of a group 
whose customs are very different to one's own then one is 
left with the second alternative as a way in to the 
language, as "the common behaviour of mankind is the system 
of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown 
language" (PI p.82e, s.206). Interpretation, of course, is 
not directly relevant to the area of first-language 
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acquisition, because the interpreter already has language, 
whereas the infant does not (OC p.71e, s.536), but the point 
made about interpretation confirms the view of "natural 
history" suggested here (as opposed to an interpretation in 
terms of the contingencies of "our very human nature" 
offered by Bearsley - 1983, p.232). 
Given this use of the term then it would follow that 
examples of our natural history are statements of the 
obvious (RFM p.43e, s.141) "which have escaped remark only 
because they are always before our eyes" (PI p.125e, s.515), 
the example in the latter's context being the use of the 
word "pain". So it might appear that, if a "word is taught 
as a substitute for a facial expression or a gesture" (LC 
p.2), with use acting as the criterion for appropriateness, 
then what is being suggested is a transition from the very 
primitive language-game of merely biologically based 
expressions or gestures (such as a wince) towards their 
replacement with language, this being supported by the claim 
that in learning to speak the child "learns to react in 
such-and-such a way" (OC p.71e, s.538). Such an 
interpretation would be consistent with Malcolm's account of 
Wittgenstein's explanation of avowals (Malcolm 1958) and 
with Lenneberg's postulation of a "biological matrix for the 
development of speech and language" (Lenneberg 1964, p.603). 
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What must be avoided here, however, is any movement towards 
a crude referential theory of meaning, which would in turn 
allow for slippage into the realm of private languages. It 
is all too easy to think of "natural" expressions gaining 
their meaning by, in some way, acting as referents for the 
words which replace them. It might then seem to follow that 
some natural expressions would gain their meaning by 
referring to the sensations that it is claimed they are in 
some sense related to and in this way a private referential 
theory could be reintroduced. As the supposed referents of 
natural expressions would be in some cases irreducibly 
private (for example, with sensations' language-games), it 
would then be easy to smuggle back a private referent so as 
to give meaning to the public language of sensations at 
least, and so contradict all that has gone before. 
What must be stressed is that these apparently 
nature-directed expressions are not, and cannot be, 
nature-interpreted; that is, they are not some sort of 
private language. Given Wittgenstein's account of meaning, 
the public, context-based interpretation of a 
biologically-based gesture (such as pointing) results in a 
variety of public interpretations, even though the 
biological base may well be invarient. For this reason he 
asserts, "We don't understand Chinese gestures any more than 
Chinese sentences" (Z p.40e, s.219) and that "The gesture 
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... tries to portray, but cannot do it" (PI p.128e, s.434). 
The pre-verbal aspect of communication, then, is as much 
subject to the constraints of context as is the verbal and 
so, in spite of their location in our "natural history", are 
not an aspect of meaning which in some way bear their 
meaning themselves, independent of other social practices. 
Thus, to say that cries are full of meaning is not to say 
that they carry their meaning with them, as elementary 
propositions were supposed to, but rather that "much can be 
gathered from them "(ib. p.146, s.543), as they serve as 
descriptions even though they are too primitive, qua 
pre-verbal, to actually be a description (ib. p.184e). 
The pre-verbal is here being identified as "a primitive 
reaction" which a language-game is based on, "the prototype 
of a way of thinking and not the result of thought" (Z 
p.95e, s.540-541). Indeed it is ordinary word use which 
Wittgenstein identifies as language, and the other aspects 
of communication are given the same descriptor "language" 
only "by analogy or comparability with this" (PI p.138e, 
s.494), which implies that the "language" of natural 
expressions founded in man's natural history is subservient 
to ordinary language, not as was implied earlier by Malcolm 
and Lenneberg, the reverse. 
Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition - p.273 - 
To summarize, it can be seen that Wittgenstein's treatment 
of the non-verbal base to language makes the following 
points: 
i) man's biological nature is such that certain general 
primitive reactions are a part of his natural history; 
ii) these reactions are not referents for language for 
those producing them, but they can be taken as such by 
those observing them; 
iii) thus, as they are interpreted in a social medium, they 
are given that medium's meanings, (they do not convey 
their meanings with them, independently from that 
interpretation). 
It is for this reason that he stresses that it is through 
training, not explanation, that the acquisition of one's 
first language begins (PI p.4e, s.5) because in the absence 
of the shared language which explanation requires, such 
beginnings are in effect the moulding of "natural behaviour" 
to make it fit to a specific set of social practices. A 
form of life may well be the "given" but this is certainly 
not provided at birth (with Bearsley 1983, p.233), where 
behaviour is biological and primitive, but rather as these 
behaviours are trained to fit the social given. 
As presented here his account seems more systematic than 
that which can be found in his actual writings, but it is 
certainly consistent with what has gone before (see Sections 
Vb7-Vb9, pp.191ff). The three points summarised above, 
although important as they stand, still only represent a 
most general description of the crucially important 
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pre-verbal base and, without further detail, it could be 
argued their very generality diminishes their usefulness - 
vague directions are almost as bad as false directions. In 
fact as they stand they are difficult to argue for or 
against, except insofar as they are internally consistent 
with the rest of his thought. The necessary detail must be 
sought elsewhere in order that this aspect of his work can 
be substantiated. 
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6.2 Pre-Linguistics 
As has already been suggested in this thesis, attempts in 
linguistics to account for first language acquisition have 
been heavily influenced by Chomsky such that it is accepted 
by many that the pre-verbal child "seems to operate like a 
professional grammarian" (McNeill 1966a, p.61) who gains 
language by acquiring "abstract information" (McNeill 1966b, 
p.99), these points being beyond dispute (Fodor 1966, 
p.105). Such a theory has been criticised at length in this 
thesis (pp.114ff) and has been replaced with an account 
which does not see language in terms of "a two-level theory" 
(Greene 1972, p.190), the child acting as a translator to 
produce an "internal representation of the grammar of his 
language" (Cairns and Cairns 1976, p.187) with the aid of an 
innate "linguistic archive" (Aitchison 1976, p.176) 
conceived of as a "mental lexicon" to explain words' 
meanings and uses (Matthei and Roeper 1983, p.70). 
The substitution of Wittgenstein's account for Chomsky's 
produces a position so opposed to Chomsky's theory that it 
becomes difficult to see quite how it would be possible to 
merge them as has been suggested (see, for example, Searle 
1971, p.12). Such a merger is only possible if just one 
aspect of Wittgenstein's work, for example the contextual 
nature of meaning, is added to Chomsky's account as Chomsky 
could then properly respond by pointing out that all 
Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition - p.276 - 
Wittgenstein is doing is simply stressing a surface element 
of language, thus retaining intact his dual conception of 
language (see, for example, Bloom 1970, p.2 and Falk 1973, 
pp.345-346). However, once the totality of Wittgenstein's 
account is grasped, in particular his monistic conception of 
language and all that flows from it (see Section Vb7, 
pp.191ff), there is then little of Chomsky's theory left to 
merge with, for their philosophies of language are quite 
distinct. 
Although other disciplines such as sociology (Firth 1950) or 
psychology (Falk 1973, p.v) may be seen by some as relevant 
to the concerns of linguistics, the relevance of philosophy 
(even when this is interpreted as Descriptive Linguistics - 
Firth 1950, p.37), is often ignored by those writing on 
language development. Indeed, one text's subtitle of "a 
multidisciplinary approach" is justified by providing a list 
of a host of relevant academic disciplines, but with 
philosophy noticeable by its absence (Lenneberg and 
Lenneberg 1975) and another's identification of the four 
academic disciplines which deal with language also excludes 
philosophy (Greene 1976b, p.53). This comment is not 
intended merely to repeat the claim that philosophy does 
have something to contribute to the field of first language 
acquisition but rather to stress that its contribution is 
crucial. 
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On the one hand philosophy can provide internal criticisms 
of linguistic theories by showing, amongst other things, 
that some of their implied meaning theories are 
unsatisfactory; on the other hand philosophy can provide a 
thoroughgoing account of language, meaning and first 
language acquisition, as already decribed, which is a far 
cry from the conception of philosophy mocked as armchair 
theorizing (Bower 1977b, p.10). The preconception, for 
example, that a word is a "container of meaning" (Anglin 
1970, p.2) sits ill with Anglin's acceptance of aspects of 
Wittgenstein's later work (ib. p.4) and such a basic 
misunderstanding of meaning is easily rectified through 
philosophy. Moreover, given the philosophical conception of 
language argued for in this thesis then the assumption that 
spoken language alone provides the necessary and sufficient 
base for linguistics can be rejected, so enabling the 
introduction of a new dimension to linguistics which, 
amongst other things, provides a structure for the 
development of an account of how language is to be first 
acquired. 
The claim has been made that in the 1960's and 1970's 
theories about language acquisition concentrated on what was 
acquired, whereas the modern approach is concerned with how 
the child learns (Oksaar 1977, p.24). This is certainly an 
over-simplification, partly because earlier theories 
certainly did have an account of how language was learned 
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(Halliday, for example, typifies Chomsky's work as being 
concerned with how language's structure is acquired - 
Halliday 1975, p.240) and partly because it is difficult to 
talk about how the child learns without at the same time 
referring to what is being learned. It is this 
interconnection between the "how" and the "what" of 
first-language acquisition that makes philosophical 
considerations about language pertinent here, for if 
"language" can be re-defined to include pre-verbal 
communication then attempts to explain how language is first 
acquired must take this additional aspect of language into 
consideration. 
Some inkling of this alternative conception of language is 
provided by Nelson who takes as his concern that area of 
language "which is assumed to underly the linguistic 
system", being "beyond the child's words" (Nelson 1977, 
p.117). Unfortunately he then proceeds to develop something 
very like Vygotsky's idea of "inner speech" and thoughts 
which are "more inward than inner speech" (Vygotsky 1934, 
p.149) through some form of representational theory couched 
in terms of there being a conceptual layer underneath 
language (what Macnanara calls "an innate language of 
thought" - 1977, p.143). 
Although developed in a way which, because of its simplistic 
referential meaning theory, is to be rejected Nelson does at 
least point towards a non-verbal area which is relevant to 
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linguistics. As such he can be read as breaking with a 
tradition exemplified by Chomsky and his followers, who 
assume that meaning is to be accounted for solely in terms 
of language, so producing a linguistic theory of meaning 
(see Section 4.3, pp.102ff). This assumption generates a 
lop-sided view of meaning such that meanings' rules, for 
example, are inevitably seen in terms of the rules of 
language (see, for example, Palermo 1978, p.175), and this 
in spite of an acceptance that the non-verbal area of 
communication does add to meaning (ib. p.223). 
This inadequate view of meaning has come to be rejected in 
that area of linguistics which is primarily concerned with 
accounting for first-language acquisition, being replaced 
with what is termed Functional Linguistics. Halliday is the 
founder of this alternative rejecting, as he does, Chomsky's 
approach as being "one-sided" (Halliday 1975a, p.240). 
Instead of concentrating on grammatical structure Halliday 
approaches the problem of first language acquisition from a 
functional perspective, in which by concentrating on the 
whole linguistic system it becomes possible to see "early 
language development ... as the child's progressive mastery 
of a functional potential" (ib. p.242)(2). 
Such an account of early language use which characterises it 
as a species of regulatory behaviour within a social context 
produces an interactionist view of meaning ("between the 
child and other human beings" - ib. p.243). It also allows 
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for the claim that "the child has a linguistic system before 
he has any words or structures at all" (ib.), what could be 
called a non-verbal linguistics. Although Halliday still 
occasionally talks in terms reminiscent of Chomsky (when, 
for example, he sees the child "constructing for himself a 
social semiotic" - Halliday 1974, p.256), it is his stress 
on the social nature of what is supposedly constructed (ib. 
p.276) which is so markedly different from what linguistics 
previously saw as its sole concern. Moreover, the 
recognition that there is no need to begin studies of first 
language acquisition with children aged nine months allows 
for the introduction of the view that before this age the 
child is not constructing anything, but is genetically 
primed just to engage in "communicative acts in general as 
opposed to intentional acts of meaning" (Halliday 1979, 
p.74). 
Functional Linguistics as outlined briefly here has marked 
similarities to Wittgenstein's view of first-language 
acquisition insofar as it has in common the idea of 
introducing the social context as being central to the 
understanding of meaning. Moreover, Functional Linguistics 
has even been criticised in much the same way as 
Wittgenstein's view of meaning was, in that it allows one to 
"end up saying that anything can be made to mean anything, 
given the right circumstances" (Greene 1976b, p.39). 
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Such a subjectivist interpretation ignores the way in which 
the group, rather than the individual, makes language 
"mean", although Greene is certainly right in claiming that 
this account deals with communicative, rather than merely, 
verbal, competence (ib. p.42)(3). As such there is no need 
to erect a theory to account for the development of 
rule-acquisition (with Olson, 1977a, p.114), for the 
functionalist account is one of the development of 
socialization (Widdowson 1976, p.41). Thus Crystal's "scale 
of linguisticness" (cited in Greene 1976b, p.19), which 
purports to show the way in which non-verbal phenomena 
gradually merge into verbal phenomena, could well be 
replaced by some sort of "scale of socialization", from the 
primitive to the highly complex, where one moves from 
simplistic attempts at socialization through to that 
provided by the complexities of language. 
As Halliday's account of first language acquisition stands, 
however, the developments in communication occurring before 
the age of nine months are not referred to in any detail and 
so, as with Wittgenstein, further elaboration is 
required(4). Such an elaboration is provided in linguistics 
(or rather, "paedolinguistics") by introducing the idea of 
non-verbal aspects of communication as being an important 
part of the "interaction basic to social, emotional and 
linguistic development" (Oksaar 1977, p.149). This allows 
for the view that, if non-verbal communication can be shown 
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to occur with an infant then, as "adults decode the meaning 
of the baby's utterances by looking at the specific 
non-verbal behaviours ... that accompany them" (Bower 1977a, 
p.143), substance can be given to the view that as a 
consequence of a Wittgensteinian account of language and of 
meaning there is indeed a pre-verbal base to first-language 
acquisition. 
In this way it can be seen that it is not that the infant 
means through its non-verbal behaviour, but rather that its 
adult audience takes this behaviour as meaningful, and in 
this way the infant "gets the idea of communicating by being 
communicated with" (Hamlyn 1978, p.106). What, then can be 
said of this non-verbal behaviour which is taken in both 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy (as interpreted here) and 
Halliday's Functional Linguistics as being crucial to 
meaning? 
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6.3 Meaning Without Words 
The first thing that must be said is that the temptation to 
treat the phenomenon of non-verbal communication in a manner 
similar to the empiricist or rationalist treatments of 
verbal communication must be resisted, otherwise the 
problems previously identified within empiricist and 
rationalist philosophies of language will simply travel 
across to the non-verbal aspect of communication. It has 
already been shown that there is some form of rationalism 
implied in Specht's identification of the non-verbal area as 
being of significance to language acquisition which brings 
with it the rationalist's difficulties with innate knowledge 
(see pp.217-218), but even apparently straightforward 
experimental work in the field of infant communication finds 
itself using the language of rationalism. 
One conclusion of a standard work in this area, for example, 
is that one to four month old infants can "sort acoustic 
variations of adult phonemes into categories with relatively 
little exposure to speech" (Eimas et al. 1971, p.306) and 
that this is possibly carried out by a "linguistic feature 
detector" (Eimas et al. 1973, p.251). Others write of the 
infant using "non-linguistic knowledge" to provide 
"hypotheses about what words might mean", and of 
first-language acquisition being a mapping of words on to 
this type of "knowledge" (Clark 1977, p.147). For such 
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writers non-verbal knowledge is the "means to crack the 
linguistic code", this being carried out in a manner 
explicitly compared to Chomsky's approach (Olson 1977b, 
p.178). The inherent problems of this view's account of 
first-language acquisition have already been identified (see 
pp.114ff), not the least being the regress of meaning it 
generates, where a public sortal capacity (or "mapping" 
ability) is explicated in terms of a prior sortal capacity, 
and so on. 
In fact the confusion here is such that Clark, an apparent 
rationalist, in an earlier paper accepts some form of an 
empiricist reference theory of meaning when he talks of a 
"child's interpretations of his perceptions" (Clark 1973, 
p.434) and of certain meanings being "cognitively simpler 
than others" (ib. p.449). Although he also accepts some 
form of the child-as-hypothesiser thesis his earlier paper's 
emphasis on the perceptual base of these hypotheses recalls 
the traditionalists' acceptance of Ideas, as does 
Macnamara's identification of thoughts as occurring in a 
separate "domain" to that of "the construction and utterance 
of sentences" (Macnamara 1977a, p.7). The central problems, 
of course, are those of explaining the move from thought to 
language and of describing the way in which language-less, 
but structured, thought can be acquired (in Clark's terms, 
how to justify "explaining" first-language acquisition 
through the language of perceptual interpretations when such 
interpreting presupposes the very skill which he purports to 
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explain). 
At this point all one is doing is rehearsing previous 
criticisms made of empiricist and rationalist views of 
language which saw it as a translation from a base 
phenomenon (Ideas, experience, elementary propositions or 
deep structures) to another, more elaborate, phenomenon. 
Each particular position had its own unique difficulties, 
but all shared the problem of translation. If public 
language is to be seen as growing from some other phenomenon 
then the way in which these two phenomena connect has to be 
explained without circularity. 
Even if this can be achieved there is then the further 
difficulty of explaining, in a fashion consistent with the 
relevant account of language, how the base phenomenon is 
first acquired by the infant. If this cannot be 
successfully carried out then, as has been previously 
argued, there is a serious flaw in the position such that 
its philosophy of language and/or meaning theory has 
radically to be recast. It would follow that the account of 
the non-verbal base of language being developed in this 
thesis should not be seen as part of some sort of 
translational account of meaning (see p.266), although this 
is not to say that it will have no difficulties of its own 
to meet. 
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To summarise, what is required of an account of 
first-language acquisition is that it should: 
1. avoid making language's meaning irreducibly private 
2. avoid an appeal to innate knowledge 
3. avoid the circularity inherent in using a translational 
account of first-language acquisition, which gives the 
infant the very abilities that are supposed to be explained 
4. avoid ignoring the non-verbal aspect of language 
5. avoid making an account of first-language acquisition 
contradict whatever account of meaning is accepted 
6. be aware of the connections between the 'how' and the 
'what' of first-language acquisition. 
Given these six constraints the non-verbal field, then, must 
be approached with some caution. In fact it is even 
difficult to find an agreed definition of its 
subject-matter, the lack of a consensus on this being 
accepted by some as an indication of the "complexity of 
communication" (Newman 1960, quoted in Harrison and Knapp 
1972, p.347). This, of course, is another similarity with 
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language per se, the difficulty of defining something so 
varied, which has led at least one linguist to refuse to 
define "language", despite the title of his paper 
("Language: origins, definitions and chimpanzees"), on the 
grounds that there are as many definitions as scholars 
interested in language (Fouts 1974, p.481). 
Given what has previously been argued about the nature of 
language-games such a refusal is very much in sympathy with 
Wittgenstein's understanding of language and is as much an 
indication of the nature of definitions as it is about 
language, resisting as it does any attempt to find a single 
definition for a complex phenomenon such as language. With 
Newman, the best that can be expected would be a host of 
definitions which, taken together, could be seen as an 
open-ended description of the field, taken separately, as 
identifying one language-game amongst a host of others. 
Such a descriptive, or functional (Myers 1979, p.1), 
approach to language and pre-linguistics fits well with what 
has earlier been presented as a descriptive account of 
meaning and first-language acquisition (Sections 5b7-5b9, 
pp.191-209) and is exemplified in Key's work. She begins by 
making it clear that she is aware of the variety of 
behaviour that is encompassed by the term "non-verbal 
communication" (from painting to snoring), but that she will 
be concerned with two areas, paralanguage (defined as "some 
kind of articulation of the vocal apparatus, or significant 
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represent "an elaborate and secret code that is written 
nowhere, known by none, and understood by all" - Sapir 1927, 
p.556, quoted in Key 1975, p.12). 
This raises two questions: one, how it is possible to follow 
such hidden rules and, two, what is it that these rules are 
guiding? The second question is answered with extensive 
descriptions of examples of paralanguage (ib. Chpt.3 passim) 
and kinesics (Chpt.4 passim), which build a picture of 
complex and subtle behaviours. With paralanguage, for 
instance, the non-verbal, but voice-dependent, communication 
from adult to infant through the medium of so-called 
"baby-talk" is designed not to produce meaning so much as 
"an atmosphere of a special, exclusive kind of relationship" 
(ib. p.73); with kinesics, there are lexical, directive and 
emotive aspects to the ways in which we communicate with our 
bodies (ib. p.101), but the various kinds of tactile kinesic 
acts are of particular importance for the development of 
language (ib. p.103). 
This two-part categorisation of what it is that is being 
guided by Sapir's "secret code" is useful in allowing for 
distinctions that some working in this area miss. For 
example, the functional analysis of infant cries and non-cry 
vocalizations (gurgling and the like) presented by Wolff to 
support the thesis, amongst others, that there is a link 
between crying and the acquisition of a first language 
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(Wolff 1969, p.109), and by Lieberman's examination of 
intonation in infants (Lieberman 1967), can be seen as 
examples of paralanguage. However, Wolff and Lieberman's 
concentration on this aspect of non-verbal communication 
(such that Lieberman claims that infants "communicate by 
means of sound from the moment of birth onward" - ib. p.41) 
ignores the other kinesic aspect of non-verbal communication 
and so presents a one-sided view of the non-verbal 
communicative process. The reverse is also true, of course, 
where kinesics can be emphasised to the exclusion of 
paralanguage. For example, visual behaviour (in particular, 
eye contact) is taken by some as the major regulatory 
influence on communication (Ellsworth and Ludwig 1972), with 
little or no mention of the other aspects of non-verbal 
behaviour which provide the context for such communication 
(see, for example, Ekman and Friessen 1972, p.355). 
The description that Key offers of paralanguage and 
kinesics, as with the description that Wittgenstein offered 
of language and the acts that accompany it, is qualified by 
the statement that "human behaviour defies classification" 
(Key 1975, p.104 - cf. "the concept of a living being has 
the same indeterminacy as that of a language", Z p.60e, 
s.326) and is structured by the complexities of the context 
of these behaviours (Key op.cit. pp.122-134). However, in 
an attempt to deal with the first question concerning the 
rule-governed nature of non-verbal communication Key herself 
relies on Austin's speech-act theory. 
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Unfortunately this section of her work is very perfunctory 
and seems to represent not so much an explicit analysis of 
meaning theory as rather an example of a philosophical 
approach to language which utilizes and epitomizes the 
non-verbal area (ib. p.125) so as to show to her 
satisfaction that "language and non-verbal events are 
inextricably related" (Key 1977, p.5). There is no defence 
offerred to a central problem with Austin's speech-act 
theory, namely that it would seem to require intentionality 
on the part of the person performing the speech-act, whereas 
this is precisely what is missing in the infant's use of 
non-verbal behaviour. 
To circumvent the problem of intentionality this area of 
non-verbal communication should, instead, be perceived in 
Wittgensteinian terms. It could then be seen as a central 
example of man's "natural history", of behaviour where the 
actor's audience predicate rule-following upon his behaviour 
and where the actor need not be consciously following such 
implied rules. Such an interpretation of the way in which 
it is possible to appear to follow hidden, if not unknown, 
rules, where simply acting is taken in conjunction with a 
particular social context as criteria for successful, or 
unsuccesful, rule-following is quite consistent with 
Wittgenstein's account of rule-following given earlier 
(pp.234ff)(5). 
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Interpreted in this way the idea of a base of non-verbal 
communication avoids the traditionalists' problems of 
privacy and their double-translational accounts of meaning 
and first-language acquisition. The feature that 
particularly distinguishes the infant's and the adult's use 
of such non-verbal communication is that with the 
pre-linguistic infant (contra Specht, Clark, et al.) there 
appears to be, by definition, no intentionality, whereas 
with the adult there may well be. Indeed, in an important 
sense the infant does not use non-verbal techniques of 
communication, for this would suggest some sort of 
intentionality on its part. It is for this reason that 
Bruner, for example(8), stresses the role of the mother who, 
he suggests, makes use of "a very complex joint anticipatory 
system" (Bruner and Sherwood 1981, p.31) so as to interpret 
intention in her infant's behaviour (Bruner 1974, p.77). In 
this manner the mother can be seen as inducting her child 
into the "rules of social interaction generally and of the 
"deep" rules of the culture as well" (Bruner and Sherwood 
op.cit. p.36), what for Wittgenstein would be termed the 
form of life(7). 
Again, however, there are difficulties in Bruner's reliance 
on Austin's speech act theory. Bruner makes it clear that 
such a theory makes use of intentionality on the part of 
both speaker and listener and yet "initially ... it is the 
adult who must bear the responsibility for interpreting 
intent" (ib. p.34). Although Bruner does not identify this 
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as a problem, it follows that Austin's account cannot then 
be of direct relevance in accounting for meaning at the 
stage of an infant's life where there is only one-way 
intentionality, from adult to child; rather, it should be 
replaced with that given by Wittgenstein, provided that the 
area of non-verbal communication is suitably elaborated. 
For much the same reason Cooper's arguments in support of 
his view that "it is fruitless to identify 
concept-possession in terms of mere discriminatory 
abilities" (Cooper 1973a, p.218) can be accepted without 
compromising the account of first language acquisition being 
offered in the thesis. It is not that the pre-verbal infant 
is being accredited with concepts on the grounds of its 
behaviour (as, for example, Chomsky might wish to do), but 
rather that the adults producing communicative behaviour 
directed towards the child take the child's behaviour as 
being communication, even though it may not be. No 
concept-possession on behalf of the pre-verbal infant is 
here being defended, with all the difficulties that such a 
claim would produce, only that the adults should have 
concepts which they infer from the infant's behaviour. 
At this point it can be seen that what what was initially 
offered as a development from an interpretation of 
Wittgenstein's philosophy of language and account of meaning 
has become a description of the area of non-verbal 
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communication coupled to the claim that first language 
acquisition initially proceeds by reference to a very 
one-sided form of communication. Both Key and Bruner have 
been criticised for relying on an Austinian account of 
meaning on the grounds that this account requires two-way 
communication, and thus two-way intentionality. Yet the 
pre-verbal infant, by definition, cannot be intending to 
produce communicative acts, as it has no verbal language 
with which verbally to act. So at this stage in the child's 
development it is suggested that what is required is that 
the concept of communication should be re-defined so as to 
include both two-way and one-way intentionality, whilst at 
the same time retaining the importance Austin and others 
accept of the social context within which such 
intentionality operates. 
This is no mere stipulative definition located in some sort 
of speculative metaphysics, for it is supported in part by 
the way in which we do in fact appear to communicate with 
pre-verbal infants (as the empirical work of both Halliday 
and Bruner amongst others suggests) and in part by 
Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, which identifies the 
crucial importance that the social context has in 
explicating meaning. However, it is clear that the 
introduction of considerations concerning the importance of 
one-way intentionality, the phenomenon of non-verbal 
communication and the relevance of the social context in 
understanding meaning cannot on their own explain how 
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language is first acquired by the child. They represent 
such broad considerations that at best they could only be 
necessary conditions for the acquisition of language, as 
they do not on their own explain the move from one-way to 
two-way intentionality or communication. That is, as 
presented here they do not explain how language is first 
acquired, only that there are certain necessary conditions 
required to allow for the development of language. These 
conditions, however, do point the way to a possible 
hypothesis consistent with what has gone before to explain 
how first-language acquisition might occur. 
It has already been established that the pre-linguistic 
child cannot be said actively to learn its first language, 
because such learning appears to presuppose the very 
intentionality required to learn language. Neither can the 
fact that language is eventually acquired by the child be 
used to support the view that the child has, in some sense, 
an innate knowledge of the linguistic basis of language. 
The Wittgensteinian concept of "natural history" (see 
pp.269ff) is relevant here, as it allows for the 
introduction of the sort of biological concerns that 
support, for example, Lenneberg's view that learning to talk 
is like learning to walk (Lenneberg 1964), or Halliday's 
acceptance of Bullowa's claim that the child, gua human, is 
"born genetically endowed with the ability to take part in 
acts of communication" (Halliday 1979, p.72). 
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This is not to say, of course, that there is some sort of 
genetic 'knowledge' of language. Rather, as all but a tiny 
minority of children do in fact acquire language then it is 
clearly part of man's natural history that language 
acquisition is possible. The difficulty arises in moving 
from the potential to acquire language to realising that 
potential, a difficulty compounded by over-simplifying the 
"what" of first-language acquisition. 
If, as this thesis proposes, the what of first-language 
acquisition is expanded so as to include more than the 
complexities of verbal communication, then it becomes 
possible to give some account of how that potential is made 
actual which accepts the six conditions described earlier 
(p.286). The account hinges on a distinction between on the 
one hand a child's propensity to behave intentionally in 
non-verbal, non-communicative, ways (which allow adults to 
infer one-way communicative intentionality), and on the 
other the child's full-blooded linguistic actions (which 
involve two-way communicative intentionality). This is a 
distinction which Halliday also draws in terms of 
"communicative acts in general, which the child is engaging 
in from birth, and what may be called acts of meaning" (ib. 
p.74), where the potential to mean is made actual through 
the phenomenon of one-way intentionality described earlier. 
If the "what" of first-language acquisition is allowed to 
include one-way communicative behaviours then the "how" 
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appears then to be allowed a purchase. The 'learning' 
situation would become one in which the pre-verbal child 
merely behaves (the "what" of first-language acquisition) 
and some of this behaviour is then given meaning by the 
adult, in Halliday's case by reference to the function that 
the behaviour performs (the "how" of first-language 
acquisition). The means/end intentionality that appears 
evident in the child's other behaviours, such as appearing 
to seek attention through prolonged eye-contact, can then be 
seen as carrying over to the intentionality inherent in 
language (communicative intentionality), where the action of 
asking for something is seen, for example, as a developed 
form of the primitive behaviour of appearing to "look with 
meaning". 
That is to say, the child is not necessarily communicating 
by, for example, engaging in excessive eye contact, but such 
contact provides what might be termed the intentional 
context for the adult to infer intentionality and so 
interpret the contact as a way of communicating (see, for 
example, the empirical study provided by Halliday of the 
development of what he terms "proto-langauge" - 1974, 
p.257). With Taylor, "The original, prelinguistic communion 
provides the indispensable context for the development of 
common spaces around objects of reference" (Taylor 1990, 
pp.524-525), where his concept of "common space" allows for 
the partners in the acts of communication to share meanings 
with each other (ib. p.35). To begin with the "sharing" is, 
Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition - p.297 - 
in terms of intentionality at least, very much a one-way 
activity based upon the infant's prelinguistic behaviour. 
However, as Bruner and Sherwood's empirical work indicates, 
it is this behaviour that the mother in particular 
interprets as having a socialising function so allowing for 
the infant's entry into language (Bruner and Sherwood 1981, 
p.36). 
The important point here is that pre-linguistic infants 
appear to be capable of a primitive form of what in adults 
would be described as means/ends behaviour. Such behaviour, 
by definition, cannot be linguistic, so it now becomes 
possible to re-formulate the question as to how language is 
first acquired. The problem is not that of explaining how 
the infant appears to develop linguistic communication from 
a base where there is no language, but rather how it moves 
from communicating entirely in one way (non-linguistically) 
to communicating mainly in another way (linguistically). 
What has so far been proposed as a solution to that problem 
is that: 
1. the infant behaves in intentional ways 
2. the adult ascribes communicative intentionality to 
that behaviour and thus assumes the infant is 
communicating 
3. the child communicates intentionally. 
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However, as it stands this proposal leaves unsaid how the 
assumption of communicative skills allows such skills to be 
realised (that is, how step two, above, acts as a bridge 
between steps one and three). Indeed, without such an 
explanation step two could fall away as irrelevant and the 
original problem would remain with no suggested resolution, 
except perhaps an appeal to some sort of biological 
propensity for the infant to move from steps one to three. 
At this point the importance of a functional theory of 
meaning to a functional account of first language 
acquisition becomes particularly clear. Bruner, for 
example, argues that empirical studies of the pre-linguistic 
infant suggests that the infant has at least four "cognitive 
'endowments" (Bruner 1983, p.30). These are abilities 
which allow the infant: 
a. to behave in means/ends ways so as to support 
goal-directed activity 
b. to behave in ways which support social interaction 
c. to behave in very systematic ways 
d. to have relatively abstract ways of appearing to organise 
its systematic behaviour (ib., pp.24-30). 
He argues that these four "endowments" are "foundation 
processes that aid the child's language acquisition...as 
enabling conditions" (ib., pp.30-31). They "enable" 
first-language acquisition not by in some sense generating 
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language, but rather by being "primitive procedures" for 
communicating from which language develops. This 
development is a functional one, in that the "endowments" 
are not themselves language, but they provide the basis from 
which language develops by functioning in a pre-linguistic 
communicative context. As they are encouraged to develop by 
the adult so they become more like linguistic procedures and 
in this way the transition from step one, above, to step 
three is realised. In addition, although Bruner does not 
himself make this point, these "endowments" (as well as 
other biological ones related to the physical make-up of, 
for example, the human larynx) can be seen as a part of 
man's natural history. So, by definition, simply presuming 
that other creatures are communicating would not thereby 
allow them to be considered as perhaps acquiring language. 
In effect the hypothesis being proposed to answer the 
question as to how the pre-linguistic infant develops 
linguistic abilities is that the infant appears to be 
"endowed" with various biological abilities to support its 
socialising activities (step one, above). Some of these 
socialising activities share features of linguistic 
communication (see a-d, above) and adults appear to seize on 
these and encourage their development in infants (step two, 
above). Thus the "continuities between prelinguistic 
communication and later speech" (Bruner 1983, p.39) are 
encouraged to develop beyond their initial socialising 
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function to the infinitely more complex function of meaning 
(step three, above). 
In this way it can be seen that what is being proposed in 
this thesis is that the conceptual link between non-verbal 
behaviour and language is provided by the general term 
"communication", where a communicative act might be 
non-verbal or verbal and involving one-way or two-way 
intentionality, depending on the function of the act. This 
speculative link rests upon the empirical observation that 
means/ends behaviour does indeed occur and that it is from 
this, and other, bases that the potential to communicate 
linguistically is made actual. Moreover, the speculation is 
supported by, and lends support to, a functional theory of 
meaning of the kind analysed previously in the thesis. 
A case study providing the detail of how the potential is 
made actual is provided by Halliday in his description and 
analysis of how his son Nigel developed language (Halliday 
1975) and represents, in effect, an extended description of 
the way in which Nigel moved from being treated as 
communicating by others (on the basis of the imputation of 
intention to his non-verbal behaviour) to the stage where he 
intended to communicate (what Halliday terms "meaning"). 
However, this assumed biological potential cannot be made 
actual by the child on its own, because the social nature of 
communication requires the conditions described above for it 
to be realised (what few empirical studies exist would seem 
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to lend support to this point - see, for example, Itard 
1801, Armen 1971 and Hern 1972). 
Such an account of first language acquisition which moves 
from the hypothesis of a genetic ability to produce 
behaviour which, by reference to the function it performs, 
can be taken as communicative to the social realisation of 
the potential that such behaviour has for the social 
development of full-blooded meaning, appears to be quite 
consistent with the holistic philosophy of language accepted 
in this thesis. As noted above, it is the holism provided 
by the concept of the form of life which allows for what 
would otherwise be isolated meaningless behaviours to be 
given a meaning by reference, implicitly or explicitly, to 
the social context within which they occur and the function 
which they perform. 
There does, however, seem to be a difficulty with providing 
a meaning theory for a pre-verbal infant's non-verbal, 
taken-as-communicative, behaviours, for such an infant would 
appear not to be aware of meaning anything by its behaviour 
and so there is no meaning as such to provide an account 
for. This criticism only has force if the suggested 
re-definition of communication is rejected, in that 
communication would then only be said to take place if there 
were a two-way interaction of meaning. Yet if communication 
were to be seen in this manner there would then appear to be 
no way in which language could first be acquired, for the 
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beginnings of language would then require some sort of 
intentional communication on the part of the 
pre-communicative infant. This paradox, of course, is 
precisely that which leads Chomsky and others into 
suggesting that the infant has some sort of intentional 
ability which allows it eventually to communicate with 
language. 
If, however, the alternative definition of communication 
identified above is accepted then no such paradox is 
generated. Those communicating through language can, if 
necessary, be seen as taking part in an activity which 
involves two-way intentionality; those who are communicating 
with pre-verbal infants are taking part in communication 
which involves a one-way intentionality (from the adult to 
the infant) based upon the assumption that the infant's 
socialising behaviour, qua human infant, is an attempt to 
communicate, with the functional context providing the 
criteria for the success of such attempts, and 
Wittgenstein's account of meaning allows for this. In 
addition, by making full use of the holism in that account 
of meaning, the adult can be seen as inferring 
intentionality in the appropriate non-verbal behaviours of 
the infant. The criteria for "appropriate" are provided by 
the relevant social context. Thus by locating meaning in 
the social context there is no difficulty in inferring 
pe-verbal meanings, if only because that inference is based 
not upon some subjective interpretation of the particular 
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context, but rather upon the context taken as a whole, and 
as a part of man's natural history. 
In this way it is possible to have meaning without words, 
where there is no need to provide a meaning theory for the 
pre-verbal infant's behaviour because what is being 
suggested is that such an infant is not necessarily 
intending its behaviour to mean in order that communication 
might begin to take place. Provided the philosophy of 
language one is working within allows for "communication" to 
be understood as occuring during one-way interactions then 
all that is required is that the account of meaning should 
be consistent with the philosophy of language, and this has 
been argued for previously. 
There is, then, no need to search for an explanation of some 
sort of paradoxical pre-verbal verbal ability, with all the 
difficulties that such atempted explanations produce. With 
Hamlyn, "We should describe the pre-linguistic child's 
thought in terms of the language of propositions, and we 
should be right to do so even if the child cannot make use 
of propositions in linguistic form" (Hamlyn 1978, p.77), for 
"actions can be said to have an analogous propositional 
flavour" (ib. p.107). In this way the complex apparatus of 
truth conditions can be implied as being a part of the 
pre-verbal infant's behaviour by means of inferences based 
upon our own non-verbal communicative skills, without having 
to make and then justify the claim that the infant is 
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somehow aware of these conditions. 
Alternative accounts of first language acquisition which 
make reference to a two-way interaction (and thus to a 
two-way intentionality) where, for example, the infant is 
seen as making "skillful adjustments of his action and ... 
expressions in response to the displays of his partner" 
(Brazelton et al. 
 1975, p.138) are precisely that which is 
rejected in this thesis, not because they are in some sense 
false (after all, Brazelton's account is based on close 
analysis of televised interactions), but because he fails to 
see that he is dealing with an infant at a later stage of 
its communicative development (although, of course, the 
analysis could well be criticised as being based on 
over-optimistic interpretations of infants' behaviours). 
There may well be such "adjustments" at the early stages of 
life, but to term them "skilful" is simply to introduce a 
dimension of intentional, rule-governed (and awareness of 
these rules) behaviour which is merely presumed acquired, 
given the failure of arguments supporting an innateness 
hypothesis. Such two-way interactive accounts are, in 
effect, smuggling back in the conception of the infant as 
linguist, as opposed to that of the infant as "a potentially 
social organism" (Denzin 1977, p.76) and thus can be seen as 
attempting to nullify the new emphasis away from the verbal 
to the non-verbal aspect of communication. To do more than 
identify the behaviour concerned in the very general way 
Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition - p.305 - 
that Key and Bruner do is to fall into the trap of moving 
from general descriptions of inferred intentions to specific 
elaborations of, for example, the "fundamental" inferred 
intention, the "intention to mean" (Pylyshyn 1977, p.40). 
The trap is a particularly dangerous one in that Pylyshyn's 
level of specificity is such that, however sympathetic one 
might feel towards his general position (where meaning is 
not solely language-based), to infer particular meanings in 
the specific context of infant communication is fallacious, 
in that the infant does not confirm these meanings but the 
adult does, on the basis of previous inferences. 
There would, therefore, be no possibility of breaking out of 
the circle of adult-perceived-inferences of meaning which, 
in turn, would justify further inferences, and so on (cf. 
Cooper 1973a, p.368). In effect the infant would never 
develop meaning, for the adult would always be inferring it, 
a reductio ad absurdum of the argument. At the level of 
generality being defended in this thesis the circle is 
avoided, because the adult does not infer meaning upon the 
behaviour of a passive infant, but the infant, qua potential 
communicator, has certain of its functional (that is, 
primitive means/ends), non-verbal behaviours treated as 
verbal communicative behaviours through the shared medium of 
the non-verbal. 
Thus the infant's move from apparently biologically based 
behaviours (Wittgenstein's "natural history") to 
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socially-based communicative behaviours is allowed for by a 
perception of communication which sees this phenomenon as 
being more than something which is merely verbal. If, with 
Wittgenstein, our view of the philosophy of language and 
meaning is seen as taking both the verbal and the non-verbal 
areas of human behaviour as appropriate to its concerns(")  
it becomes possible for us to see how a descriptivist 
philosophy can generate a descriptivist account of 
first-language acquisition whose acceptability lies in the 
accuracy of its description (assuming that there are no 
internal contradictions or other weaknesses). The holism of 
Wittgenstein's later work provides "the wider context from 
which language-use emerges: a context of varying activity, 
pre-verbal communication, and the relationships with others 
that this presupposes" (Hamlyn 1978, p.113). 	 Given a 
comparable descriptivist account of the pre-verbal base, as 
provided in this thesis, Wittgenstein can then be taken as 
giving what appears to be an adequate account of 
first-language acquisition and of meaning. 
Despite all that has been argued for in this section of the 
thesis the claim could still be made that although the 
philosophy of language and account of meaning might be 
acceptable there are still a number of reasons why the 
corresponding account of first language acquisition is 
unsatisfactory. One possible criticism might be in terms of 
its lack of specificity as compared to the empiricist, 
rationalist and semantical alternatives. However, it is an 
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integral part of the philosophy of language defended in this 
thesis that being over-specific brings with it the danger of 
the account applying to only one aspect of communication, to 
one language game as if it were the only language game. 
Moreover, as it has already been shown that neither the 
empiricist, the rationalist nor the semantical accounts of 
first language acquisition can break free of the specificity 
of their view of communication, and that specificity is 
quite inappropriate at the point where it is particularly 
unclear whether two-way communication is taking place 
between infant and adult, then the charge of being 
unspecific is in fact a strength, rather than a weakness, of 
this thesis' position. 
Another criticism that might be brought to bear against the 
thesis is that, in direct opposition to its account of 
meaning's apparent relativism, it is itself assuming 
universal communicative abilities. Leaving aside the 
question as to whether or not this is indeed a relativistic 
philosophy (and, as has been argued previously, this is not 
an interpretation that would be accepted - see pp.253ff) 
such a criticism does highlight an important aspect of the 
account offered of first language acquisition. What is 
assumed is that there is behaviour prior to verbal 
communication and this would seem uncontentious. However, 
what is then argued for is that, given a wider definition of 
"communication" than has usually been accepted, certain 
aspects of this pre-verbal behaviour are taken as being 
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communicative, even if in fact they may not at first be. 
Which aspects are so taken depend upon the appropriate 
context; that they are so taken would appear to be universal 
in the sense that, failing evidence to the contrary, it 
would seem to be a part of man's "natural history" that 
language does develop, in all but the most unnatural 
contexts (see, for example, Armen 1971 or Itard 1801). 
A third criticism might then be that the thesis is guilty of 
assuming the point at issue, namely that there are innate 
communicative abilities in the pre-verbal infant. At one 
level this is to misunderstand the account being given of 
first language acquisition, for the view that public 
language can develop from something innate and therefore 
private has been previously criticised as having, amongst 
other failings, crippling difficulties in explaining how the 
child translates private phenomena into those of the public 
realm. 
At another level the criticism points to the ambiguity of 
the concept of "innate communicative abilities". Because 
"communication" is usually taken as deriving its meaning 
from adult verbal interaction, especially in philosophy, 
then innate communicative abilities are naturally seen as 
referring to something which both parties to the interaction 
are at least minimally aware of. If, however, 
"communication" is redefined so as to include non-verbal 
interaction and, crucially, one-way interaction then there 
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is some bite to the criticism. However, the thesis is not 
so much assuming what is at issue as rather accepting, with 
certain reservations, that the empirically based studies of 
Halliday, Key, Bruner et al. appear to lend support to the 
points made about the importance of non-verbal, one-way, 
interaction in accounting for the phenomenon of first 
language acquisition. What appears to be innate is 
straightforward behaviour based upon man's "natural history" 
and non-verbal communication is predicated upon that by 
adults. 
The criticism can therefore be side-stepped by accepting 
that what is being assumed (although justified by being 
based upon empirical studies of infants) is that the 
pre-verbal infant does produce communicative behaviour and 
that the adults they are in contact with do infer, and so 
encourage the development of certain of these behaviours 
into meaningful communication. This is not so much the 
point at issue as an apparently uncontentious description of 
what in fact appears to occur. Moreover, it gains 
additional strength by being consistent with the philosophy 
of language and account of meaning which makes up the 
totality of the thesis' position, the whole combining to be 
mutually supportive in a way which the alternatives examined 
are not. 
In doing so this thesis can thus be seen as providing the 
theoretical framework that Key correctly laments as being 
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missing from her work (Key 1975, p.162), which satisfies the 
six requirements for an account of first language 
acquisition identified earlier (p.286). However, it is a 
strange "theory" stressing as it does descriptive 
disparities and the impossibility, given the phenomena of 
communication, of the kind of all-embracing theory she seems 
to require. Similarly, from a philosophical perspective, 
the requirement for the provision of a "theory of meaning 
... as the essential theoretical prelude to the First Word" 
(Platts 1979, p.5) is met by an equally strange "theory", 
describing as it does the practicalities of the non-verbal 
"prelude" to language. 
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SECTION VII - CONCLUSIONS 
All the business of war, 
And indeed all the business of life 
Is to endeavour to find out 
What you don't know by what you do 
(Deighton 1963, p.144) 
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If the interpretation of a Wittgensteinian account of 
meaning with and without words described, defended and added 
to in this thesis is sound then it is so because it avoids 
the problems that eventually brought its alternatives to 
grief. If the arguments advanced earlier are accepted they 
support the view that the only appropriate criticisms of a 
metaphysical position are internal to that position (see 
pp.8ff) and the descriptivism advanced in this thesis 
appears to have met such criticisms as are internal to it. 
Descriptivism avoids a translational account of meaning in 
which ordinary language's meanings reduce to, and are 
dependent upon, some other aspect of languages (here the 
pre-verbal base), for there is no translation of meaning 
from the pre-linguistic to the verbal. At best there is an 
inference of meaning by one partner in the interaction, but 
this is an inference based on language, not upon pre-verbal 
phenomena alone (see p.272), although the infant's 
pre-verbal behaviours provide the reason for the inference. 
Moreover, the inference is not based upon some form of 
argument from analogy, as it is firmly located in the 
context of the interaction as a whole, although there is 
some uncertainty as to nature of the philosophical arguments 
which might support the notion of one-way intentionality. 
Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition - p.313 - 
As there is no translational account then there is no need 
to posit some innate knowledge of language in order that the 
translation might begin, nor, for that matter, a picture of 
the language-user (infant or adult) as some sort of 
linguist. The recurrent problem of circularity is avoided 
because verbal meaning is not being explained by means of 
something which presupposes such meaning. Thus when 
Davidson rejects what he takes to be Wittgenstein's use of a 
meaning-assumed non-verbal base of functions to explain 
verbal meaning (see p.141) on the grounds of circularity it 
can now be seen that such a rejection is misconceived. The 
non-verbal base, as elaborated here, does not (and cannot, 
without introducing a translational account of meaning) 
explain verbal meaning in the way Davidson assumes. 
Linguistic meaning, once it is located in a social context, 
is explained holistically, by its location, by the criteria 
of practice given in the particular context itself located 
in the wider context of the form of life. Moreover, it 
explains the non-verbal base which is not in some sense 
mystical and beyond verbal explanation. Indeed, Davidson's 
use of "non-linguistic" is such that it is far from clear 
whether he would allow the term to include categories such 
as paralanguage and kinesics, where pre-linguistics would be 
a part of, but distinguishable within, the far broader area 
of non-linguistics. As it stands his use of "non-
linguistics" is no more than an attempt to prescribe one 
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aspect of communication as having some sort of communicative 
precedence over other aspects and, as has been shown, the 
prescription has difficulties when applied to the actual 
practice of communication (pp.168ff). 
Descriptivism's socially based description of meaning 
(p.247) thus avoids circularity, is internally consistent, 
especially as it avoids the apparent inconsistencies of 
relativism (pp.253ff), and by introducing the non-verbal 
aspect of communication would seem to provide a broader 
description of the phenomena it deals with than alternative 
accounts of meaning (pp.248ff). This last point needs 
qualifying in that the description provided of the 
pre-verbal base need elaborating in order that its adequacy 
can be judged, although the elaboration is consistent with 
what has gone before. Moreover, that elaboration accords 
with empirical work on the nature of the connection between 
the pre-verbal base and first-language acquisition (Section 
6, pp.266ff), so providing another reason for accepting the 
position as sound, in that it allows for the acquisition of 
one's first language (pp.257ff). 
At this point an important implication of this descriptivist 
metaphysic becomes obvious. Given that only internal 
criticisms of metaphysical positions are valid it might 
appear that there could be some form of relativism implied 
where one is presented with a library of alternative 
metaphysics and, assuming internal consistency, can make no 
Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition - p.315 - 
judgements between them. Such a situation is similar to 
that described by Walsh, in that we "need to enter into the 
thought of a metaphysician as we enter into that of a writer 
of imaginative literature" (Walsh 1963, p.18), but is not 
that presented in this thesis. If this were the case then 
the alternative metaphysical positions described could not 
be judged as, in the main, unacceptable. However, the 
criterion of first-language acquisition does provide a basis 
for choice between them, as has been shown. It would follow 
that if one applied appropriate aspects of the descriptivist 
account defended here to these alternative metaphysics then 
they might well appear more acceptable, whilst retaining 
their otherwise distinctive features('-). 
Rorty's distinction between impure and pure philosophy of 
language can, from this perspective, be seen as unsound. Of 
course, the fact that it could not even be made to apply to 
what seems a prima facie example of pure philosophy of 
language, Davidson's, has already cast doubt on its 
usefulness (p.160), but now it can be seen that Rorty's 
conception of language is far too narrow. There are more 
than his two aspects of philosophy of language, if only 
because language as described here can involve more than 
words. 
If the concept of language is expanded in the way suggested 
in this thesis then it can be seen that Rorty's approach is 
well within the paradigm of "present-day language theories 
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(which) do not make provision for nonverbal components ... 
in the structure of a sentence, even though these nonverbal 
acts are ubiquitous in the face-to-face interactions between 
human beings" (Key 1975, p.118). This is not to say that 
Rorty is in some sense wrong to draw these distinctions, 
only that, as with Augustine, and the early Wittgenstein, he 
is taking one aspect of language as the whole of the concept 
of language, further refining this aspect in a way that is 
not illegitimate so much as one-sided. Indeed, by 
legislating for only one aspect of the philosophy of 
language as warranting consideration those aspects of the 
philosophy of language which account for meaning and 
first-language acquisition are philosophically ruled out of 
court. In this way Rorty can now be seen as working within 
such a delimited framework that one hesitates to give it the 
general term philosophy of "language". 
The traditional empiricists and rationalists operated with a 
double and single translational conception of meaning 
respectively (p.42). The criticism here was not directed 
against the privacy of their referent, Ideas, but rather the 
fact that without compromising the other elements of its 
position neither could properly account for language being 
first acquired. However, if one were to develop the 
empiricists' emphasis on the "world" such that sensory 
impressions could be received from the social as well as the 
physical world then, with some development of their 
associationist psychology, it might be possible to include 
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non-verbal phenomena as being a part of their philosophy of 
language(2). 	 If this were included then the infinite 
regression of explaining Ideas by means of further Ideas 
(p.31) would be halted, as there would then be an 
identifiable point at which the world, qua social, met 
Ideas, comparable to the way in which Wittgenstein explains 
meaning in a non-circular way. 
Thus by recognising the existence and relevance of the 
non-verbal aspect of language traditional empiricists might 
well be able to retain their version of an ideational 
philosophy of language, for they could then account for 
first-language acquisition. At this point, of course, one 
is then left with an alternative description of meaning as 
Idea-based, rather than socially based, the latter being 
preferred to the former because the pre-verbal component is 
a social, not an ideational, phenomenon. In this way, then, 
by accepting the importance of non-verbal phenomena in 
understanding meaning traditional empiricists would be 
accepting a Trojan horse, in that such an acceptance would 
appear to destroy the very basis, Ideas, of their position. 
The traditional rationalists' interpretation of Ideas as 
being mind (or God)-dependent is one that appears to exclude 
the social world and the behavioural manifestations of 
non-verbal communication. Given their single-translation 
account of meaning then it might appear that Ideas, as they 
are innate, cannot make use of the pre-verbal 
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(pre-Ideational) by definition. 
However, it was argued that the physical world works so as 
to actualize potential Ideas (p.40) and thus it could be 
claimed that at this point non-verbal phenomena function as 
an actualizer of Ideas. In this way an important, and 
crippling, aspect of the traditional rationalists' work is 
altered, for if meaning were not solely Idea-dependent then 
it would be possible for meaning to develop without 
necessarily making reference to the contradictory (in their 
terms) notion of an Idea-free God (p.41). As with the 
empiricists, however, to identify an area of meaning which 
is not necessarily dependent upon ideas casts into doubt the 
bedrock of the Ideational theory. 
The traditionalists, then, are impaled upon the horns of a 
dilemma. They can either retain their Ideational accounts 
of language and thus not explain first-language acquisition, 
or, in accepting the non-verbal, explain the latter but cast 
doubt upon the former. The non-Ideational philosophy of 
modern empiricism and rationalism of Quine and Chomsky 
respectively had, however, different problems. 
Quine's central problem, that of his reference meaning 
theories expressed in terms of Observation Sentences, 
produced a gap between non-verbal referents and their 
expression in language which he could not bridge (pp.80ff). 
However, if he were to take cognisance of the non-verbal 
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aspect of meaning then there would be no need to see a gap, 
shakily bridged by some form of behaviourism and 
referentialism. If language were perceived of as part of a 
variety of social practices, as involving both verbal and 
non-verbal phenomena, then the circularity of explaining 
first-language acquisition by means of language-based skills 
(pp.84-85) would be avoided. 
The problems of radical translation similarily alter, for 
there would be more to aid translation than the sealed 
verbal unit of the language under consideration and the 
concept of translation itself alters. In Quine's case the 
addition of the phenomenon of one-way, non-verbal 
communication to his account of first-language acquisition 
provides a means of moving away from his flawed reliance on 
Observation Sentences as the basic tool used by infant 
translators. 
As has already been suggested, the assumption of an 
unproblematical analogy between the activity of 
first-language acquisition and that of translating one 
language into another is a dangerous one, not least because 
it suggests that the pre-linguistic child has something 
linguistic to parallel the language which the mature 
translator is working from. However, if the considerations 
advanced earlier hold, then the model for the pre-linguistic 
child is that of the adult translating the child's 
behaviours and so the problem of the indeterminacy of 
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translation for the child does not exist. Rather, the 
assumption of meaning by the adult brings with it a 
determinacy of meaning, whereby the adult's interpretation 
of the child's behaviour becomes the child's meaning too, 
with, to begin with at least, no reliance upon Observation 
Sentences. 
There is, then, no indeterminacy of translation here, for 
determinacy is provided by the adult's use of language. 
Such an addition also has the effect of removing the purely 
sensory base to his empiricism, replacing it with a social 
base (and so remove problems of referential inscrutability) 
and at this point it becomes difficult to distinguish this 
re-worked "empiricism" from Wittgenstein's later work. In 
effect, Quine's acceptance of the existence of innate 
mechanisms of language readiness (1969a, p.196) can be 
interpreted as a form of Wittgenstein's argument concerning 
natural history, with the proviso that these mechanisms are 
to be taken as operating in the context of non-verbal 
communication as opposed to Occasion Sentences. 
Indeed, this re-working has marked similarities to the 
re-working of the Tractatus in which the reliance on 
elementary propositions (which parallel Observation 
Sentences) to bridge the gap between the empirical world and 
language (Occasion Sentences) is replaced with a view of 
language which does not require elementary propositions. 
Occasion Sentences are, then, interpreted as Observation 
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Sentences by reference to the holism of the appropriate 
context and so the addition of the non-verbal aspect to 
meaning here allows for such sentences/propositions to drop 
out as irrelevant. 
The case of Chomsky's rationalism is quite different, for 
the acceptance of non-verbal phenomena as being relevant to 
his concerns effectively destroys his position (as was 
noticed earlier - pp.257-258). His perception of the 
dualist nature of language is such that once the non-verbal 
dimension of meaning is added to his account the need to 
give an explanation of the apparent deep-structure of 
language vanishes. If the postulate of "deep" linguistic 
universals is replaced with the concept of .a potential for 
social behavior then the theory of the infant-as-linguist is 
replaced by a description of the infant-as-socialiser. That 
is, linguistic universals and their accompanying grammar are 
presented as a hypothesis to explain the nature of language 
and its acquisition, but if language is more than 
linguistics then this hypothesis does not fit what it 
purports to describe. 
Moreover, the ambiguity of the concept of "creativity" in 
Chomsky's identification of a problem in accounting for the 
creativity of language acquisition (see Cooper 1975, 
pp.101-110) results in a weakening of this supposed 
empirical support for his innateness hypothesis. The sense 
of "creativity" that Chomsky requires to lend empirical 
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support to his innateness hypothesis is one that stresses 
the fact that the new sentences which the child actually 
produces are so unlike those which it has experienced that 
they could not be acquired by some form of finite 
experiential learning, but rather by the operation of some 
sort of innate knowledge. 
Consideration of the non-linguistic context identified 
earlier is again relevant here. The activity of 
first-language acquisition does not seem to be one that is 
best described in terms of the child acquiring language and 
its structures, but rather in terms of the adult inferring 
language (and, perhaps, its structures) upon certain of the 
child's non-linguistic behaviours. The creativity (that is, 
the fact that new sentences are created and understood) of 
the child's subsequent understanding and production of 
language seems better described in Halliday's functional 
terms, whereby the increasing complexity of the child's 
social and linguistic situations require the child to 
function in a particular way, not by defining "creativity" 
and "language" in such a way that an innateness hypothesis 
is required to give meaning to the definitions. Indeed, 
there is much empirical work to suggest that the more 
stunted the social context the slower the rate of linguistic 
development, which contradicts Chomsky's claim that the 
social context of language development is irrelevant. There 
is a distinction to be drawn between first acquiring 
language and developing what is acquired, but both precede 
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within a social context and the richer the context the 
richer the development. 
All that would be left of Chomsky's rationalism by such 
considerations of the non-linguistic context within which 
language is first acquired would be the postulate of a 
surface-structure of language and its related practices; and 
here a grammatical approach is singularly inappropriate, as 
functional linguists have recognised (see for example, the 
claim that here "grammaticality is irrelevant" - Key 1975, 
p.125). That the non-verbal aspect of communication 
"contradicts the conditions of language-acquisitions 
postulated by Chomsky" (Oksaar 1977, p.149) indicates the 
nature of the problem, for it is not just his theory of 
language-acquisition which is contradicted, but also his 
meaning theory and "philosophy" of language. All that is 
left of linguistic rationalism is his minor claim that 
phrase structure analyses of language are less elegant than 
his transformational analysis, a debatable point about one 
highly specific aspect of communication, where both types of 
analyses ignore the way in which their work requires a 
social context to give them substance. 
Davidson's sentential empiricism, drawing as it does on 
aspects of the work of both Quine and Chomsky, was found to 
have certain difficulties taken from both. Thus the crucial 
understanding of the nature of convention T cannot be 
acquired by the infant ex natura rei, and sentential 
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primitives thus cannot be acquired by the infant. However, 
if the non-verbal aspects of communication were added to 
Davidson's work (a move he would, of course, oppose in that 
he believes circularity results) then the whole thrust of 
his work pivots. Clearly a sentential concept such as truth 
cannot apply to non-sentential phenomena (unless, perhaps, 
one were to translate it into "infelicities ... flaws and 
hitches" - Austin 1955, pp.137) and so the truth-functional 
aspect of his theory would have to be seen as only applying 
to a part of the activity of communication. It would then 
have lost its function of attempting to explain how language 
is first acquired (p.158 - though not the acquisition of 
subsequent languages), for it in turn would need acquiring 
as part of the socialisation process identified previously. 
However, Davidson's Principle of Charity can then be seen as 
applying not only to interpretation from one language to 
another but also, with Davidson, as applying to the 
interpretations involved in first-language acquisition. 
Here, though, the interpreter is the adult, not the infant, 
and "charity" is required at the point where the adult 
infers intentions in non-verbal behaviour. In doing so the 
infant is encouraged in its communicative behaviour and, 
eventually, into producing convention T-based sentences. 
Sentence-based primitives then drop out as irrelevant, being 
replaced with non-sentential behaviour interpreted through 
the Principle of Charity as meaningful behaviour. 
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In this way such a re-working of Davidson alters the concept 
of "interpreter" in the context of first-language 
acquisition, because the adult is not so much interpreting 
the infant's behaviour as representing another language, but 
imposing upon that behaviour the adult's own language. At 
this point then, Quine's radical indeterminacy thesis (p.74) 
is rejected, for there does exist a reference point to act 
as a criterion for success in identifying meaning, namely 
the language of the adult that the child is presumed to be 
acquiring. That is, the requirement of "interpretation" 
that there be two languages, the infant's and the adult's, 
is replaced with the realisation that there is but one, the 
adult's, and the adult accepts certain of the infant's 
behaviour as being a part of that language. 
Davidson would then be left with his sentential empiricism, 
the non-sentential aspect of communication being grafted on 
so as to account for first-language acquisition. Moreover 
this graft makes uses of Davidson's own Principle of Charity 
to justify the introduction of intensionality into his work, 
for the intentions here are one-way (inferred by the adult 
onto the infant's behaviours) and so circularity is avoided. 
Such an addition merely enlarges the scope of his work 
without rejecting it out of hand, this further holism being 
less of a problem than it was to the positions already 
Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition - p.326 - 
mentioned. In effect Davidson deals with the extensional 
aspect of language but requires an explicit account of the 
one-way extensional language used by mothers to children 
(which, from another perspective, is one-way 
intensionality). This last can be provided if he could 
somehow bring the non-verbal dimension of language into his 
account although, as Austin has shown, the question as to 
whether or not the concept of truth applies here is far from 
easy to answer, a question which is crucial to Davidson's 
truth-functional account of language. 
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This thesis has attempted to justify a particular, 
descriptivist, approach to meaning by relating it to a . 
 
similar approach to first-language acquisition. In doing so 
the thesis has identified one phenomenon that any 
"philosophy" of language must account for, such that, if a 
philosophy of language fails to do so, then such a failure 
is a prima facie reason for rejecting that philosophy, a 
repudiation the more damaging because the rejection rests 
firmly upon the presuppositions of that philosophy itself. 
Conversely, accounts of first-language acquisition have been 
shown to rest upon presuppositions of meaning and language 
such that if these are criticized then little is left of the 
substantive accounts themselves. 
Given the mutual entailments operating between philosophy of 
language, meaning theory and first-language acquisition 
then, as both the second and third subject areas have been 
shown to require the addition of the non-verbal aspect of 
meaning, the philosophy of language has effectively been 
translated into the "philosophy" of them both, the verbal 
and the non-verbal, the philosophy of communication 
theory(3). In enlarging the scope of the philosophy of 
language in this way the thesis points to contexts where 
meaning can be expressed utilising the varieties of 
non-verbal communication. At this point the descriptivist 
philosopher and the functional linguist merge to become 
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social anthropologists, studying the nature of the 
phenomenon of communication from its potential beginnings in 
simple non-verbal behaviour through to its actualisation in 
the complexities of that behaviour we call language, where 
there is meaning with and without words. 
*************** 
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NOTES 
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SECTION II  
1. This is taken from Kenny's (1967) translation. 
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SECTION III  
1. As opposed to connotative meanings which, for Frege, are 
subjective and therefore part of Conceptions (Frege 1892, 
p.212). 
2. It should be noted that he calls his position "Logical 
Empiricism" (Ayer 1936, p.179). 
3. Observation Sentences may, in fact, consist of only one 
word. 
4. Quine's position is clearly opposed to traditional 
realism, in particular the traditional realist's 
correspondence theory of truth. However, Quine does 
share aspects of a realist conception of meaning, in 
particular the view that social practice on its own 
cannot account for meaning. Thus in Stoutland's terms 
Quine could be classified as an "anti-realist" without at 
the same time rejecting all aspects of realism (Stoutland 
1989, pp.101-107). 
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SECTION IV 
1. The reference is to his account of language acquisition, 
but this is a function of his empiricism. 
2. There is, of course, a change in Chomsky's expression of 
this thesis between 1957 and 1965 (see Greene 1972, pp.50 
and 89). it should be stressed that I am here describing 
Chomsky's account of sentence structure, rather than of a 
grammar's rules, hence conceptual dualism rather than 
grammatical "tripilism". With Cooper (1975, p.13), this 
is to concentrate on the syntactic aspect of grammar. 
3. At this stage the distinction between optional and 
obligatory transformations has disappeared (see Greene 
1972, p.53). 
4. In Stoutland's terms Plato and Chomsky appear to share 
the traditional realist view that meaning is epistemic 
(op.cit., p.99). 
5. Huxley's example of the problem of "sleep-teaching" comes 
to mind here (Huxley 1932, p.19). 
6. It is perhaps significant that although he and Katz 
(1975) were prepared to deal with Cooper's earlier (1972) 
criticisms, Chomsky completely ignores Cooper's later 
more thoroughgoing critique (Cooper 1975), not even 
referring to it in 1980 in the publication whose title 
identifies precisely that area of his work that Cooper 
claims is "bankrupt" and "incoherent" (op.cit. p.77). 
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SECTION Va 
1. Given the mutual implication described in Section I it 
follows that those who give accounts of the child's 
acquisiton of its first language are, ex natura rei, 
properly concerned with philosophical matters. 
2. I have here avoided the detail of Tarski's argument and 
criticisms of it, but these "equivalences of the form 
(T)" are, of course, his T sentences (Tarski 1944, 
p.55). His condition of material adequacy for a 
definition of truth, convention T, for a language is, 
then a matter of providing a "complete list, or way of 
showing how to calculate a T-sentence for each sentence 
of the language" (Blackburn 1984, p.271). 
3. This alternative to Formal Semantics has been labelled 
the theory of Communication-Intention, where meaning is 
described by "reference to the possession by speakers 
of audience-directed intentions of a certain complex 
kind" (Strawson 1969, p.171), the communications 
sub-group being represented by Austin and Searle (who, 
in fact, lay greater stress on the rule-governed nature 
of the process), the intentions sub-group by Grice and 
Bennett, these representatives being suggested by 
Harrison (1979, chpt.11 passim). 
4. It should be stressed that Davidson's opposition to 
traditional realism, in particular its epistemic 
conception of meaning, results in only certain aspects 
of realism being combined with nominalism. Stoutland 
claims that his attempt to find an alternative to the 
dichotomy between realism and anti-realism is, in 
effect, a way of explaining how Davidson can 
consistently oppose both realism and anti-realism (op.  
cit., p.109, note 19). However, it is not clear how 
Davidson's acceptance of a theory of absolute truth 
(Davidson 1977b, p.225) and Stoutland's rejection of 
such a theory can be made to cohabitate. 
5. In passing it is worth noting that Cooper (1973b) 
approaches the philosophy of language with synonymy as 
the major problem that meaning theories must account 
for, but without Davidson's bias towards a formal 
account of truth. 
6. But note that "truth conditions are not to be equated 
with meanings" (Davidson 1982, footnote 3; 1970, p.56). 
There is then no single or double-translation account 
of meaning with the attendant problems examined in 
previous sections of this thesis. 
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7. His aim is "to extract a rich concept (here something 
reasonably close to translation) from thin bits of 
evidence (here the truth values of sentences) by 
imposing a formal structure on enough bits" (Davidson 
1973a, p.74). 
8. The move from sense to sentence is particularly clear 
when one considers the different "primitives" of each 
theory. For Quine sensory information is primitive, 
for Davidson a "learnable language has a finite number 
of semantical primitives" (Davidson 1965, p.9). 
9. Where the coherence is with truth expressed in 
sentences and behaviour, rather than with the rest of 
language. 
10. Schematically his account could be represented thus: 
Re Formal Languages - Frege + Tarski > Convention T 
Re Natural Languages - Quine > Principle of Charity 
Account of Meaning 
11. Or that the supposedly extreme cases of meaning where 
there is little contact with the basic shared framework 
of truth are, in fact, the ordinary cases. If this 
were so then his truth-based account of communication 
founded in agreement would be irrelevant. 




Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus = TLP - written 1921, 
published 1921). 
MIDDLE: 
Philosophical Remarks = PR - written 1929-1930, 
published 1979. 
Culture and Value = CV - written 1931 and 1937, 
published 1973. 
"Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough" = RFB - written 
1931 and 1948, published 1967. 
The Blue and Brown Books = BBB - written 1933-1935, 
published 1958. 
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics = RFM -
written 1937-1944, published 1956. 
Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology 
and Religious Belief = LC - written 1938-1946, 
published 1966. 
LATE: 
Zettel = Z - written 1945-1948, published 1967. 
Philosophical Investigations = PI - written 1945-1949, 
published 1953. 
On Certainty = OC - written 1949-1951, published 1974. 
Remarks on Colour = RC - written 1950, published 1977. 
2. For example, there are important differences in the 
relation of sense, names and meaning, and also in their 
treatment of propositional logic (see Kenny 1973, 
chpt.2, passim). 
3. The nature of this presumption is such that he is 
forced to conclude that we have "a priori knowledge of 
the possibility of ontological form" (ib. 6.33). 
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4. The absurdity of the whole undertaking is accepted by 
Wittgenstein himself when he writes that a proper 
understanding of his work involves recognising it as 
"nonsensical" (ib. 6.54). 
5. As will be argued later this is neither nominalism nor 
a form of extreme relativism but, with Stoutland a 
"social practice view" (op. cit., p.107) of meaning and 
truth. 
6. This is similar to the way in which Stoutland attempts 
to chart a path between what he perceives to be the 
failings of traditional realism and anti-realism (ib.). 
7. Its substantive 'filling' being given by the particular 
form of life under consideration. 
8. For "experience does not direct us to derive anything 
from experience" (0C p.19e, s.130). 
9. Contra the transitionary period of his thought, where 
gestures' understanding were necessary for 
first-language acquisition (see p.198). 
10. Which is done, for example, in the Investigations by 
learning the language of the builders (PI s.2ff). 
11. Where the design of the argument is in the form of a 
monocoque, not that of chassis and body. 
12. Indeed Pears asserts he is anti-realist (Pears 1971, 
pp.140-141) but, in context, this can be read as the 
transcendental realism of the Tractatus. 
13. It is worth noting that Wisdom prefaces his short 
article with the warning that what he has to say is not 
based on any notes but only on memory. 
14. As Finch would accept (Finch 1977, p.74). 
15. Thus three aspects of Wittgenstein's work are subsumed 
under the term "form of life". This would allow for 
aspects of a form of life to be criticised internally 
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as "the axis of one's beliefs" altered, although not, 
of course, the whole form of life (Hinman 1983, p.345). 
In this way "form of life" is not, contra Specht, an 
"irreducible ultimate" (Specht 1963, p.49), for parts 
are reducible in terms of other parts. 
16. Later, because of what he perceives of as a vagueness 
in the term "forms of life" he is unsure whether it is 
a "charter for relativism" or, qua biological concept, 
an example of objectivism (Trigg 1985, p.27). On the 
interpretation offered in this thesis it could be 
either, with suitable qualifications. 
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SECTION VI  
1. And develops from it, for Saffra's Neapolitan gesture of 
contempt is supposed to have shown Wittgenstein the way 
in which propositions do not picture their reality 
(Malcolm 1958a, p.69), although it could also have quite 
literally indicated the way in which a proposition can 
be non-verbal. 
2. Which is to accept that "the child, as a result of its 
natural constitution, is a potential sharer in these 
forms of life and needs to be made an actual sharer in 
them" (Hamlyn 1978, p.106). 
3. Cf. Cooper's criticism of Chomsky, that "competence 
cannot be grasped independently of a speaker's 
performances under certain conditions" (Cooper 1975, 
p.129 )• 
4. Although this cut-off point is to be preferred to 
Tough's three years (Tough 1977, p.2). 
5. With Hamlyn, one is here anthropomorphizing the infant, 
but avoiding the extremes of empiricism and rationalism' 
(op.cit. pp.96-99). 
6. See also the proposal for an hermeneutical psychology 
which would include for study the way in which a mother 
treats her infant "as though he were a person, a being 
already having, though perhaps unable to express, 
conscious needs, desires, wishes and intentions" (Gauld 
and Shotter 1977, p.201). 
7. In passing it is worth remarking that this view results 
in an abandonment of any need to invent fictitious 
examples of creatures such as a Cyclopes whose 
"non-linguistic behaviour shows it to be rational" (Kirk 
1967, p.370). 
8. And not (contra Macnamara 1977b, p.12) that Wittgenstein 
is rejecting the non-verbal aspect of communication. 
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SECTION VII  
1. This is possible because of the links betweeen 
philosophy of language, meaning theory and first 
language acquisition, where the one mutually entails the 
other (see below, Note 3). 
2. Ideas are, of course, also non-verbal, but not in the 
behaviourally public sense used here. For this reason 
they cannot aid social communication. 
3. The schema produced previously (p.19) now alters in the 
following way: 
(where PL = Philosophy of Language 
MT = Meaning Theory 
FLA = First Language Acquisition 
PC = Philosophy of Communication 
CT = Communication Theory) 
Originally: PL<->MT<->FLA 
But: MT and FLA require the 
non-verbal 
So : PL expands to become the 
philosophy of communication 
and MT becomes communication 
theory (so as to include both 
verbal and non-verbal 
phenomena) 
Thus: 	 PC<->CT<->FLA 
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